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This thesis is a study in which the authors define and develop a U.S. Army require-
ment for automatic generation and distribution of near real time battlefield information
for command and control. This information consists of identification, position, combat
posture, and operational readiness, and allows commanders and stalls to more elTectively
and efiiciently command and control U.S. forces on the AirLand battlefield. The pro-
posed system interfaces with and complements the Army Tactical Command and Con-
trol System. Methodologies are developed and applied to determine operational and
organizational requirements. A technical solution to the stated requirement is proposed
and developed. The tecl .l^il concept integrates mature, off the shelf, ver\' low fre-
quency, radar beacon and computer technologies in a reahstic, technically feasible ap-
proach to generate the desired battlefield information. A methodology to assess
operational merit is developed and applied to the concept. The proposed solution is
shown to be a low cost, low risk, high payolf system which meets the stated requirement.
The product of this work is an Operational and Organizational Plan.
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THESIS DISCLAIMER
The beliefs and concept set forth in this tliesis are the result of extensive research,
professional and technical discussions, and the author's military experiences. Where
appropriate, the authors have cited references and given credit to others for their ideas
and concepts. Any parallels or likeness between the concept espoused in this thesis and
other concepts or proposed command and control systems is unintentional and purely
coincidental.
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I. THE COMMANDER'S NEEDS
A. COMMAND AND CONTROL OF AIRLAND BATTLE
1. Command and Control
Command and control is defined as, "...the exercise of autliority and direction
by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the
mission." [Ref l:p. 77]. Command and control is an intangible, it is not a commodity
that a commander can requisition or touch, yet it is something that every commander
knows he must possess or exercise if he is to succeed. A commander's force may be very
large and possess tremendous firepower or combat potential but these attributes are
worthless if a commander cannot effectively employ that force, transform its combat
potential into combat power, and bring it to bear on the enemy at the critical time and
place. Command and control is the essential ingredient that will enable a commander
to perform that transformation. It is the synergistic catalyst which enables a commander
of a smaller force to defeat a larger force.
2. A Command and Control System
To effectively exercise command and control (C2) over their assigned forces,
commanders have developed command and control systems. A command and control
system is defined as, "...the facilities, equipment, communications, procedures and per-
sonnel essential to a commander for planning, directing, and controlling operations of
assigned forces pursuant to the missions assigned." [Ref. l:p. 77].
A command and control system is a tool which a commander will use to plan,
direct, and control his forces. To effectively use this tool a commander must have a
process or organized manner of directing the tool's energy so as to realize the most
benefit from its employment. A commander must have a command and control process
which will enable him to efficiently employ his command and control system and provide
effective command and control to his force thereby accomplishing the assigned mission.
3. The Command and Control Process
J.S. Lawson Jr. has developed a model of the command and control process.
In his model, Lawson defined the process as one consisting of an environment, five pri-
mary functions, and extraneous factors. These elements are unique and can be described
as follows:
1. The environment consists of the commander's forces, his enemy's forces, and the
combat environment (the mission, the time he has available to execute the mission
and tlie natural environment in which the forces will interact).
2. The five primary' functions the C2 system must perform are: sense, process, com-
pare, decide, and act.
3. The extraneous factors which the system must consider are: external data, the
desire to reach a specified state, and decision aids
The first step of the process is to 'sense' the environment has changed. This
sensing is the result of data being received about the environment. This data is proc-
essed and integrated with external information to produce an estimate of the situation.
This estimate is compared to a desired state that the commander wishes the environment
would represent. The commander then decides if the environment and the desired state
are similar. If they are not, he must take some action to alter the environment and to
cause it to conform to the desired state. Figure 1 is an illustration of the Lawson
Command and Control Process Model. [Ref 2:p. 24]
As previously discussed, the command and control process is applied by a
commander's C2 svstem to the environment. A measure of effectiveness for a C2 svstem
and its apphcation of the C2 process, is a function of Lawson's environment. To put it
more succinctly, "...it is a function of friendly forces, enemy forces, and the combat en-
vironment." [Ref 3]. The sections which follow will discuss the effect those three en-
vironmental elements have on a modern C2 system's design.
B. C2 SYSTEM DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
1. Friendly Forces
a. AivLand Battle Doctrine
To successfully conduct mihtary operations the U.S. Army has developed a
doctrine known as AirLand Battle. This doctrine has been defined as follows: "...the
U.S. Army's basic fighting doctrine. ...it reflects the structure of modern warfare, the dy-
namics of c^m.bat power, and the application of the classical principles of war to con-
temporary battlefield requirements." [Ref 4:p. 9].
This definition identifies three kev elements that are intecrated into the
AirLand Battle doctrine. Each of these key elements represents a unique aspect of war
which impacts on the development and execution of doctrine. The elements and their
meaning under the AirLand Battle (ALB) doctrine are as follows:
• The Structure of iModern Warfare: describes the modern battlefield on which
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Figure 1. Lavvson's Command and Control Process
• The Dynamics of Combat Power: deals with the generation of combat power and
a commander's application of it to the AirLand battlefield.
• The Principles of War on the Contemporary Battlefield: describes the incorpo-
ration of the nine basic principles of war into the AirLand Battle Tenets and Im-
peratives. Through the tenets and imperatives the commander will apply combat
power to the modem battlefield and achieve his objective.
b. TJie AirLand Battlefield
The AirLand battlefield will be an area of dynamic action. Combat oper-
ations on this battlefield will be executed at greater speeds, with greater lethality, and
destruction than ever before. This battlefield will be a complex, multidimensional battle
area that will integrate both air and land combat operations in combined arms oper-
ations. The concept of integrated combat operations requires the Army to be prepared
to plan and conduct combat operations on a three dimensional battlefield. Future bat-
tles will be fought across the full width of the battlefield, at great depths along the bat-
tlefield, and in the third dimension, the airspace above the battlefield.
The three dimensional battle area requires a command and control system
that can simultaneously plan, control, and direct combat operations in all three dimen-
sions. Figure 2 illustrates the multidimensional characteristics of the AirLand battle-
field.
The concept of fighting in three dimensions is compounded by the fact that
AirLand Battle doctrine also requires a commander to simultaneously conduct three
different operations while he fights, plans, and controls combat operations (battles) in
three dimensions. These battles are closely related to the three dimensions of AirLand




Deep operations are described as activities directed against enemy forces
that are not yet in contact with friendly forces along the front line Oi troops (FLOT).
Deep operations are designed to influence the conditions in which future close oper-
ations will be conducted. A principal objective of deep operations is to deny the enemy
commander the freedom of action. With deep operations, a commander will disrupt the
enemy's continuity of action and the tempo of his operations thereby causing him to
become responsive to the friendly commander's actions. [Ref. 4:p. 19]
Rear operations are described as activities conducted to the rear of elements
in contact. These operations are designed to ensure freedom ofmaneuver and continuity
of operations, including continuity of sustainment and maintenance of command and
control. Rear operations have little immediate impact on close operations, but are crit-
ical to subsequent operations, whether in exploiting success or recouping failure. Rear
operations are essential to ensure friendly forces defeat the enemy's operations in our
rear areas with minimum expenditure of resources. [Ref 4:p. 20]
Close operations are described as the current activities of major committed
combat elements, together with their immediate combat support and combat service
support. Close operations are those activities currently transpiring at the FLOT, at this
moment. Close operations bear the ultimate burden of victory or defeat. The measure
of success of deep and rear operations is their eventual impact on close operations.
[Ref. 4:p. 19]
As the last statement infers, none of these operations are conducted in iso-
lation and they each impact on the others. In view of this, they are graphically depicted
as three circles, with the center circle, close operations, being the focal point. Figure 3




Figure 2. The Dimensions of the AirLand Battlefield
Under AirLand Battle doctrine, commanders, at various levels of command,
must be concerned with conducting these three simultaneous operations. In addition,
commanders must conduct these operations on a three dimensional battlefield that may
be influenced by the use of: nuclear and chemical weapons, electronic warfare (E\V),
conventional weapons with greatly enhanced accuracy and lethality, high technology
sensors, and smart munitions.
A commander conducting operations on this battlefield may also have to
operate with joint or combined forces. The air assets operating above the commander
may belong to the U.S. Navy; the ground forces operating to the commander's left may
be from the U.S. Marine Corps; and the forces conducting operations on the
commander's right flank, might be a NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) ally.
Each of these participants adds its own set of doctrine, organizations, and equipment to
the complexity of the AirLand battlefield.
The AirLand Battle doctrine will be applied to a complex, multidimensional
battlefield. A commander operating on this battlefield requires a command and control
system that is capable of:
Figure 3. The Tliree Operations of AirLand Battle
• presenting the ^"'tlefield as a three dimensional battle area;
• displaying the battle in sufTicient width and depth to depict the commander's three
simultaneous operations;
• interfacinc with the command and control svstcms of other forces in joint and
combined operations;
• operating efficiently in spite of the enemy's electronic countermeasures;
•
• providing continuous operations in spite of nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC)
warfare.
2. Tlie Dynamics of Combat Power
The dynamics of combat power will decide the outcomes of campaigns, major
operations, battles and engagements. Combat power is the ability to fight; the abiUty
to alter the situation on the battlefield or change the environment. Combat power is




• leadership. [Ref 4:p. 11]
Maneuver is the dynamic element of combat. It is the means of concentrating
forces at the critical point to achieve surprise and shock, to attain momentum and moral
doniinance which enables smaller forces to defeat larger forces. [Ref 4:p. 1 1]
Firepower is the essential destructive force that defeats the enemy's physical and
mental commitment to fmht. It facilitates a force's abilitv to maneuver. Lone raniie
firepower confounds the enemy's ability to mass his forces at the critical time and place.
[Ref4:p. 12]
Protection is the conservation of fighting potential until the critical point is
reached. It includes all actions taken to lessen the effects of the enemy's efforts to em-
ploy maneuver or firepower against friendly forces. [Ref 4: p. 13]
Leadership provides the purpose, direction and motivation to the force. It is the
leader who will determine the degree to which maneuver, firepower, and protection are
maximized; who will ensure these elements are effectively balanced; and who will decide
how to bring them to bear against the enemy. It is the leader who must employ the
C2 system to its fullest to transform his force's combat potential into combat power.
Leadership is considered to be the most essential element of combat power.
[Ref 4:p. 13]
A command and control system that supports a commander under AirLand
Battle doctrine must enhance the dynamics of combat power. The system must assist,
not hinder, the commander as he endeavors to maximize maneuver and the firepower
of his force so as to bring them to bear on the enemy at the critical point. The command
and control system must permit free maneuver; it must not limit or dictate when and
where a force can go. This system must aid the commander's efforts to mass his
firepower; to increase his ability to deliver the destructive blow, at the critical time. The
system must also protect the force by not drawing attention to the fact that it exists.
The system must minimize its emission of signals that can be detected and ensure that
emitted signals cannot be exploited by the enemy.
3, The AirLand Battle Doctrine Tenets
The AirLand Battle doctrine is a formula for generating combat power. The
doctrine is based on securing and retaining the initiative and exercising it aggressively to
accomphsh the mission. The objective of AirLand Battle is to impose our will on the




• synchronization. [Ref 4:p. 14]
Initiative is the setting or changing of the terms of the battle by action. Initi-
ative implies an offensive spirit or nature; it is a willingness to accept risk when the cir-
cumstances are favorable. Initiative is a constant effort to compel the enemy to conform
to the commander's will. [Ref 4:p. 15]
Agility is the ability to act faster than the enemy; it is being able to work inside
or faster than his C2 process. Agility is necessary if the commander hopes to seize and
retain the initiative. It permits the rapid concentration of strengths against weaknesses.
For a commander to be 'agile' he must reduce 'friction' on the battlefield. Friction is,
"...the accumulation of chance errors and confusion on the battlefield." [Ref 2:p. 16].
It is, "...the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult. It is the product of the
many small mistakes, delays, miscalculations, and conflicts that occur...." [Ref 4:p. 8].
Depth is the extension of operations in space, time, and resources. Through
operations in depth, the commander obtains space for maneuver, time for planning and
time to acquire resources. The tenet of depth is applied when the commander plans to
fight three battles simultaneously: the deep battle, the rear battle, and the close battle.
[Ref 4:p. 16]
Synchronization is the arrangement of battlefield activity in time, space and
purpose to produce maximum combat power at the decisive point. Synchronization is
both a process and a desired result. Synchronous activities produce synchronized oper-
ations which overload the enemy's abihty to sense, decide, and act. Through synchro-
nization, "...the enemy's tempo and cohesion are shattered. Once this is achieved the
initiative is gained and the enemy will be presented with unexpected situations more
rapidly than he can deal with them." [Ref 5:p. 69].
Synchronization is the most difficult tenet to apply and the most difiicult attri-
bute to attain on the AirLand battlefield. It requires the commander to have knowledge
of all forces that are operating in his sector, regardless of their relation to his command.
This is necessary so all combat systems can function in harmony and fight as one cohe-
sive force. This is also how fratricide on a complex and confusing battlefield will be
avoided. If a commander cannot synchronize the activity of these forces in space, time,
and purpose, his efforts under AirLand Battle will fail. [Ref 4:p. 16]
The commander's AirLand Battle command and control system must embody
the AirLand Battle Tenets. The system must increase the commander's ability to reach
sound decisions by reducing uncertainty about the environment. It must reduce the
'friction' which is an inherent component of military operations. The command and
control system must reduce the stochastic nature of combat operations by providing the
commander with timely, accurate, and relevant information. The system must allow the
commander to confidently expand his operations in time and space while continuing to
maintain positive control over his assets.
Synchronization of battlefield activity must be a paramount concern of the
command and control system, "...a commander's focus must be oriented at all times to
his ability to synchronize his forces. His command and control effort (system) is the
primary means through which synchronization is achieved." [Ref 5:p. 71]. The system
must improve the commander's abihty to concentrate the maximum amount of combat
power at the most decisive point. Synchronization is the all essential tenet that the
command and control system must enhance. It is the keystone upon which success on
the AirLand battlefield rests. Without synchronization, a commander will not be capa-
ble of generating the combat power required to seize the initiative, apply agility, conduct
operations in depth, and defeat a numerically superior force. To obtain synchronization
the commander's C2 system must provide and present timely, accurate, and relevant in-
formation on all friendly forces operating in the commander's sector. With this infor-
mation, a commander can fuse all of the friendly forces into a truly combined arms team,
capable of fighting as one synchronized force.
4. The AirLand Battle Imperatives
The AirLand Battle Imperatives embody the principles of war in the doctrine.
The AirLand Battle Tenets will characterize a successful operation but the AirLand
Battle Imperatives are the essential elements that ensure success of an operation. A
correlation exists between the Imperatives and the functions found in Lawson's com-
m.and and control process model. In some cases this correlation is self evident and in
others it is not. The commander's C2 system must embody these imperatives and
through the C2 process must ensure they are appUed. The Imperatives of AirLand
Battle doctrine and their correlation with the C2 process functions are as follows:
• anticipate events on the battlefield; SENSE
• conserve strength for decisive action; PROCESS & COMPARE
• use terrain, weather, deception, and PROCESS & COMPARE
operations security;
• use combined arms, sister services, EVALUATE
and allied forces to complement and reinforce;
• ensure unity of effort; EVALUATE
• concentrate combat power against the EVALUATE
enemy s vulnerabiUties;
• understand the effects of battle on EVALUATE
soldiers, units and leaders;
• designate, sustain, and shift the main eflort; DECIDE
• press the fight; ACT
• move fast, strike hard, and finish quickly. ACT
[Ref. 4:pp. 22-26].
A C2 system that functions under the AirLand Battle doctrine must embody the
offensive spirit of its tenets and must enhance the commander's ability to apply its im-
peratives. This system must perform the five functions outlined in Lawson's C2 process
model. It must provide the commander with timely and accurate information on the
battlefield and it must provide a display so the commander can visualize (SENSE) the
events as they occur on the battlefield. The system should automatically and contin-
uously update itself (PROCESS and COMPARE) thereby enabling the commander to
designate (DECIDE) the most appropriate unit to assume a mission.
The AirLand Battle C2 system must not detract from the comander's efforts to
press the fight or exploit the situation (ACT). The system must enhance unity of effort
which is synonomous with synchronization and this goal must not be isolated to just one
unit, but must be extended to adjacent units, to the other services, and to our allies. The
AirLand Battle command and control system must be interoperable and capable of ex-
changing information with other C2 systems (EXTRANEOUS DATA).
5. Force Structure
The previous sections of this chapter addressed the AirLand battlefield and how
combat power is generated and applied to make the battlefield more conducive to our
operations and subsequent attainment of our goals. Before proceeding though, some
important aspects about the force structure (resources) which supports the Army
commander on the AirLand battlefield must be identified.
a. The Army of Excellence (AOE)
The Army of Excellence is the force structure which was developed to pro-
vide a viable and capable force to conduct combat operations under the AirLand Battle
doctrine. It satisfied a need for a, "...fighter-heavy, more deployable force that could be
delivered (to the AirLand battlefield) with minimum resources...." [Ref. 6:p. 1.3].
The AOE force structure realigned the resources available to form a more
solid and versatile combat force capable of successfully executing the AirLand Battle
doctrine on the modern battlefield. This realignment of resources has resulted in a
complex force structure which provides a commander with a greater variety and capa-
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bility for delivering destructive force to the battlefield than ever before. A commander
is no longer just concerned with controlling infantry, armor, artiller^^ or cavalry. To-
day's commander must be capable of synchronizing the operations of ten combat arms
or combat support organizations and eight combat support organizations. The
commander must exercise command and control over highly mobile and fast moving
ground and air forces functioning as one force in a combined arms team. He must have
a C2 system that can handle the diversity of participants and information which this
combined arms team will require and generate.
The AOE force structure is manpower lean and relies on technologically
advanced weapon systems to compensate for its reduced size. Today's technologically
advanced weapons systems are more accurate, lethal, and do provide greater amounts
of firepower than in the past, bur they are also more expensive. The result of increased
monetarv costs has been a reduction in the number of assets available. Commanders
today are stiU expected to perform the same missions as they did in the past and they
are expected to do it with fewer assets. To accomplish this, commanders must now
disperse their limited numbers of men and equipment over greater areas. This concept
of dispersal has resulted in an increase in the amount of area a unit must control. This
situation is compounded by the fact that today's enemy (usually considered to be the
Warsaw Pact) can also place greater amounts of lethal and accurate firepower on our
forces and has not been constrained by monetary concerns of his nation.
Historically, dispersal of assets has been the manner by which commanders
have coped with the increased lethality of modern weapon systems. Today's
commanders are also using dispersal to reduce the possibility of detection, which reduces
the possibility of becoming a lucrative target.
Figure 4 is a graphical display of how much acreage an infantry battalion
has become responsible for over time as technology has improved weapons and
commanders have dispersed forces. It is important to note that an anomaly exists be-
tween the size of an infantry battalion in 1865 and a current day AOE battalion. Both
are purported to contain approximately 800 men but in an AOE battalion, only 468 arc
actually combatants (riflemen or antitank crewmen). The remaining 332 men are sup-
port personnel. [Refs. 7:p. 23; 8:p. 2.14]
b. Command and Control on the AirLand battlefield
As dispersal of units and the complexity of the force structure has increased,
the commander's ability to effectively command and control his forces has decreased.
H
CIVIL WAR 20 ACRES
WORLD WAR I .160 ACRES ZI7
WORLD WAR II .400 ACRES ^17
PRESENT 18,000 ACRES
Figure 4. Historical Dispersion and Coverage
Where a commander once executed positive control over his forces, he now must rely
on procedural control. Procedural control infers a reliance upon previously arranijcd
procedures or orders. The commander must rely on his subordinates and must believe
that they understood the intent of his order and are executing it properly. In this case
the commander will only know what his subordinates tell him through reports that are
normally filed in accordance with standard operating procedures (SOPs).
Historically, positive control inferred the commander had the ability to see
and influence the entire battlefield from his command post. Today positive control in-
fers a commander, using electronic devices, can automatically acquire information on the
battlefield situation and can apply effective command and control from his command
post. If a commander had a C2 system that provided positive control, the commander
would not have to rely on his subordinates to report their actions and the commander
would be able to see whether the intent of his order was understood and whether it was
being executed. To a degree, positive control reduces the subordinate's responsibility to
be part of the commander's 'SENSE' function in the C2 process and it allows the sub-
ordinate to apply his time and energy to other critical tasks (e.g.: seizing the initiative).
With positive control the commander will be more capable of sensing and evaluating the
situation from his command post.
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With only procedural control, the commander is operating with a less ef-
fective command and control system. The commander is relying on his subordinates to
see and, more importantly, to report the situation. The subordinates' abihty to do this
have a direct influence on a commander's ability to generate combat power, to ensure
unity of effort, and to synchronize the activities of his units in time, space, and purpose.
The commander on the AirLand battlefield must have a C2 system that
employs a mixture of positive and procedural control. Positive control should be the
primary mode of operation and procedural control should be the alternative or back-up.
For a commander to maximize his overall force effectiveness at the decisive
point, he must know: where his units are; what they beheve their mission is; what their
tactical posture is; and what their operational readiness/ status is. As a minimum, the
AirLand Battle command and control system must provide the commander with this
information.
6. The Seven Command and Control Actions
The Army has developed it's own version of the Lawson's command and control
process model. The Army's model is based on the AirLand Battle doctrine and the re-
quirements it places on a commander to:
• simultaneously fight three battles, on a three dimensional battlefield;
• be constantly alert for chances to seize the initiative;
• think and act faster than his opponents;
• bring maximum combat power to bear at the critical point;
• force his will on the enemy.
To assist the commander in accomphshing these tasks, the Army's C2 model
has identified seven command and control actions. These actions correspond directly to
the five functions found in Lawson's model. The seven actions and the corresponding
function are hsted below:
1. see the situation; SENSE
2. evaluate the situation; COMPARE
3. develop the plans; DECIDE
4. allocate resources to support the plans; DECIDE
5. coordinate the resources; DECIDE
6. fight the battles; ACT
7. sustain the force [Ref 9.:p. IS). ACT
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Of the seven actions, 'seeing the situation' and 'evaluating the situation' can be
considered the most important. These two actions are the initial steps in any decision
making or problem solving process. If a commander or staff does not see or sense a
change in the environment, he/it will not be capable of accurately evaluating the situ-
ation. If either of the first two steps are not executed properly, the remaining five steps
will be an exercise in futihty.
The commander's abiUty to 'see the situation' is driven by the Army's ability to
gather information on friendly and enemy forces. The enemy does not openly and freely
invite the Army to gather information on it and that information which is gathered, is
often clouded by the enemy's use of deception. The enemy's situation is a perceived one.
It may be ver\^ accurate or it may be totally inaccurate. The commander has little ca-
pability to control this fact.
The commander's ability to 'see the friendly situation' is driven by his subordi-
nate commander's and staffs ability to provide desired information. This information
should be more accurate because the element of deception is absent. This is not always
the case because the commander must rely on his subordinates to manually generate this
information.
The current AirLand Battle C2 system is based on procedural control. The
system is manpower intensive and slow. It relies on people to generate, encrypt, ex-
change, decode, interpret, post, and analyze information. This process involves seven
steps and may be reiterated at many echelons of command before the information re-
aches the commander or staff that needs it. This means the probability of errors entering
the information increases and the timeliness of the information is degraded.
The commander and staff must be provided information tnat is timely, accurate
and of high resolution. The commander and staff must have a C2 system that will au-
tomatically collect, verify, fuse, filter, disseminate and display information in a usable
format. If the commander and staff have a robust and versatile C2 system as described,
this seven step process will be reduced to two steps, interpret and analyze. This re-
duction of workload means the commander and staff will be able to direct more time to
interpreting and analyzing information and on developing better plans. This redirection
of time and effort will enable the commander to seize the initiative, to be more agile than
his opponent, to synchronize activities on the battlefield and to strike in depth to ac-
complish his assigned mission.
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7. The Command, Control and Subordinate System
The Command, Control and Subordinate System (CCS2) architecture integrates
the C2 systems of five battlefield functional areas into the Army's Tactical Command
and Control System (ATCCS), an element of the Army's Command and Control Master
Plan (AC2xVIP). The CCS2 assists commanders and staffs in effectively transferring and
organizing information which supports operations on the AirLand battlefield.
[Ref. 10:p. 8]
The CCS2 is structured around five battlefield functional areas (BFA). Each
BFA consists of one or more of the Army's basic branches. The list which follows
identifies the five battlefield functional areas and their respective branches.
1. Maneuver:
Infantry (Close Combat Light),

















Staff Judge Advocate Corps,
Adjutant Generals Corps,
Finance Corps,
Chaplains Corps. [Ref. 9]
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All of the missions and operations at the tactical level fall under one of these five
functional areas. All of the plans a commander develops or executes will be influenced
in some way by these functional areas and will require interaction between most if not
all of the branches. [Ref 10] Figure 5 depicts the CCS2 architecture [Ref 10:p. 4.9].
The architecture is hierarchical in nature, extending from corps down to the
lowest tactical levels. At each echelon the architecture is replicated and the echelons are
linked through the functional area commanders. Each functional area commander at a
specific echelon is responsible for receiving and processing information from higher and
lower echelons within his functional area. The functional area commanders then dis-
seminate this information, as appropriate, to the other functional areas on their respec-
tive level or echelon. Figure 6 displays the hierarchy which exists in the CCS2.
[Ref 9:p. 22]
The architecture is linked or supported by a communications network which
consists of three components. These components are:
• the combat radio system;
• the area common user system;
• the area data distribution system. [Ref 9:p. 9]
Figure 7 reflects how these systems not only interface with all five of the CCS2
functional areas but also interface with each other. The network's ability to interface
allows a functional area commander to communicate both horizontally and vertically
throughout the architecture. [Ref 10:p. 9]
The CCS2 architecture supports the commander's decision making process by
estabUshing baselines for coordination and communications within and across BFA C2
systems. As future BFA C2 systems are fielded, the CCS2 will provide a means of
identifying requirements for connectivity. Future C2 systems must be fully integrated
into CCS2 and should employ ATCCS common hardware and software to ensure max-
imum interoperabilty. The CCS2 is the vehicle that will enable commanders and staffs
operating on the AirLand battlefield to realize the full potential of automated C2 sys-
tems. This architecture will enhance their ability to exchange, receive, process, and filter
information. Automation, in conjunction with the CCS2, will enable a commander to
exercise positive control over his forces on the AirLand battlefield.
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Figure 5. Command, Control and Subordinate System (CCS2)
8. Materiel
a. Combat Systems
As previously stated, the weapon systems in the U.S. Army are the most
lethal and most mobile that it has ever possessed. A commander today has phenomenal
amounts of destructive capability at his disposal. Systems such as the Multiple Launch
Rocket System, the M-1 Abrams Tank, and the Patriot Air Defense System are at the
forefront of their technological communities. The Army intends to continue to improve
the capabilities of combat systems so as to meet and defeat the threat it faces.
b. The Command and Control System
The state of the Army's C2 system is bleak. As previously stated, the sys-
tem is a manual system that relies on procedural control measures to generate informa-
tion and antiquated procedures to display and disseminate it. In a slow moving,
relatively static scenario, with units operating over a ver>' limited area, this system might
function adequately. Under the concept of AirLand Battle doctrine, battles will rage
across the full depth of the battlefield and success will be measured in speed, synchroni-



















Figure 6. The CCS2 Architecture Hierarchy
spoiiding to the commander's need for information, it will become Hooded with
information and chaos will ensue.
9. Tiie Threat
The U.S. Army must be prepared to conduct combat operations across a wide
spectrum of confiicts, ranging from high to low intensity. The levels of mtensity are
meant to describe a^d limit the use of war or wardghting assets, f^ach level of intensity
has a distinct definition which embodies specific characterisiics that dilferentiales it irom
the others. The definitions for high, mid, and low intensity conflicts are as follows:
• High intensity Conflict: "..war between two or more nations and their respective
allies, if any. in which the belligerents employ the most modern technology and all
resources in intelligence; mobility; firepower (including nuclear, chemical, and bi-
ological weapons); conunand, control, and communications; and service support."
(Ref. 11 :p. MJ.
• Mid Intensity Conflict: "...war between two or more nations and their respective
aUies, if any, in which the belligerents employ the most modern technology and all
resources in intelligence; mobility; firepower (excluding nuclear, chemical, and bi-
ological weapons); command, control, and communications; and service support

















Figure 7. The CCS2;Communications Network Interface
structive power that can be employed or the extent of geographic area that might
be involved." [Ref. ll:p. 14].
• Low Intensity Conflict-Type A: "...internal defense and development assistance
operations involving actions by U.S. combat forces to establish, regain, or maintain
control of specific land areas threatened by guerrilla warfare, revolution, subver-
sion, or other tactics aimed at internal seizure of power." [Ref. 11 :p. 14].
• Low Intensity Conflict-Type B: "...internal defense and development assistance
operations involving actions by U.S. advice, combat support, and combat service
support for indigenous or allied forces engaged in establishing, regaining, or main-
taining control of specific land areas threatened by guerrilla warfare, revolution,
subversion, or other tactics aimed at internal seizure of power." [Ref ll:p. 14].
For the purposes of this discussion two assumptions will be made:
• High and mid intensity conflicts share sufficient common characteristics to permit
combining them into one threat categor}' to be known as High to Mid Intensity
Conflict.
• The two types of low intensity conflict share sufficient common characteristics to
permit combining them into one threat category to be known as Low Intensity
Conflict (LIC).
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As the level (intensity) of the conflict changes so will the threat forces faced by
the U.S. Army. This next section will provide a superficial examination of the threat
U.S. combat forces can expect to face in future high to mid intensity and low intensity
conflicts. This examination will consider the following three areas: doctrine, force
structure, and materiel. For a more in depth examination of the threat, the reader is
referred to the AC2MP (S), Volume II, 1 September 1987; FiM 100-2-1, SOVIET ARMY
OPERATIONS AND TACTICS; and FM 100-20, LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT.
a. High Intensity Conflict
High to mid intensity conflicts are considered to be the most severe form
of conflict the U.S. Army is likely to be involved in, in the foreseeable future. High to
mid intensity conflicts are typically thought of as a joint and combined operation in a
European scenario where a base of operations exists and lines of communication are
established. Under this scenario the threat forces of the Warsaw Pact present the most
serious opposition. Combat under high to mid intensity will be characterized by ex-
tremely rapid, continuous operations, employing mechanized ground forces and large
amounts of air power on an extremely fluid battlefield. The employment of extremely
accurate and lethal, high technology weapons will be commonplace. Electronic warfare
will be employed extensively, as will nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.
b. Low Intensity Conflict
Low intensity conflict is a less severe form of conflict but one in which the
U.S. Army has a greater probability of becoming involved. It focuses primarily on de-
veloping, third world nations and the need for U.S. forces to assist in conducting internal
defense operations, counter insurgency operations, and peace keeping missions. These
operations might require the rapid deployment of a force to a remote theater of oper-
ations (a non-European scenario) where the force would have to establish a base of op-
erations and where Hnes of communication do not currently exist. Low intensity
conflicts are typically thought of as crisis or contingency operations or rapid response
strikes that result from an unforseen event which threatened U.S. citizens or interests.
A most recent example of this was the United States intervention into Grenada (Opera-
tion Urgent Fury) in October of 1983. [Ref 11]
Low intensity conflicts will be characterized by highly lethal, intermittent
combat actions. Clear and distinct lines of combat or fronts will not exist and U.S.
forces will be widely dispersed to control more terrain and to be better prepared to im-
mediately respond to contingencies.
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As previously stated, high to mid intensity conflict is the most severe threat
scenario the U.S. Army expects to face. Its probability of occurring is less than that of
low intensity conflicts, which are less severe. Figure 8 illustrates the relationship that
exists between the probability of occurrence and the severity of each category' of contlict.
c. Doctrine
( 1 ) High Intensity Conflict. The threat forces of the Warsaw Pact adhere
to a doctrine based on mass, speed, momentum, and dynamic action. The threat will
launch many attacks across a wide front in an effort to force a penetration in our de-
fenses. If an attack succeeds, the threat will attempt to exploit the situation by con-
centrating maximum force on the breach in an elTort to force massive formations
through it and into our rear areas.
As the threat conducts operations to the immediate front, other
threat ground and air forces- will conduct simultaneous operations in our rear areas.
These deep operations will be launched at high value targets (e.g.: logistic centers, nu-
clear storage facilities, air bases) in an effort to disrupt our continuity of operations.
The Warsaw Pact nations have identified command and control centers as high value
targets and their doctrine requires,
"...the rapid location and identification of command and control elements.... once
pinpointed, command posts will be exploited (by electronic warfare) until they can
be destroyed by tube or rocket launched artillery, air delivered ordinance, or rear
area unconventional warfare parties." [Ref. 12:p. 3].
(2) Low Intensity Conflict. The threat forces in low intensity conflict will
most likely consist of regular or irregular forces from third world nations, guerrilla
forces, or terrorist groups. The threat will not attempt to maintain constant contact
with U.S. forces but will strive to attack and destroy high visibiUty or high value targets
when the situation is most advantageous. These forces will not possess the level of
training or proficiency expected of the threat in a high to mid intensity conflict but they
will be more familiar with the battle area and will use this advantage to maximize their
limited capabihties. [Ref 11]
d. Force Structure
(I) High to Mid Intensity Conflict. The Warsaw Pact nations arc or-
ganized into highly mobile armored and mechanized forces supported by vast amounts
of artillery and aviation assets. The threat is organized and trained to function under a
combined arms concept. They have been, and will continue to be, a numerically superior
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Figure 8. Probability vs. Severity of Potential Conflict Type
merous, large scale, and highly lethal oOeiisive operations. Their mobility permits them
to quickly and efficiently shift their forces about the battlefield to exploit any advantage.
The threat possesses extensive electronic warfare, NBC, and intelhgence capabilities.
They function under a well established, highly centralized command and control system
that applies techniques of operations analysis and automation to the battlefield.
[Ref. 13j
(2) Low Intensity Conflict. The threat to be countered in a low uitensity
conflict is expected to be a lightly or non armored/mechanized force. It will consist of
infantr>' forces supported by light artillen.^ and no or limited aviation assets. This is not
to infer that the tlireat will not be a formidable one but it is not envisioned to possess
the capabilities of that to be faced in a high to mid intensity conflict. It is not expected
that the threat would possess any nuclear capabilities but may possess limited electronic,
biological and chemical warfare capabiUties. Its organic capability to collect intelligence
material would most likely be limited to human intelhgence (HUM INT) and some
communications intelligence (COMINT).
e. Materiel
(1) High to Mid Intensity Conflict. The Warsaw Pact nations possess a
vast array and number of modern weapon and combat support systems capable of being
employed on the modern battlefield. These systems are highly mobile and incorporate
a level of technolocv that challcnses our technoloaical advantage. The threat has made
'>')
and continues to make improvements in weapon and combat support systems, specif-
ically in the areas of mobility and command and control. [Ref 14:p. 1-2]
(2) Low Intensity Conflict. The threat in a low intensity conflict will
most likely possess export variants of equipment made by the Warsaw Pact nations, the
United States, or one of the major arms exporting nations (e.g.: Peoples Republic of
China, Peoples Republic of North Korea, France). Although this equipment may be of
inferior quality or outdated when compared to that found in a high to mid intensity
conflict, it nonetheless presents a formidable and lethal threat to the force that must
counter it. As major world powers develop and improve their current weapon and
combat support systems their outdated versions will enter the foreign military sales arms
market and will become available to developing nations. The potential acquisitions of
these systems by third world nations can be viewed as an enhancement to the threat
those nations present.
/. Threat Summary
The potential threat the U.S. Army must be prepared to counter is varied.
The threat may possess weapon and combat support systems that are comparable to
present day American systems. The threat may come from an area where the U.S. Army
has operated extensively; where the support base is in position and the lines of commu-
nication are established; or it may come from a region where no U.S. force has ever
conducted operations; where there is no local support base and where the lines of com-
munication are extended. U.S. forces will use dispersal as a means of ensuring
survivability and maintaining control of terrain.
Regardless of the threat, the commander and his staff require a C2 system
that will be responsive to his/their needs and that cannot be exploited by the enemy.
The system must be deployable, capable of supporting worldwide operations and inter-
operating with the C2 systems of our allies and the other U.S. services.
10. The Combat Environment
A final aspect of the AirLand Battle environment the commander must consider
is the combat environment. This environment includes such topics as:
• the commander's assigned mission;
• the time the commander has available to accomplish this mission;
• the actual terrain the commander will conduct operations on;




• the development of future concepts and systems.
The combat environment embodies many of the elements that Lawson's model
refers to as extraneous factors. These factors cannot be totally controlled by a
commander or staff but they must be monitored and considered when decisions are being
made. They must enter the C2 process at some point. The following section will provide
a brief overview of these factors and will provide an insight into their importance to the
C2 process.
a. Mission
The mission is the goal towards which the commander and staff strive. It
will have a direct influence on a commander's ability to exercise effective command and
control. Thx- commander must have a versatile C2 system that is capable of configuring
itself to support any mission or contingency.
b. Time Available
Time on the battlefield is a precious commodity that a C2 system can ill-
afford to waste. A commander only has a given amount of time from receipt to exe-
cution of a mission order. During this period his staff must gather information, generate
alternative courses of action, present those courses of action for evaluation, receive a
decision, prepare and distribute orders, and allow sufficient time for subordinates to re-
peat this process at their level of command.
The commander and staff must have a C2 system that is efficient and that
can save time by streamlining this process. Automation is the key to providing such a
system. If a commander had a C2 system that could continuously and automatically
generate, receive, store, and disseminate information the amount of time his staiT re-
quires to complete its cycle would be greatly reduced.
The commander's C2 system should also be capable of presenting the max-
imum amount of useful information in the shortest time possible. This could be ac-
complished by providing the commander a display that at a glanre could provide him
situational information on all the units operating in his sector. From this information
he could quickly assess the situation and decide who is capable of assuming what
mission.
c. The Terrain
Terrain encompasses all aspects of the natural environment such as;
weather, the relief and elevation, hydrology, soil composition, obstacles, etc. The C2
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process must consider the characteristics of the natural environment when comparing
and evaluatine alternative courses of action.
The C2 system must also consider the natural environment in which it will
function. Will relief features pose a problem to line of sight dependent systems? Will the
soil support the weight of the C2 system's prime mover? Will the atmospheric properties
of the region effect the C2 system's electromagnetic signals? All of the concerns terrain
poses to a planner of maneuver operations must be applied to C2 systems if those sys-
tems are going to support the planned operations.
d. Constraints
Constraints are limitations or restriction placed on a person, activity, or
system. Two major constraints that commanders face today are budgets and logistics.
( 1 ) Budgetary Constraints. The current trend in fiscal spending to sup-
port military equipment, manning, and operations is downward. Commanders cannot
expect the recent surge in spending to continue and must anticipate cutbacks in future
allocations. These cutbacks may come in manpower or equipment. A cutback in either,
without a reduction in mission load will lead to greater dispersion on the battlefield.
An additional increase in dispersion would exacerbate the commander's currently tenu-
ous abiUty to exercise C2 on a highly lethal and rapidly changing battlefield. To com-
pensate for problems caused by decreased military spending, and to enhance the
commander's ability to exercise command and control, the Army must develop an eco-
nomical C2 system that can support the operations of a widely dispersed force.
(2) Logistical Constraints. Regardless of the area of operations, logistics
will always be a concern in the C2 process. A superior system can become a white ele-
phant, an albatross around the commander's neck, if the logistics system cannot provide
the support it requires. A C2 system must not be logistically intensive. It must not re-
quire or place extraordinary demands on the logistics system.
e. The Future
A commander and his staff must always think to the future as they apply
the C2 process. They must consider how today's actions will drive and determine to-
morrow's actions. This is also the case with doctrine and C2 systems that will support
operations under that doctrine. AirLand Battle is the doctrine the U.S. Army will em-
ploy in today's wars to meet our national objectives. AirLand Battle Future is an ex-
tension of the AirLand Battle doctrine through the year 2004. The next section of this
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paper will discuss how AirLand Battle Future will generate requirements for a new C2
system to support operations on the future AirLand battlefield.
( 1 ) AirLand Battle Future. AirLand Battle Future (ALB-F) embodies all
of the fundamentals of AirLand Battle but also, "...emphasizes the joint and combined
nature of modern warfare and the need to maximize the full potential of U.S. and allied
forces in a unified effort." [Ref 15:p. 2].
AirLand Battle Future, like AirLand Battle, is a doctrine based on
maneuver warfare. It sees the Army fighting in a scenario where the adversaiy has a
numerical advantage. To defeat the foe the Army must, "...throw the enemy off balance
with a powerful blow from an unexpected direction, follow-up rapidly to prevent his re-
covery and continue operations aggressively." [Ref. 15:p. 3]. The operations, "...must
be rapid, unpredictable, violent and disorienting, and the pace must be fast enough to
prevent him (the enemy) from taking effective counteraction." [Ref. 15:p. 4].
To support these operations, AirLand Battle Future requires opera-
tional and tactical plans that stress flexibihty; that create opportunities to capitalize on
the adversary's weaknesses; that ensure synchronization of joint and combined oper-
ations; and that are precise in nature. To be flexible, capable of changing; to capitalize
on weaknesses; and to ensure synchronization of forces; a commander must have a
command and control system that provides him automated, timely, accurate, and rele-
vant information. This system must interface with or be interoperable with those sys-
tems used by other services and by our allies.
The Army under AirLand Battle Future must organize as a maneuver
force. This force must consist of, "...agile, powerful, self-sustaining tactical units that
can operate and survive, independent of tics to a fixed sustaining base, other like units
and higher headquarters." [Ref. 15:p. 15]. This force must be, "...mobile enough to
concentrate rapidly from dispersed locations, engage the enemy with violent attacks to
shock, paralyze or overwhelm him quickly and then rapidly disperse to avoid enemy
counterattack." [Ref 16:p. 16].
To succeed under AirLand Battle Future doctrine, the Army must
embark on an evolutionary process which will transform our current organizations into
maneuver forces. The AirLand Battle Future Concept Statement, dated 16 June 1987,
has identified four major goals which this evolutionary process must strive to attain.
These goals are as follows:
• dcployabihty.
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• reliable and efficient systems,
• complementary systems,
• near real time command and control.
The Concept Statement refers to deployability in the following con-
text, "...we must improve our ability to move an entire force globally and within a thea-
ter on an order of magnitude higher than current capabilities." [Ref 15:p. 17].
Deployability is a function of weight, volume, and airlift capability. All future systems
must consider these factors to ensure the deployabilty of the force, which the system
supports, is maximized. The optimum design of a system is one that is self-deployable
or one that is wholly contained in a self-deployable system.
Reliable and efficient systems are referred to as, "...(systems) must be
improved so tactical units can operate autonomously for extended periods."
[Ref. 15:p. 17]. Systems must be operational immediately upon entering a theater of
operations. Systems cannot require excessive amounts of setup work, ancillary equip-
ment, or installation time. Once a command post has been established all command and
control systems must become operational. All systems must be reliable and dependable
in any environment, on any terrain. Any supporting component of a system must be
easily replaceable and not so critical that its loss means the total system becomes non-
operational. Redundancy and graceful degradation must be typical characteristics of all
future command and control systems.
The Concept Statement recognizes the importance of jointness and
combined forces through discussions of complimentary systems which state, "...we must
improve our procedures for the complimentary use of acquisition and attack resources
of other services, higher Army echelons and Allies." [Ref 15:p. 17], Command and
control systems must interface, either directly or through common hardware and soft-
ware, with the overall Army Tactical Command and Control System to ensure maximum
exchange of information. The Army must develop economical, interoperable systems
which will use common hardware and software so the transfer of information between
the other services and our allies is maximized.
The Concept Statement clearly dictates a need for a near real time
command and control system when it states, "...we must continue to develop command
and control systems which allow us to receive and disseminate information to all of our
formations in near real time." [Ref 15;p. 17]. These systems should be automatic or
transparent to all users. Status and location reports should be sent to a command and
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control center as they occur without requiring any action from the users. Information
should be received and stored in a database system and displayed on a tactical oper-
ations screen. The database and tactical operations screen should be continuously and
automatically updated as changes are received. Lower echelon command elements
should pass data vertically and horizontally via the Command, Control and Subordinate
System and commanders receiving this data should be capable of displaying it on their
tactical operation screens.
Improved command and control systems will be essential if AirLand
Battle Future doctrine is to succeed. Commanders under AirLand Battle Future will
have to control many small, highly mobile, autonomous forces that are widely dispersed
on a dynamic battlefield. The attainment of synchronization among these units will be
even more complex and challenging than it is today. If the AirLand Battle Future
commander can effectively command and control these units, he will be able to control
the tempo of operations, establish the terms of the battle, impose his will on the enemy,
and defeat the enemy at the place and time he chooses.
1 1. Baseline Deficiencies
Thus far, this chapter has examined command and control under the AirLand
Battle doctrine from the context of the Lawson command and control process model.
The examination has produced a list of significant deficiencies which categorize the cur-
rent methods for exercising command and control as inefficient. The identified defi-
ciencies follow:
• Timeliness: The current C2 system is a manual, manpower intensive process that
requires excessive amounts of manual manipulation of data. This is a slow process
which could be avoided through the use of automation. With automated devices
information could be continuously and automatically generated, transmitted, re-
ceived, stored, and disseminated. Information is a time sensitive commodity that
must be available when it is needed. Commanders on the AirLand battlefield can-
not wait information to be generated.
• Data Processing: The current C2 system is manual and all of its data processing
is done by hand. This process is slow and has great potential for allowing errors
to enter the information. The system is not capable of quickly answering ad hoc
questions that might arise. The system's database system consists of paper, charts,
and status boards. The method for exchanging information between C2 systems
is known as transcribing or copying desired information by hand.
• Communications: There is no direct interface between today's C2 systems and the
communications systems that must support them. Information must be relayed
with a man in the loop. One command center cannot received information from




Intelligence Collection/Processing/ Dissemination: This process, which occurs at
all levels of command is not timely and requires the submission of a manually pre-
pared report that may or may not contain accurate information due to a require-
ment for a man to initiate it.
Display: The current system relies on various maps, overlays, and charts to present
information on the same units. To determine where a unit is; what its strength is;
and what its situation is; a commander might have to refer to three different charts
or maps. This is not an efficient system. An excessive number of displays means
that when time is short some chart is going to be overlooked and some critical piece
of information is not going to be considered.
Position Reporting: The current system relies on maps, compasses, and the ability
of a soldier to properly use them to determine and report his position. This process
takes time and because it depends on a man, is only as reliable as that man.
Procedural Control: The system relies on the subordinate to perform the sense
function for the commander. If the commander cannot rely on his subordinate to
perform this function adequately the commander will have to do it himself This
usually requires him to leave his command post. By doing this, the commander has
denied himself what few assets he has to effectively exercise command and control.
12. Initiatives
The current command and control system will not adequately keep pace with
the needs of the commander on the modem AirLand battlefield nor will it be capable
of smoothly transistioning to the battlefield of AirLand Battle Future. The Army has
recognized these facts and to correct the previously cited deficiencies has embarked on
a series of initiatives that will remedy the dilemma. Listed below are some of the more
important initiatives:
• The Army's Command and Control Master Plan: This document establishes a
baseline requirement for all future C2 systems.
• The Command, Control and Subordinate System: This is the architecture that will
integrate all of the C2 systems from the various battlefield functional areas into one
composite system known as the Army's Tactical Command and Control System.
It also estabUshes the baseline for connectivity between the battlefield functional
areas.
• The Army's Tactical Command and Control System: This is a family of interop-
erable C2 automated systems that incorporate common hardware and software to
collect, manipulate, distribute information/data, and process data within and
among the various battlefield functional areas.
• Communications: The Army is currently developing, procuring, and fielding three
new famihes of communication networks to support the C2 process. These include
the SINCGARS family of radios, tlii: VIobilc Subscriber Equipment (VISE) for area
communications, and the Digital Dau: Distribution Network. These systems will
provide the mediums for exchanging information across and throughout the bat-
tlefield functional areas.
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• Information Generation: The Army is currently conducting limited development
of automated C2 systems that will be information generators on the battlefield.
These systems are intended to free the subordinate from having to process periodic
status reports. One such system under development is the Inter-Vehicular Infor-
mation System (IVIS). [Ref 17]
• Battlefield Displays: As part of the ATCCS, the Army is considering the inte-
gration of large screen battlefield displays into the C2 centers. These screens would
replace the current system's maps and charts.
These initiatives are a start but they are not the final solution. The Army must
look to automation and display systems that will provide maximum information with
minimum expenditure of time or resources. The weapon system operator on today's
AirLand battlefield will not have time to prepare reports if he is expected to fight out-
numbered and win. The last section of this chapter will cite two needs that have not
been satiofied bv the ongoing initiatives.
13. The Need
Sun Tzu is quoted as saying, "...if you know the enemy and know yourself, you
need not fear the result of one hundred battles. If you know yourself and not the enemy,
then for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the en-
emy nor yourself, then you will succumb in every battle." [Ref 5:p. 76]. Sun Tzu's in-
tent is to say that knowledge is the key to success on the battlefield and this point is as
true today on the modern AirLand battlefield as it was in his ancient time. To know the
enemy, the Army has developed the All Source Analysis System (ASAS). Tliis intelli-
gence system is the focal point for all inteUigence data that is generated. It uses the
CCS2 and the variouii communication networks to collect and disseminate intellisence
information.
If the ASAS in conjunction with the CCS2 and various mediums of communi-
cation can satisfy the Army's need for information on the enemy, then what system
provides the commander information on his forces? The answer to this question is the
present day procedural command and control system. As previously discussed, this
system is not timely, not accurate, and not reUable. It cannot provide the commander
the information he needs to exercise efiective command and control on the AirLand
battlefield.
The Battle of Gettysburg (1-3 July 1863) provides a historical example of a
procedural command and control system that failed to provide the commander the in-
formation he needed. The system's reliance on a subordinate's actions resulted in the
defeat of the Confederate forces. One can onlv wonder what the outcome of the battle
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would have been if General Lee, the commander of the Confederate forces, had been
able to exercise positive control over General Stuart's cavalry. For the first two days
of that battle and the previous five days, General Lee had no contact with nor any idea
as to the whereabouts of Stuart's force.
On 23 June 1863, General Lee directed General Stuart to move his forces north
of the Potomac River into Maryland as quickly as possible. General Lee intended to
issue further orders once Stuart's forces had completed the move. General Stuart mis-
understood General Lee's intent and proceeded to lead a 5000 man force on an
uneventful expedition that lasted until 2 July 1983. [Ref 18:pp. 26-116]
If General Lee had been able to monitor Stuart's activities, he would have
known that Stuart had not understood the intent of the order. He would have realized
that Stuart's forces were not contributing to the battle and he could have issued direc-
tives to correct the situation. If Lee had the capability to exercise positive control over
Stuart, he could have synchronized the battle and brought his maximum combat power
to bear on the enemy at the critical time. If this had happened, the battle of Gettysburg
might have been a victory for the South and history as we know it today might be quite
different.
The ability to have information is not sufficient to ensure victory. The
commander must be able to quickly and efficiently apply this information to the C2
process. Another of Sun Tzu's principles states, "Speed is the essence of war. Take
advantage of the enemy's unpreparedness; travel by unexpected routes and strike him
where he has taken no precautions." [Ref 2:p. 4]. Sun Tzu's principle is not limited to
physical combat but extends to the C2 process where a commander must possess the
ability to make decisions and act faster than his opponent; to take advantage of his op-
ponent's unpreparedness; and to operate within his opponent's decision cycle. Modern
history's most recent example of this is the Second World War.
"In the German blitzkrieg of 1940, the German army's abiUty to paralyze the AUied
forces' decisionmaking process was not based solely on the increased speed of the
mechanized formations. It was based primarily on the abihty to see the battlefield
more clearly, make quick decisions, exploit opportunities, and disseminate in-
structions and create conditions which made it dilficult for the French and British
armies to identify and respond rapidly to the threat. This decision making time dif-
ferential was what created the Allies' paralysis." [Ref 19:p. 34].
AirLand Battle and AirLand Battle Future are doctrines dependent on know-
ledge and speed. Under these doctrines, the commander is tasked to sense, process,
compare, decide, and act faster than his opponent. To accomplish this the AirLand
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Battle commander, from battalion to division, must be supported by a very robust
command and control system. Today's AirLand Battle commander and tommorow's
AirLand Battle Future commander, must have a stand alone command and control sys-
tem that:
• automatically and continuously generates, processes, stores, and disseminates near
real time information on friendly forces;
• integrates friendly information with enemy information on a large screen display
system that can:
display the AirLand battlefield in sufficient width and depth to allow the
commander to visualize the three simultaneous operations he is tasked to con-
duct;
display not only forces on the ground but elements operating in the third di-
mension of AirLand Battle, the air;
provide the commander the capability to vai/ the resolution of his battlefield
display to focus his attention at the critical points as the situation changes.
If the commander on the AirLand battlefield can harness the technology of au-
tomation he will be able to use it as a force multiplier to synchronize his combat power
in time, space, and activity to defeat the enemy's physical and moral determination to
fisht.
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II. OPERATIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
Chapter One has established a need for automated command and control capability
which would provide a commander and his stafTwith continuous, near real time, visual
display of the friendly force disposition on the AirLand battlefield. This command and
control capability would automatically:
« transmit disposition data;
• receive and process disposition data into a usable format;
• correlate disposition information with other types of information in a C2 database;
• present this correlated information on a C2 display;
• disseminate this information, as required, to other headquarters and battlefield
functional areas within the Armv Tactical Command and Control System
(ATCCS).
Chapter Two will outline the operational characteristics which must be embedded
in this C2 capability to realize its full potential. It will introduce a system concept that
will answer the following questions:
• Which elements will comprise the system?
• What architecture will join these elements?
• How will the disposition data be generated?
• How will the various users of this information receive it?
• How will the information be displayed?
• At what level will the data be generated, received, processed into information,
transmitted, and/or displayed?
This chapter will also address the operational and organizational considerations for
the proposed system. These considerations along with the need statement and threat
summary of Chapter One formed a basis for the Operation and Organization Plan at
Appendix A.
B. OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
The operational characteristics of any military' system are those characteristics or
traits which describe the system's capabilities. This section will address six major cate-
gories of operational characteristics and their corresponding traits. These categories are
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aggregate in nature and representative of the traits system designers must incorporate








General characteristics refer to characteristics of the system that do not fit
concisely under any of the other categories. These characteristics are important because
they reinforce the other characteristics and provide the system with a quality of
robustness, compatibility, and flexibility.
a. A Stand Alone System
A C2 system should be a stand alone, independently operating system
whose capability does not depend on the interaction of many other systems. The num-
ber of participating systems required to make the overall C2 system function should be
minimized.
b. Global Coverage
A C2 system must support a force with a global mission. Therefore the
system must not be limited by an inabihty to operate in certain geographic regions or
climates. The system and all of its components must be capable of providing effective
and efficient support to any force, anywhere, and anytime it is needed.
c. Essential Information
A C2 system as a minimum, should provide the commander and his staff
accurate, near real time information on an element's location, mission, combat posture,
and operational readiness. This information must be presented in a clear and concise
manner. Location information should be provided in Universal Transverse Mercator
(UTM) or Universal Polar Stercographic (UPS) coordinates for the Mihtary Grid Ref-
erence System [Ref 20:p. 1.5]. The system should provide location accuracy with 100
meter circular error probability (CEP) [Ref 17].
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2. Interoperability
Interoperability is defined as, "...trie ability of systems, units or forces to provide
services to and accept services from other services, units or forces and to use the services
so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together." [Ref I:p. 192].
a. Joint and Combined Operations
Interoperability is an important consideration for any military system but
more so for a C2 system. The U.S. Army will not fight future conflicts in isolation but,
"...must be prepared to fight as part of a larger force, for example as a deployed force in
NATO Europe, a combined force in Korea, or as a force tailored to meet a range of
contingencies in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, or Latin America." [Ref 15:p. 1551].
The Army's C2 systems must be capable of interoperating with our allies' C2 systems
and the C2 systems of the U.S. Na\7, Marines, and Air Force. Interoperability is an
essential characteristic a C2 system must possess if a commander hopes to attain syn-
chronization of forces in a joint or combined operation.
The ability to exchange information must be direct, not a convoluted,
multi-interfaced exchange that requires excessive amounts of data manipulation and re-
formatting. The system should exchange standard data elements, organized into stand-
ard formats, with allied forces and the other U.S. services. The system should also be
capable of exchanging information with other battlefield functional area C2 systems
within the Army Tactical Command and Control System. [Ref. 14:p. 2]
b. Economical Concerns
All too often the U.S. designers of a new system stress the use of the most
advanced technologies and give little thought to the monetary costs involved in devel-
oping, fielding, and maintaining such systems. To enhance interoperability and the ac-
ceptance of new systems by our allies, these system designers must consider our allies'
ability to afford advanced technologies.
AirLand Battle 2000, an extension of the Army's current AirLand Battle
doctrine into the 21st century and the predecessor ofAirLand Battle Future, placed great
emphasis on the development and application of new forms of technology but it, "...was
not well received by the allied defense ministries. Both privately and publicly a number
of them criticized development of futuristic systems it (defense ministries) envisages as
being unrealistic, far too costly, and a means of fostering 'made in (the) USA' high
technology equipment, which may or may not work, onto unwilling European taxpay-
ers." [Ref 15:p. 1551).
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In view of this, future C2 systems should employ mature, state of the art
technology which is economical from the standpoint of acquisition, operation, and
maintenance. The monetary cost of a system and the abihty of prospective users (our
aUies) to procure and sustain the system must be considered during system design.
c. Information Security
All future C2 systems must interoperate with other automated systems in
the joint and combined arena in compliance with the United States Message Text For-
mat (MTF) Programs and Standard NATO Agreements (STANAGs). The C2 system
must receive, store, retrieve, transmit, and print data ranging in classification from UN-
CLASSIFIED through SECRET without manual encryption. The C2 system must
employ measures for ensuring that information exchanged is safeguarded against ex-
pl jitadon by unauthorized individuals. [Ref 14:p. 3]
3. Deployability
Deployability is defined in a strategic sense as, "...the relocation of forces
(equipment) to desired areas of operation." [Ref l:p. 111]. Deployabihty can also be
described as a force's or system's capability of being deployed or relocated from one
area of operation to another. This definition requires a system designer to consider the
system's characteristics of transportability, mobility, and initialization.
a. Transportability
As previously stated, "...U.S. forces must be prepared to fight. ...as a de-
ployed force.. ..(they) must retain strategic mobility. The forces (and their supporting
systems) must be deployable." [Ref 15:p. 1551]. If the U.S. Army must be prepared to
conduct operations in distant lands, its C2 systems must be capable of accompanying the
force to those lands. The system must be air, sea, and ground transportable
[Ref I4:p. 3]. To support rapid deployment, the system must be capable of roll on, roll
off transport on a variety of cargo aircraft (USAF C-130. C-141, and C-5A). In addi-
tion, the system should be air transportable by helicopter.
b. Mobility
A C2 system must be as mobile as the force it supports; it must enhance,
not impede a commander's ability to exercise command from any vantage point on the
battlefield. A system's mobihty has an influence on its ability to support continuous
operations. A system that can function while moving will improve continuity of oper-
ations for a force fighting on the fluid AirLand battlefield. [Refs. 14:p. 8;21:p B.4]
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c. Initialization
A C2 system is only useful to the extent that it can be used. In essence, the
fact that a system can be deployed is of Uttle benefit if the system cannot function
without extensive preparation or set up. The system must be capable of assuming an
operational posture immediately upon entering a theater of operations and must not
require special ancillary equipment or extensive site preparation. The system must be
capable of supporting all contingency operations regardless of the location, natural en-
vironment, or the intensity of the conflict,
4. Survivability
Survival is defmed as, "...Uving or continuing longer than another person or
thing; the continuation of life or existence...." [Ref 22:p. 1174]. Given this definition,
one can then define survivability as a person's or thing's ability to continue to live or
function despite another person's or thing's efforts to terminate the first's life or ability
to function.
In the context of a C2 system operating on the AirLand battlefield, survivability
means being capable of operating across the wide spectrum of possible conflicts. The
systems must be just as capable of providing support to a commander and his stall in a
high intensity conflict, where rapid, continuous, lethal operations, electronic warfare and
nuclear, biological and chemical operations are the norm as it is in a low intensity con-
flict where actual contact may be sporadic or intermittent.
To achieve survivability, the C2 system designer must consider the system's
signature, the concept of critical nodes, the need for redundancy, electronic counter-
counter measures, and operations in nuclear, biological, and chemical environments.
a. Signature
If a system has a signature, be it electromagnetic, thermal, or visual, it can
be detected. If the system has a unique signature, it can not only be detected but it can
be identified and the likelihood of it being targeted for attack, increases. An ideal C2
system would be one that is totally passive; one that has no signature at all. Technology
cannot provide an ideal C2 system but a more attainable goal would be to acquire a C2
system that has a slight or minimal signature which is diflicult to detect and similar to
others on the battlefield. A trait such as this will enhance the svstem's survivabilitv.
b. Critical Nodes
A C2 system must be robust, it must not rely on a critical node or have an
Achilles' heel embedded in its architecture. A critical node is, "...an element, position,
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or communications entity whose disruption or destruction immediately degrades (or ne-
gates) the abiUty of a force to (provide) command and control or effectively conduct
combat operations." [Ref. l:p. 97]. A system that has or relies on a critical node is only
as survivable as that critical node. If that node is destroyed or rendered ineffective, so
is the system that relies on it.
c. Redundancy
Redundancy is the intentional use of excess means or ways for accompHsh-
ing the same task [Ref. 22:p. 969]. In a C2 system, redundancy is the capability to
perform a task through a variety of means or alternative procedures. It is a trait that
will enable a C2 system to continue to operate with no or insignificant loss of effective-
ness even though the system has lost components. A C2 system that has redundancy
embedded in it is characterized as being robust or strong in nature.
If a system that is redundant sustains significant losses and its ability to
provide effective support is impaired, the system should degrade gracefully. This means
that the system will continue to operate but with gradually decreasing efficiency. This
characteristic might require the acquisition of duplicate sets of equipment or could be
embedded in the system's software so that it automatically identifies and circumvents
problem areas. This characteristic can only exist if there are no critical nodes in the
system's architecture.
d. Electronic Counter-countermeasures
Electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) are, "...actions taken to en-
sure friendly effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum despite the enemy's use of
electronic warfare." [Ref l:p. 127]. Forms of ECCM include the use of electronic en-
cryption devices, employing a technology that is jam resistant, changing operating pro-
cedures, etc.
A system may be rendered jam resistant by employing various modulation
techniques or by using a technology that would make the monetary or political costs
associated with jamming far exceed the benefits. An example of this would be to operate
the C2 system on a frequency that is used by other international users where, under
normal circumstances, the C2 system would be compatible with the international users.
If a belligerent nation were to attempt to jam the C2 system, it would then face the
consequences, both political and operational, of that action.
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The system must be protected against spoofmg or unauthorized access by
the enemy. The incorporation of electronic encryption devices or technologies such as
frequency hopping or spread spectrum modulation, are alternatives to be considered.
e. Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Resistance
The hardware and software components of a C2 system must be capable
of supporting operations in an environment which has been contaminated with nuclear
fallout or biological and chemical agents. The components of the system must not be
affected bv decontamination agents that will be used after a NBC attack. These traits
must apply to equipment which is built to miUtary specifications (iMILSPEC) and that
which is procured as nondevelopmental items (NDI). [Ref 14:p. 3]
Components which are essential to mission accomplishment will be desig-
nated as MILSPEC items. Given this fact, these items must be shielded to survive the
electromagnetic pulse of a nuclear blast. [Ref 14:p. 3]
5. Sustalnability
Sustainability is defined as, "...the ability to maintain the necessary level and
duration of combat activity.. ..it is a function of providing and maintaining those levels
of force, materiels, and consumables necessary to support a military effort."
[Ref l:p. 353]. For the purposes of this discussion, sustainability shall refer to the





To ensure the benefits of a C2 system are realized as soon as possible, the
system designer should attempt to use mature, state of the art technology which is
available today, will not require extensive developmental or production lead time, and
can be applied to the concept at hand with minor or no modification. The technology
must be affordable to the greatest number of potential users.
The system should limit the amount of equipment which must be built to
MILSPECs and should attempt to use fully developed, off the shelf MILSPEC govern-
ment furnished equipment (GFE) where possible. The application of NDI equipment
will expedite system fielding and will transfer much of the research and developmental




Reliability is defined as, "...the ability of an item to perform a required
function under stated conditions for a specified time." [Ref l:p. 309]. Reliability is
usually expressed as mean time between failures (MTBF) in hours. The appropriate
MTBF time for a C2 system is beyond the scope of this thesis but the system must be
capable of supporting 24 hour, continuous operations, in a hostile environment, and in
all three climatic zones as defined by AR 70-38. [Ref 14:p. 3]
c. Maintainability
The system should be of modular design and should make extensive use of
built-in test equipment (BITE) to isolate a fault in a major component, circuit card, or
module. Once a fault is isolated, the operator would remove the defective item and re-
place it with a serviceable item from the unit's prescribed load list (PLL). Defective
items would then be evacuated through the maintenance system for repair or disposal.
This capability will allov^^ the operator to perform all operator and organizational main-
tenance and would not require an increase in the number of maintenance personnel
necessary to support the system. [Ref 14:p. 9]
d. Compatibility
The C2 system should have the same requirements for electrical power as
the other elements which comprise the ATCCS. For example, if the system is mounted
in a vehicle then it should function using the vehicle's 28 volt direct current (DC) power
source. If the system is NDI equipment that would be ground mounted and is not in-
tended for mobile operation, its power requirements should be 115/208 volts alternating
current (AC), 50/60 hertz, which would be supplied by a generator or commercial power
sources. [Ref 14:p. 8]
The number of versions or variants of any system which are fielded should
be limited. In addition, all versions should consist of the same component parts, with
the same capabilities and the same installation or mounting configuration. Common-
ahty of component parts will greatly reduce the burden placed on the logistics system
and will greatly enhance the system's overall robustness and operational readiness rate.
e. Personnel
An automated C2 capability should be integrated into existing C2 facilities
without generating the need for additional personnel. If the capability is truly auto-
mated, its operation should be transparent to its users and it should free personnel to
perform other functions. This capabihty should be an integrated part of the ATCCS and
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should use ATCCS common hardware and software. Individuals identified to operate
and maintain the ATCCS equipment would assume those duties for this system,
/. Training
The training for a C2 system and any other system, will have to be planned
and integrated in a coordinated effort with all the BFA systems. A capstone training
plan will have to be developed as will a new equipment training plan to support fielding.
Tutorials will be embedded in the system software and appropriate operator and main-
tenance manuals will be required. The addition of a new C2 system should have minimal
impact on the overall training system. [Ref 23:p. 6]
6. User Interface
User interface addresses how the operators will interact with the system com-
ponents. Considerations for user interface are transparency, operator interface, tutori-
als, human factors engineering/ safety, graphics and symbology, and operation under
mission oriented protective posture (MOPP) conditions.
a. Transparency
A C2 system should be automated and the system should function auto-
matically. It should transmit, receive, process, display, and disseminate information
without any interaction with an operator. In essence, the C2 system's functions are
totally transparent to the operator or user.
b. Operator Interface
The system should provide the operator or user a means of manipulating
the system's capabilities, e.g.: a means of altering the resolution of its display, to query
its database, to manually enter data or extract data from its database, to perform staff
planning functions, etc. This interface may take the form of a keyboard, a mouse and
icon system, or a voice actuated system, [Ref 23:p. 3]
c. Operator Tutorials
A C2 system should be designed to be extremely user friendly and should
have tutorials and on-line help programs embedded in its software. The tutorials should
be designed with critical task training problem situations and exercises which approxi-
mate those expected to be encountered in actual tactical operations, [Ref 23:p. 6]
d. Human Factors Engineering!Safety
The C2 system should be designed to facilitate safe, efficient, and effective
operation and maintenance by soldiers in the fifth to ninety-fifth percentile while wearing
climate appropriate clothing or equipment under tactical conditions. [Ref 23:p. 6]
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e. Graphics and Symbology
A C2 system should have the capability to generate, display, and manipulate
decision graphics and standard military symbology as specified in FIVI 101-5-1, OPER-
ATIONAL TERMS AND SYMBOLS [Ref. 24]. The symbology depicted on a display
should automatically change as new information is received and the database is updated.
[Ref 14:p. 3]
/. Operation Under MOPP Conditions
A C2 system must be designed to allow for efficient operation by a soldier
who is dressed in full NBC environmental protective clothing and equipment (mission
oriented protective posture level four, MOPP 4). [Ref 23:p. 6]
g. Army Tactical Command and Control System (A TCCS) Interface
The C2 system should interface with the ATCCS and should incorporate
ATCCS common hardware and software into its design. The C2 system which will be
discussed later in this chapter does employ ATCCS common hardware and software and
through this process many of the previous characteristics are satisfied. In addition,
through this interface, the C2 system will have access to and interface with the following
systems:
( 1 ) A Tactical Computer System. This system will provide the C2 system
access to a database system for data storage and retrieval and will provide central con-
trol functions to the system data storage and display devices.
(2) A Large Screen Operation Display (LSOD). The LSOD will provide
a capability for displaying all symbols, decision graphics, and selected information from
the database that will be required to provide an accurate, near real time representation
of the battlefield.
(3) A Tactical Computer Terminal. This system will provide the C2 sys-
tem with an operator interface device for manipulation of the system's capabilities. The
operator will be able to input or remove data from the system's database or issue com-
mands to the LSOD.
The three previously identified systems are meant to be generic in
nature and their names are not meant to tie or link this concept to any one C2 system
which is currently being developed. The author's intent is to state a need for a system
or device that provides the specified capabilities.
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h. A TCCS Communications Network Interface
The C2 system will interface with the Army's Tactical Command and Con-
trol System to ensure the activities of the battlefield functional areas (BFA) are syn-
chronized. The ATCCS interface will provide the C2 system with access to the three
communication systems which support the Army in combat operations. These commu-
nication systems will allow for dissemination of the information generated by the C2
svstem.
/. Equipment: Military Specifications vs. Nondevelopmental Items
The C2 system will require equipment that meets full military specifications
(MILSPEC) if the equipment is expected to be operated while in a man portable con-
figuration or mounted in moving armored or wheeled vehicles or aircraft which are
normally found in an Army of Excellence Division. Nondevelopmental items should be
capable of supporting operations in a stationary, semi-static command post. NDI
equipment should be ruggedized to allow for transport as cargo in wheeled and tracked
vehicles. [Ref. 14:p. 3]
j. Line of Sight Requirements
The C2 system should minimize its need for line of sight between active el-
ements of the system. If line of sight is required, the system should have a
retransmission capability.
k. Continuous Operations
The system should be capable of supporting 24 hour a day operations and
should be configured for both static and mobile operations. It should require minimal
operational or organizational maintenance. [Ref. 14:p. 3]
/. Support Staff Operations
With timelv and accurate information, access to a database svstem. a larse
screen operations display which can be manipulated, and access to the ATCCS com-
munication networks, a commander's staff will have a greater ability to react quickly to
changes in current operations, plan future operations, analyze alternative courses of
action, and assess the impact of future decisions. [Ref 14:p. 3[
C. THE SYSTEM CONCEPT
This section will describe a C2 system concept that will satisfy the need described in
Chapter One. The description of this system will be written in broad and general terms
and it will attempt to incorporate as many of the previously outlined characteristics as
possible while not attempting to link the concept to a specific technology.
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1. A Command and Control Support System
The system's mission or purpose is to provide commanders and their staffs, the
operators, with near real time information on the friendly units located within their area
of operations. Once the operators have this information they can display it along with
other information (e.g., the perceived enemy situation, barrier plans, etc.) to enhance
command and control of the forces in their area.
This C2 system concept will provide near real time information and will be be
an enhancement to ATCCS; not a new system which is replacing an old system, but the
addition of a new system element to an existing system (ATCCS) in order to satisfy a
critical need.
To define this near real time information system (NRTIS) one must identify its
participants or components. A superficial examination of the concept finds the system
to be composed of two major components:
• a command and control node, which consists of the operators or users of informa-
tion such as the commander and his staff;
• a maneuver element, which consists of units or platforms conducting operations in
proximity to the command and control node.
Figure 9 illustrates the interactive relationship which exists between these two
components. The actual interaction consists of the passing of data from the maneuver
element to the C2 node and then the return of that data as processed information from
the C2 node to the maneuver element. The data transmitted by the maneuver element
would provide the C2 node a means of determining the maneuver element's identifica-
tion, location, mission, combat posture, and operational readiness. This interaction
would normally be an automatic function with the maneuver element periodically
transmitting the required raw data to any C2 node that is capable of receiving it. The
C2 node would normally be a passive participant in this process and would only transmit
processed data back to a maneuver element upon request. This transmission would be
sent via the ATCCS communications network..
2. The Near Real Time Information System Components
The NRTIS components (the maneuver element and the C2 node) consist of
various pieces of equipment which are grouped into modules. Where possible, the
components will have common or like modules and the hardware or software incorpo-
rated into these modules will be interchangeable. This commonality will add a sicnif-
icant level of robustness to the system and would enhance its availabihty,
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Figure 9. The Near Real Time Information System
support systems. In addition, it would allow a commander to freely move about the
battlefield and command his force from any C2 node or vantage point.
a. The Maneuver Element
For the purposes of this discussion a maneuver element will be defined as,
a unit (crew, squad, platoon, company, etc.) or an individual piece of equipment or
platform (helicopter, tank, ambulance, etc.) whose operational characteristics dictate a
need for its headquaner's C2 system to be supported by an automated near real time
information system. The designation of specific units or platforms as maneuver elements
will var\' between battlefield functional areas. The criteria for and the designation of
specific units or platforms as maneuver elements will be examined later in this chapter.
A maneuver element will normally consist of three modules:
• an antenna module,
• a limited operator interface module,
• a transceiver module.
Regardless of the type of unit or platform designated as a maneuver ele-
ment, all of the modules and the components which form the modules will be inter-
changeable. The abihty to move a set of maneuver element modules from one tank to
another or to an ambulance or to a helicopter would greatly improve the system's overall
availability. Commonality amongst the hardware and software must be stressed to cn-
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sure the system's versatility and flexibility is maximized. Figure 10 illustrates the group
of modules which will form a maneuver element.
b. The Command and Control Node
The C2 node will normally be located in a command post where a
commander and his staff, the operators, will have maximum access to its information
and capabilities. A command post is defmed as, "...a unit's or subunit's headquarters
where the commander and the staff perform their activities." [Ref. l:p. 78]. Because a
command post may be established in a variety of configurations (man portable, in fixed
structures, portable structures or vehicles) the C2 node must be capable of supporting
a variety of operational configurations. In addition, command posts exist throughout
all echelons of command but not all command posts will require a near real time infor-
mation system. Therefore, not all command posts will receive a C2 node equipment set.
For the purposes of this discussion, only those command posts within a BFA that are
considered to be focal points of command activity, where near real time information is
required, will be designated as C2 nodes. The criteria to designate a command post as
a C2 node will be addressed later in this chapter. Under the NRTIS concept the C2 node
will perform two main functions:
• it will receive and, through NRTIS software, process maneuver element data into
information;
• it will make this information available for use by the C2 node's operators via the
ATCCS common hardware and software and other users via the ATCCS commu-
nications network.
To perform these functions the C2 node has been partitioned into two sep-
arate elements which will be designated as the NRTIS element and the ATCCS element.
Figure 11 illustrates this partitioning and the unilateral relationship which exists be-
tween the two elements.
The NRTIS element receives data from a maneuver element, processes this
data into information and passes the information to the ATCCS element. The ATCCS
element will make this information available to operators in the C2 node and will be
capable of disseminating the information to other command posts.
(1) The NRTIS Element. The NRTIS element will consist of five mod-
ules:
• an antenna module,
• a limited operator interface module,
• a transceiver module,
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Figure 10, Maneuver Element in Modular Configuration
• a NRTIS processor module,
• an ATCCS interface module.
Each C2 node will be capable of generating data on itself in the same
manner as a maneuver element does. This capability will allow other C2 nodes to de-
termine the identification, location, mission, combat posture, and operational status of
adjacent headquarters. The rate of the C2 node's transmission would be restricted to
enhance its passive nature.
Each NRTIS element, regardless of the echelon or type of command
post it supports, will have identical capabilities and will be comprised of similar modules
and components which will be interchangeable. In addition, the NRTIS element mod-
ules which are common with the modules found in a maneuver element will also be
interchangeable. Figure 12 provides an illustration of a NRTIS element in modular
form,
(2) The Army Tactical Command and Control Element. The ATCCS el-
ement is the portion of the C2 node which uses the processed information that is gen-
erated by a maneuver clement. It actually allows four functions to be performed:
• it allows the information to be presented in both graphic and text format;
• it provides for storage of the information;
• it provides a means of disseminating the information to other users;
• it provides a means of manipulating the information to support staff functions.
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The modules which comprise the ATCCS element are:
• a NRTIS element interface module,
• a large screen operational display module,
• a database module,
• an operator interface module,
• a communication interface module.
This element along with the entire NRTIS concept will be an inte-
grated part of the Army's effort to apply automation to the command and control
process. These modules would use common ATCCS hardware and software thereby
ensuring commonaUty of module capabilities and physical configurations. Figure 13
iliusLraics the ATCCS element in its modular configuration.
D. THE NRTIS COMPONENT FUNCTIONS
The System Concept section divided the NRTIS into its basic modules. This section
will provide a concept of operation for the NRTIS concept and explain the functions
and characteristics of each module.
1. Concept of Operation
To the maximum extent possible, the operation of the NRTIS will be transpar-
ent to the operators at the maneuver element and the C2 node. This will be accom-
plished by embedding an algorithm in the software or employing a technology which

















Figure 12. The NRTIS Element in Modular Configuration
will enables a C2 node to determine the maneuver element's identification, position,
mission, combat posture, and operational status. (The rate of transmissions will be ex-
plored later in this chapter.)
To make this function as transparent as possible to the maneuver element's
crew, certain elements of this information would have to be entered into the system prior
to operation. For example, the maneuver element's identification, its mission, its com-
bat posture, and its operational readiness would be put into the system through its lim-
ited operator interface module. Combat posture and operational readiness might change
during the course of a mission and this would require that either the system automat-
ically or the operator manually, through the limited operator interface module (LOIM),
change the transmission data. The maneuver element's position will change often while
conducting a mission which requires it to move. To accommodate this, a technology
and corresponding software must be used to allow a C2 node to accurately determine the
maneuver element's location. If a maneuver element enters a change in one of its in-
formation types, the system should immediately transmit that data to ensure the C2
node has the most timely and accurate information available. A hierarchy or control
mechanism would be embedded in the system to manage this characteristic and ensure
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Figure 13. The ATCCS Element in Modular Configuration
The C2 node's NRTIS element will automaticallv receive the maneuver ele-
ment's transmission, process it and pass it to the ATCCS element. The ATCCS element
will autom.atically update the database and would pass the information to the large
screen operations display module (LSOD) for display. These functions would all occur
without operator interface. The database would be continuously updated as trans-
missions are received. The LSOD would be updated at a slower rate to ensure its
operator/viewer would have time to digest and comprehend the information being dis-
played before it is changed. Rates of update will be discussed further, later in this
chapter.
2. The Maneuver Element
As previously discussed under this concept, the maneuver element is a platform
or unit whose activities a commander or staff wishes to monitor closely. The maneuver
element is the data generator in the NRTIS concept but it is important to realize that
data generation is not its primary mission. A maneuver element exists to accomplish a
combat or tactical mission and the generation of data for the NRTIS concept is a sec-
ondar\' function which may help it accomplish its primary mission. In view of this, the
functions a maneuver element performs under the NRTIS concept should in no way in-
hibit or impair its ability to accomplish its primary combat or tactical mission. The
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paragraphs which follow will describe the function of each maneuver element module
and a general concept of how the overall element will operate.
a. The Antenna Module
The antenna module will allow the maneuver element to receive signals from
and transmit data to C2 nodes. The module should be of common shape and design so
as not to identify the maneuver element as a specific unit or platform. It should not limit
the maneuver element's ability operate in its normal manner or require excessive space
or power to operate. Its weight should not be excessive and installation should be ac-
complished by an operator without aid or use of special tools.
b. The Limited Operator Interface Module
The LOIM will provide the operator in the maneuver element the abihty to
enter the data that will be sent to a C2 node. This device could either be manually op-
erated or voice actuated by the maneuver element's operator or it could be mechanically
or electronically actuated by another system on the maneuver element. The LOIM
should have minimal effect on the operator's or maneuver element's ability to perform
its primary mission.
c. The Transceiver Module
The transceiver module will be capable of receiving signals from and trans-
mitting data to C2 nodes. It will be the primary means of transmitting data on the
maneuver element's identification, location, mission, combat posture, and operational
readiness to the C2 node. It may include an- interface with the communication networks
which form the ATCCS communication system.
3. The Command and Control Node
The C2 node will receive the data from the maneuver element through the
NRTIS element. The NRTIS element will process the data into information in a usable
format for use by the ATCCS element which will present the information to its operator
for display, storage, and/ or dissemination. The C2 node will also act as a maneuver
element in that it will be capable of transmitting data about itself for use by other C2
nodes.
a. The Near Real Time Information System Element
( 1 ) The Antenna Module. The antenna module will allow the C2 node
to receive the data being transmitted by maneuver elements and will allow a C2 node
to transmit data about itself This module will possess the same characteristics as de-
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scribed under the maneuver element and its components should be interchangeable with
those found in a maneuver element.
(2) The Limited Operator Interface Module. The C2 node's LOIM will
possess the same capabilities and characteristics as described for the LOIM under the
maneuver element and it should be interchangeable with a maneuver element's LOLM.
(3) The Transceiver Module. The transceiver in the C2 node will be ca-
pable of performing the same functions as the transceiver found in a maneuver element
but it will also be capable of receiving the signals which a maneuver element's transceiver
transmits. It will possess the same characteristics as a maneuver node's transceiver and
to the maximum extent possible, its components should be interchangeable with those
found in a maneuver element.
(4) The Processor Module. The processor module will take the data that
is received by the C2 node's transceiver, and through NRTIS software, process it to de-
termine the desired information. It will pass this processed information to the ATCCS
interface module.
(5) The ATCCS Interface Module. The ATCCS interface module will
take the processed information and transform it into a format which is usable by the
modules of the ATCCS element.
b. The A TCCS Element
The ATCCS element is the system through which the operators will realize
the true benefit of the NRTIS concept. It will receive the processed maneuver element
information from the NRTIS element and apply ATCCS common software to simul-
taneously update its large screen operations display (LSOD) module and its database
module (DM). It will possess the capability to exchange this information through the
ATCCS communications interface module and will allow for operator interface to the
LSOD or the DM via an operator interface module (OIM). It is important to remember
that all of the modules and software found in the ATCCS element are common ATCCS
items. These ATCCS items either currently exist or are being developed to support an
ATCCS subordinate system which would interface with the NRTIS.
(I J The Large Screen Operations Display Module. The LSOD module
will provide a full color, graphical display of the battlefield's terrain and relief features
and the control measures normally found on an operations overlay (e.g.: unit locations,
boundaries, phase lines, coordination points, etc.). The LSOD, through an operator's
interface module and the database, should be capable of displaying other types of over-
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lays and information in conjunction with the basic operations overlay. In essence, the
LSOD will be the operations map board with its various overlays being stored in the
ATCCS database. The LSOD should be capable of employing all of the symbology and
decision graphics found in FM 101-5-1, OPERATIONAL TERMS AND SYMBOLS
[Ref 24].
The LSOD should provide a commander and the staff a near real time
'snapshot' of the battlefield situation. A quick glance at the LSOD should tell an oper-
ator:
• Who the friendly forces in his sector are.
• What the current activity of those forces is.
• What their capabihties to continue to perform those activities arc.
• What the locations of those friendly forces are,
• What their relation to perceived enemy forces in the sector are. [Ref 25:p. 7.2].
The LSOD must be capable of providing as much information as
possible but this information must be conveyed to its operators in a clear and concise
manner. The portrayal or positioning of a maneuver element's symbol on the LSOD
should provide the operator an approximate position. In addition, the maneuver ele-
ment's symbol should allow the operator to quickly differentiate the various missions,
combat postures, and states of operational readiness the maneuver element can assume.
All of this information should be conveyed without having to access the database.
However, the operator should be capable of obtaining more precise information by ac-
cessing the database.
Without the NRTIS, the operator would have to request and receive
a countless number of voice radio situation reports (SITREPS) from maneuver elements
in his locale. In addition the operator would have to analyze and post these reports to
various overlays and charts. Under the NRTIS concept:
• The operator will receive reports from all maneuver elements operating in his sec-
tor, not just those which are task organized to his headquarters. This will enable
an operator to ensure his plans or actions arc not or do not inhibit those of adja-
cent maneuver elements. This ability by itself should reduce friction and the pos-
sibility of fratricide on the battlefield.
• The system's software can be designed to automatically sort and post specific time
critical information to the LSOD and other information to the database. The sys-
tem should also give its operators a signal that critical information has just been
received.
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• The system will be automatic and the information will be timely and accurate be-
cause there will be limited man-machine interface at the information generation
station, the nianeuver element, and as information passes through the ATCCS ar-
chitecture.
(2) The Database Module. The database module (DM) under this con-
cept is more than a storage device, it is also a central control unit. In the discussion
which follows, this module will be required to autonomously interact with and manipu-
late other portions of the ATCCS. It will also act as a reservoir or storage device for
various forms of information. The reader should be cognizant of this so as not to be-
come confused when the topic of discussion shifts from storage to software.
1. Database Storage:
• The database module's storage device will be a piece of ATCCS common hard-
ware and will incorporate ATCCS common software. The storage device will
store all of the information generated by a C2 node's operators; information
supplied by other ATCCS systems; and all of the NRTIS information received
by the C2 node.
• The actual amount of memory necessary to support this concept and all of the
other functions the DM will have to perform is beyond the scope of this thesis.
An analysis of the memory required to support this concept is in order and
should be pursued by other thesis candidates.
2. Database Module Software:
• The software which is incorporated into the DM should be capable of auto-
matically responding to requests for information from other headquarters. The
NRTIS will receive a request, conduct a search of its database, and respond
automatically without operator interface. The request and the response will use
the ATCCS communication networks as its communication medium.
• The software should also be capable of generating a request for information on
maneuver elements. For example, assume a rule is embedded in the software
which states that, as a minimum, every hour a maneuver node will transmit and
update the DM. If an hour should pass and the DM is not updated, it will au-
tom.atically transmit a query to the maneuver element requestmg an update. If
the query is not answered, a request for information will be sent to other C2
nodes operating in proximity to see if they have had contact with the maneuver
element. The C2 node will receive and sort the responses it receives and will
post and store the most current. These events should all occur without an op-
erator interface and would use the ATCCS communication networks.
• If the only way a parent C2 node can maintain contact with a subordinate ma-
neuver element is through another C2 node, then the parent C2 node should be
able to link the two DMs. This would be performed through the OIM and
would form a retransmission system. This capabihty would greatly enhance the
overall flexibility, redundancy and survivability of the system.
• A final characteristic which should be embedded in the DM software is the au-
tomatic generation and transmission of periodic standard operating reports to
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higher and lower echelons of command. Here again, a rule would be embedded
in the software which states, "Every X number of minutes (hours, days, etc.)
search the database for the X bits of information (unit locations, missions,
combat posture, operational readiness status, etc.) on X elements and generate
a message in the proper message text format for transmission to X headquarters
via the ATCCS communication network." When these messages are received
at the appropriate headquarters, the information would automatically be used
to update that headquarter's database and large screen operational displays.
fS) The Communications Interface Module. The communications inter-
face module (CIM) will provide the NRTIS concept the ability to interact with the
ATCCS communication networks. This capability will include access to all three com-
munication networks (the area, tactical, and digital) and will enhance the concept's
ability to disseminate the information it generates. The CIM will be linked to the DM
and will allow the DM to automatically exchange information with other DMs in its
BFA and in other BFAs. This capability will allow the NRTIS to disseminate its infor-
mation across a broad geographic area and will allow operators to generate a more ac-
curate and timely battlefield display at all echelons of command.
The software embedded in the CIM will conduct communication
network management to the extent that it will determine over which communication
network a given request, message or response will be transmitted. Criteria such as:
networks available at the sender's and receiver's location; prioritization of information
type (SITREP, logistics, administrative, etc.); the current system load and the additional
load the message will add to the system; must be considered in developing the software
which will make the network determination. In addition, if the transmission is not suc-
cessful on one network, the software should automatically switch to another and re-
transmit. This process should continue until it is successful or some limiting factor is
reached. In all cases, the system should inform the operator that it has either succeeded
or failed to transmit a message.
It is important to note that the interaction between the NRTIS and
the ATCCS communication networks will not be continuous. A C2 node will not
transmit a message every time new data is received from a maneuver element. What the
previous discussion does infer is that the current process of generating periodic reports,
which are normally governed by standard operating procedure, could be automated and
through this automation operators would receive information which is more accurate
and timely.
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(4) The Operator Interface Module. The operator interface module
(OIM) will allow an operator to manipulate the other modules in the ATCCS element.
It will allow the operator:
• to access the database to perform input and output functions;
• to generate and transmit message traffic via the CLM;
• to manipulate the LSOD:
to change its resolution;
to apply or remove various overlays;
to highlight various features (e.g.: road networks, maneuver units, etc.).
• to allow staff officers to perform staff functions.
The OIM would allow the staff officer to efficiently use and apply the
information generated by the NRTIS in the C2 process. It will be used as a stalTtool
by various staff officers and ideally, each staff section would have one for its dedicated
use. The OIM will most likely be a tactical computer terminal consisting of ATCCS
common hardware and incorporating ATCCS common software. Each OIM will be a
self contained workstation which can access the ATCCS database, generate a small scale
operations display, and have an adequate amount of memory space to allow a staff of-
ficer to execute his staff functions. In addition, the OIM would provide the staff officer
an automated workstation from where he could: access all of the data in the database;
manipulate the graphics depicted on the LSOD; develop and store plans; and then
present those plans in briefings on the LSOD while other operators monitored the cur-
rent situation on other workstations.
4. The Total System Design
Figure 14 on page 57 provides a graphic illustration of the entire NRTIS con-
cept including the relationships and interaction which occur between the various mod-
ules and the data or information each conveys.
E. OPERATIONAL ISSUES
This section will address specific operational issues which must be resolved if the
NRTIS concept is to be incorporated into the ATCCS. The issues will be addressed in
a question and answer format with the answers being derived from several U.S. Army
doctrinal publications.
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Figure 14. The NRTIS Modular Configuration
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1. What information should a maneuver element transmit?
The maneuver element should transmit those bits of information which are es-
sential to providing a capsulized situation report or should answer the five classical
situational questions: Who, What, When, Where, and How. To do this, the maneuver
element must transmit:
its identification Who is he?
its mission and combat posture What is he doing?
its all occurring now When was this so?
its position Where is he?
its operational readiness status How capable is he of continuing?
2. What should the maneuver element's transmitted information convey?
To enhance the survivability of the maneuver element, the transmission must
be extremely short. Therefore, the information contained in the data must be very spe-
cific and meaningful.
a. Identification
The actual terminology or symbology presented to an operator at a C2 node
must be meaningful. The level of identity must coincide with the level to which ma-
neuver elements are designated. For example, if a squad size element is designated as a
maneuver element then the system, using symbology and terminology, must convey that
information to an operator. Figure 15 illustrates this point.
b. Mission
The mission a maneuver element is conducting will be determined by ex-
amining the class of operations under which the mission falls. FM 100-5, OPER-
ATIONS [Ref 4], divides all military operations into one of three possible classes of
operations. Each class can be further divided into subclasses which characterize mission
types. Table I on page 59 illustrates the various classes of operations and their associ-
ated missions. [Ref 4:pp. 89-160]
All of the various missions possess unique traits which distinguish them
from other missions. Yet at the same time, they all share some common traits or char-
acteristics which can be used to describe a situation. The common situational charac-
teristics are: movement, contact, and engagement. A maneuver element or C2 node,
regardless of its mission, will either be moving or static; will be in contact with the enemy
or not in contact; and will be engaged in combat with the enemy or will not be engaged.
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m THIS TEXT AND SYMBOLOGY CONVEYS
1
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:
1st SQUAD, 3d PLATOON,
^ ^ BATTERY B, 3d BAH ALION,
3/B/3-44 1 /52 441 st AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY,
52d INFANTRY DIVISION
Figure 15. Maneuver Element Identity












By applying the common situational characteristics to each mission and af-
ter considering the definitions, traits, and goals of each mission as defmed in [Ref. 4], it
has been determined that the NRTIS must transmit situational data on four classes of
operations (missions) and six situations (combat postures). The four missions which a
maneuver node can conduct and the NRTIS concept must support and each mission's
definition are as follows:
I. ATTACK:
• An attack mission is defined as a maneuver element attempting to defeat the
enemy by:
seizing the initiative and aggressively destroying the enemy's forces;
gaining information on the enemy and then exploiting it;
securing key or decisive terrain;
depriving the enemy of resources;
disrupting the enemy's attack by counterattack;
depriving the enemy the freedom to maneuver by taking action against the
enemv.
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• This mission will embody all of the ofTensive operations discussed in [Ref. 4]
and will imply the force is moving and will continue to move once it has made
contact with the enemy or engaged the enemy.
2. DEFEND:
• A defend mission is defined as a maneuver element attempting to:
retain ground;
gain time;
deny the enemy access to an area;
damage or defeat an attacking enemy force.
• This mission will embody all of the defensive operations outlined in [Ref 4] and
will infer the maneuver element is conducting primarily static operations or
limited amounts of movement.
3. RETROGRADE:
• A maneuver element is conducting a retrograde operation when it is attempting
to:
gain time by slowly moving its forces rearward;
preserve its forces by moving them rearward;
• avoid combat under unfavorable conditions;
draw the enemy into unfavorable conditions by moving friendly forces
rearward.
• This mission will encompass the terms and meanings associated with retrograde
operations as found in [Ref 4] and will assume movement is involved.
4. MOVING:
• Moving is not an operation found in [Ref 4] but for discussion of C2 under the
NRTIS concept, it is a necessary mission type which must be recognized and
defined.
• Moving describes actions taken by a maneuver element to change its position
or to conduct a noncombat related mission such as convovine. It can be related
to displacement or just plain movement.
• Movement will normally occur in territory that is controlled by friendly forces
and is well to the rear of the PLOT.
c. Combat Posture
Each mission can be described by three of six combat postures. The combat
posture tells a C2 node what the current situation is at the maneuver element's location.
Three of the combat postures arc common to the ATTACK, DEFEND, and MOVING
missions. The combat postures associated with the RETROGRADE mission are dif-
ferent because of the unique nature of retrograde operations as defined in [Ref 4].
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The six combat postures and their definitions that will be employed to de-
scribe the situation under the NRTIS concept are as follows:
• MISSION-- ATTACK:
1. POSTURE- MOVING: Under this mission, this combat posture infers the
maneuver node is conducting an offensive operation and is moving or maneu-
vering to find the enemy. The maneuver element has not sighted nor has it been
engaged in combat operations with the enemy.
2. POSTURE-CONTACT: Under this mission, this combat posture infers the
maneuver element is conducting an offensive operation and is moving or ma-
neuvering and has sighted the enemy. The maneuver element has not become
engaged in combat operations with the enemy and is continuing to move to ei-
ther develop the situation or to bypass the enemy.
3. POSTURE-ENGAGED: Under this mission, this combat posture implies the
maneuver element is conducting an offensive operation, has sighted the enemy,
and is engaged in combat with the enemy. The maneuver element is continuing
to move to either destroy the enemy, bypass the enemy, or develop the situation.
• MISSION-DEFEND:
1. POSTURE-MOVING: Under this mission, this combat posture imphes the
maneuver node is conducting a defensive operation and is moving or maneu-
vering to assume a more advantageous position. The movement is limited and
the maneuver element has not sighted the enemy nor is it engaged in combat
with the enemy.
2. POSTURE-CONTACT: Under this mission, this combat posture implies the
maneuver element is conducting a defensive operation and has sighted the en-
emy. The maneuver element may conduct hmited movement to develop the
situation but it is normally assumed that it is in a static position. The maneuver
element is not engaged in combat with the enemy.
3. POSTURE-ENGAGED: Under this mission, this combat posture implies the
maneuver element is conducting a defensive operation, has sighted the enemy,
and is engaged in combat. The maneuver element may conduct limited move-
ment to develop the situation or assume a more advantageous position but it is
normally assumed to be in a static position.
• MISSION-MOVING:
1. POSTURE-MOVING: Under this mission, this combat posture implies the
maneuver node is moving or convoying between points which are to the friendly
side of the PLOT. The maneuver clement is not performing a mission which
implies that enemy forces will be encountered therefore this mission is neither
offensive or defensive in nature. The maneuver clement has not sighted the en-
emy nor is it engaged in combat.
2. POSTURE-CONTACT: Under this mission, this combat posture implies the
maneuver clement is moving or convoying between points on the friendly side
of the PLOT. The maneuver element has sighted the enemy. The maneuver
clement was not and has no intention of conducting cither olfcnsive or defensive
operations but it will continue to move to either bypass or avoid becoming en-
gaged in combat. If the maneuver element intends to develop the situation and
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conduct ofTensive or defensive operations, it would change its mission type to
ATTACK or DEFEND.
3. POSTURE-ENGAGED: Under this mission, this combat posture implies the
maneuver element is moving or convoying between points on the friendly side
of the PLOT. The maneuver element has sighted the enemy and is engaged in
combat. It is assumed the maneuver element will continue to move to bypass
the enemy. If it cannot bypass the enemy, the maneuver element will change its
mission type to ATTACK or DEFEND.
• MISSION-RETROGRADE:
1. POSTURE—DELAY: Under this mission the maneuver element is moving
rearward and is slowly releasing control of terrain to the enemy so as to gain
time. The maneuver element is moving and is engaged in combat with the en-
emy and is attempting to inflict severe casualties on the enemy while simul-
taneously preserving freedom to maneuver.
2. POSTURE-WITHDRAWAL: Under this mission the maneuver element is
moving rearward and is in combat with the enemy. The maneuver element is
voluntarily disengaging from combat in an eflbrt to preserve its forces or to free
itself to assume a new mission.
3. POSTURE-RETIREMENT: Under this mission, the maneuver element is
moving rearward and is not in active combat with the enemy. This movement
is normally conducted as a tactical road march or convoy and would equate to
the combat posture of moving. If a maneuver element were to come in contact
or become ensased bv an enemv force the maneuver element would change its
posture to withdrawal.
d. Location/Position
The C2 node must know where the maneuver element is if it is to gain any
meaning from the information the maneuver element generates. For maneuver nodes
operating on the surface of the earth (tanks, trucks, etc.) the C2 node should receive
position data which is accurate to 100 meters CEP [Ref 17]. For aerial platforms (hel-
icopters, remotely piloted vehicles, airplanes, etc.) the C2 node should receive surface
positional data which is accurate to 100 meters CEP and altitudinal data which is accu-
rate to 100 feet.
The functions of collection, transmission, and processing of the data neces-
sary to determine a maneuver element's position will be embedded in the system's soft-
ware. The function of using this information to generate a display will also be embedded
in the NRTIS software. Transparency of system functions must be maximized at the
C2 node and at the maneuver element.
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e. Operational Readiness/Status
The C2 node will require information on the maneuver element's ability to
accomplish its assigned tasks or to continue to perform its current operations. This in-
formation could be conveyed in three ways:
9
•
by providing an extensive and detailed logistic report which covers all classes of
supply and all authorized equipment;
by providing a limited report that addresses only combat essential items (e.g: am-
munition, fuel, combat systems, etc.);
• by providing a commander's estimate of his operational readiness which would be
extremely narrow in scope (unit is: mission capable, mission capable with limita-
tions, or not mission capable).
In the interest of being brief but concise, the NRTIS concept should
require the maneuver element to transmit the following operational readiness in-
formation:
Unit Strength: The number of major weapons systems (pacing items) which are
operational.
Supply Status: This should address only combat critical supplies such as Class
III (fuel) and Class V (ammunition) which are necessary to support major
weapon systems.
Commander's Estimate: This should state the commander's subjective opinion
of his force's capabihty of accomplishing the assigned mission (e.g.: unit is 90%
mission capable; unit is 80% mission capable; etc.).
This information would be entered into the system via the LOLM and would
be part of the maneuver element's periodic transmission. If the process of collecting the
data on supply classes could be automated and integrated into the transmission without
operator interface, the value of the NRTIS would be enhanced.
3. How often should a maneuver element transmit?
A maneuver element's periodic rate of transmission will be derived from evalu-
ating the following criteria and applying them to each maneuver element.
a. Rate of Movement
A maneuver element's rate of movement has a direct correlation to the
amount of territory it can cross in a given time period. A maneuver node which moves
at a great rate will cross more territory than one that moves at a slow rate and in doing
so will come in contact with more C2 nodes or unit boundaries. In view of this, a ma-
neuver element that moves at greater rates of speed needs to have a greater rate of
transmission or shorter period between transmissions than a maneuver element that
moves at a slow rate of speed or which is static.
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b. The Maneuver Element's Mission
The mission a maneuver element is conducting and tlie rate at which oper-
ations are conducted, will have an impact on the maneuver element's transmission rate.
During defensive operations, where movement is limited, there may be less of a need for
periodic information updates; especially if the maneuver element is in a static position
and operations are moving slowly. During offensive operations or retrograde operations
where there is movement and operations are occurring at greater rates, a greater trans-
mission rate may be required to ensure an accurate assessment of the situation is possi-
ble.
c. The Enemy
The enemy the maneuver element is facing and its ability to move forces or
strike, must be considered when determining the update rate or in controlling the update
rate. If the enemy possesses the ability to quickly change the situation, the system must
be capable of responding and providing a quick update to the C2 node.
d. Inter-Branch or Battlefield Functional Area Relationships
The relationships which exist between various branches or BFAs may gen-
erate a requirement for dilTerent transmission rates. An example is the relationship be-
tween the aviation community and the air defense community. If fratricide is to be
avoided, the air defense units must know where the aviation assets are and that infor-
mation must be disseminated to the dispersed air defense fire units in a timely manner.
This need for rapid collection and dissemination of information may require that aerial
platforms transmit at a greater rate than ground platforms to ensure the most timely and
accurate information is available.
4. What information should a C2 node receive?
A C2 node, regardless of its BFA, should be capable of receiving all data signals
transmitted by any maneuver element operating in proximity to it. This capabihty will:
• allow the C2 node to generate the most accurate and complete display of battlefield
disposition;
• enhance the system's robustness and flexibility because any C2 node will be capable
of supporting any echelon of command;
• allow the C2 node to act as a relay or retransmission station for other C2 nodes
which cannot receive a maneuver element's signal;
• estabUsh a large database which will allow operators to develop better and more
detailed plans.
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5. What information should a C2 node display?
In today's manual operations center the operations map board presents the
commander and stafT a basic illustration of the current situation on the battlefield. The
basic map board provides a graphic display of control measures and friendly unit lo-
cations. If the integration of additional information is desired (e.g.: opposing forces,
battlefield obstacles, mobility corridors, etc.) additional overlays are developed and ap-
plied to the map board. Information on a unit's operational readiness status is usually
miaintained on a chart or status board which is adjacent to the operations boards.
The NRTIS concept will be capable of providing the same information that the
current system does but NRTIS will use a LSOD in lieu of a map board or charts. The
actual information that will be displayed under the NRTIS concept will be dependent
on what the C2 node's operators decide is relevant. The C2 node will be capable of di-
rectly receiving information on all maneuver element's operating in proximity to it. In
addition, the C2 node will receive information on subordinate and superior maneuver
elements via the ATCSS communication networks. The operators at the C2 node will
have to determine what information they wish to view and using the software embedded
in the system, they will tailor the LSOD to fit their needs. For example, an infantr>'
brigade should be capable of tailoring the information that will go onto its LSOD to just
those units under its task, organization and all units operating on its flanks. Or it might
also wish to display all helicopters conducting operations in its sector. Or it may wish
to see all maneuver elements which are moving on the ground so it can assess traffic
flow.
The operators will also have the capability through the OIM to enter informa-
tion into the database which can also be placed on the LSOD. This capability, in con-
junction with those previously addressed, will enhance the clarity and meaningfulness
of the battlefield display.
6. What information will be displayed at a C2 node?
The displays must provide as much information as possible in the clearest and
most concise way. The current system for determining what information should be
gathered to be displayed on maps, overlays, and charts attempts to adhere to this axiom.
To accompUsh this, a process of echeloning is used which requires a headquarters to
maintain information on elements that are two levels below it and one above. This
process means that a headquarters at a certain level of command will only maintain or
display information on specific echelons or levels of command. For example, a company
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commander will maintain information on his platoons and squads whereas a brigade
commander \n\l maintain information on his battalions and companies.
The general rule which is applied to this practice is, "..a commander fights one
level below his echelon of command but thinks (or plans for operations) two levels below
his echelon." In view of this, a commander must maintain and display information on
elements which are two levels below his own echelon of command. Table 2 depicts this
rule as it applies today. [Ref 12:p. 4],





















The actual information a headquarters normally displays is the same as that
which the NRTIS concept intends to provide. Ideally the NRTIS concept, through its
interface with the ATCCS communication networks and the OIM's ability to apply
ATCCS software the LSOD's resolution, will allow operators at higher echelons of
command to have access to and display information on the lowest echelon of maneuver
elements.
7. How will information be displayed?
Under the NRTIS concept the LSOD and OIM display will provide the same
basic information as found in a manual operations center. Staff officers will prepare
information overlays using an OIM and will store them in the database until such time
as the overlays are required. When an overlay is needed, it will be called from the da-
tabase through the application of ATCCS software and will be displayed on the LSOD.
The NRTIS will be capable of layering many overlays on the LSOD to allow for simul-
taneous viewing.
The display must, at a glance, provide an accurate, near real time representation
of the current battlefield. The best way to accomplish this is through the use of symbols
and terms which have specific meanings and which will convey maximum information
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with minimum use of graphics capabilities. The C2 node's displays will, to the maximum
extent, use standard map symbols, control measures, and operational terms as found in
[Ref 24] SYMBOLS.
To display information which is stored in the database and which may or may
not be combat critical or which may not be easily transformed into a symbol, an oif
center information block capability should be developed. This capability would allow
an operator, using an OLM, to highlight a maneuver element, access the database, and
present all or select bits of information on that unit off in some corner of the display
screen away from the maneuver element's symbol. Information which might be dis-
played in an off center information block include the following:
• a maneuver element's full Combat Arms Regimental unique designation;
• a maneuver element's six digit grid coordinates;
• a maneuver element's mission;
• a maneuver element's combat posture;
• a maneuver element's detailed logistics status, as of some date-time group;
• a maneuver element's detailed personnel status, as of some date-time group;
• a maneuver element's overall operational readiness status, as of some date-time
group.
The discussion of the NRTIS concept which follows provides an insight into
symbology and terminology considerations which must be addressed by hardware and
software developers.
a. Identification
The abihty of the NRTIS concept to use symbology and terminology to
provide a battlefield display which provides a maneuver element's full identity at a glance
is directly related to the display module's physical size, level of pixel density, and the
software's graphics capabilities. Ideally an operator should be capable of displaying any
symbol found in [Ref 24] with its appropriate unique designation as specified by the
Combat Arms Regimental System (CARS) as seen in Figure 15 of this thesis. If it is
determined that selected combat platforms will be designated as maneuver nodes and the
full CARS designator is to be displayed, then it becomes evident that the display screen
will become excessively cluttered with CARS designations. An alternative to full CARS
designators must be identified. A modified or short designator or no designator for




To display a maneuver element's position or location, the ATCCS element's
software will apply the accepted rules as follows: "...the center of mass of the symbol
indicates the general vicinity of the unit. If a staff is added to identify a headquarters,
the base of the staff will indicate the precise location of the headquarters."
[Ref 24:p. 2.26].
c. Mission
To designate a maneuver element's mission the basic symbology found in
[Ref 24] must be expanded. The presence or absence of an additional symbol could be
used to specify what type of mission a maneuver element is conducting.
d. Combat Posture
To designate a maneuver element's combat posture the basic symbology
found in [Ref 24] must be expanded. The presence or absence of an additional symbol
or a change in the symbol's color could be used to specify the maneuver element's cur-
rent combat posture. A direction of movement indicator may be a beneficial attribute
incorporated into combat postures that involve movement.
e. Operational Readiness!Status ~-~ -
To provide an 'at a glance' representation of a maneuver element's opera-
tional readiness status the system should employ a visual technique which equates per-
centage of field filled with operational readiness. The percentage of field fill would be
illustrated by a change in the color of the symbol's field as it becomes less mission ca-
pable. The precise manner in which a maneuver element's OR status is determined is a
topic for further study. Alternatives include:
• allowing the maneuver element's commander's subjective estimate to determine the
maneuver element's OR status, which in turn would determine its percentage of fill;
• developing an algorithm and embedding it in the ATCCS element's software which
will use all available data to derive a rating that would determine percentage of fill.
If a more detailed listing or presentation of a maneuver element's OR status is desired
then an off center block, should be used.
8. How often should the database and displays be updated?
Ideally the database and the displays should automatically be updated with new
information as soon as it is received. This event will be a function of
• the maneuver element's transmission rate;
• the maneuver element's rate of movement;
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• the maneuver element's mission;
• the receipt of periodic situational and logistics reports;
• the receipt of responses to queries for information;
• operator input of information into the system.
If the system automatically updated itself at a continuous rate the operators
might never be able to use the information. Conceptually there is an acceptable rate at
which the system and the human operator can function to optimize efficiency. The de-
termination of that rate is beyond the scope of this thesis but suffice it to say that the
database should receive immediate and continuous updates and the display screens
should respond immediately to changes in mission and combat posture and should pro-
vide a periodic update for location and OR status.
9. What information should a C2 node pass on to other C2 nodes?
If the receiving headquarters is within the C2 node's chain of command, it
should use the ATCCS communications networks to pass the processed NRTIS infor-
mation. This information could be the basic maneuver element report of identification,
location, mission, combat posture, and operational readiness status or it could be more
detailed, in depth reports that were compiled from additional data found in the C2
node's database. The system's software should allow the C2 node to establish a direct
link to superior, subordinate and adjacent headquarters so that time sensitive or critical
maneuver element information can be transmitted immediately upon receipt. The soft-
ware should also allow the system to automatically and periodically transmit
situational/status reports that are required by current standing operating procedures.
If the headquarters is not within the C2 node's chain of command, it would only
pass information when that headquarters requested it. This exchange of information
would be conducted over the ATCCS communication networks. The only information
that should automatically be transmitted to another headquarters is the basic maneuver
element report. Requests for other information would have to be dealt with on a need
to know basis to preserve database security. If a need arose, the software should allow
a C2 node to estabUsh a link with another C2 node so that a maneuver element's basic
report could automatically be relayed between them.
10. How will line of sight problems be avoided?
Line of sight is a limiting factor in almost all C2 systems that employ the
electromagnetic spectrum as a communications medium. To avoid its impact on future
systems, designers must do the following:
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• develop or employ technologies which are not line of sight dependent;
• develop and employ technologies which can circumvent the difilculties the line of
sight requirement causes (e.g., satellites, high frequency radio waves, etc.);
• develop and distribute economical and automatic retransmission devices;
• develop and integrate an automatic retransmission capabihty or procedures into the
operator's system components.
1 1. Who will control the NRTIS system?
As the concept is currently conceived, there will be no single node that is the
keystone or net control station. Each maneuver element and C2 node is an independent,
stand alone node that does not need any other node to function.
As for management of codes, message formats, and encryption material:
• Each maneuver element should be capable of loading its unique CARS designator
into the transceiver and through the software tliis will be encrypted to protect the
maneuver element's identity.
• The system will incorporate ATCCS common message text formats.
• Over the air rekeying should be employed if it becomes necessary to use encryption
devices on this system. If it is necessary to use manual key lists then normal se-
curity measures currently in effect would have to be applied to this system.
F. ORGANIZATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
1. Introduction
This section will estabUsh criteria to be used to determine what organizations
or platforms should be designated as maneuver elements or C2 nodes. The application
of the criteria to each BFA and the final determination of what units or platforms should
be identified as maneuver elements or C2 nodes is an area for further study and will not
be addressed in this thesis.
2. The Criteria
In order to determine what units or platforms should be designated as a ma-
neuver or C2 node, it is necessary to estabhsh a set of criteria which, when applied to a
specific unit or platform will identify a clear and real need for the near real time infor-
mation system.
The criteria were derived, by the authors, from an examination of those opera-
tional characteristics which tend to inhibit, impede, or complicate a commander's ability
to exercise effective command and control. A total of six criteria were identified as being
relevant. They are as follows:
1. a unit or platform's mission.
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2. dispersion of units or platforms on the battlefield,
3. a unit or platform's rate of movement,
4. a unit or platform's availability,
5. a unit or platform's criticality to mission accomplishment,
6. a unit or platform's normal mode of employment.
It is important to remember that, for a given unit or platform, each of the criteria is
scenario dependent. This means that careful consideration will have to be given to each
when fmal designation of units and platforms is made.
a. Mission
Mission refers to an organization's or platform's doctrinal reason for being,
as defined by that organization's capstone doctrinal publication. A mission may be
classified as combat, combat support, or combat service support. For example: The
mission of the Air Defense Artillery is, "...to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of attack
or surveillance by hostile aircraft or missiles after they are airborne, thereby supporting
the primary Army function of conducting prompt and sustained land warfare oper-
ations." [Ref 26:p. 1.1].
• Maneuver Element: If knowing an organization's or platform's disposition en-
hances the controlling headquarter's ability to accompUsh its mission, then that
organization or platform will be designated as a maneuver element.
• C2 Node: If knowing the disposition of a maneuver element is critical to and/or
would enhance mission accomphshment, then that headquarters will be designated
as a C2 node.
b. Dispersion
Dispersion describes the average doctrinal distance between similar organ-
izations or platforms or the area an organization or platform is responsible for control-
ling.
• Maneuver Element: If the dispersion between like organizations or platforms is
more than one kilometer or if the area an organization or platform is responsible
for covering exceeds 10 square kilometers, then it will be designated a maneuver
element.
• C2 Node: If a headquarter's organizations or platforms arc normally dispersed on
the battlei'iold over a 20 square kilometer area then it will be designated as a C2
node.
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c. Rate of Movement
Rate of movement describes the speed at which an organization or platform
normally conducts combat operations or if it is not a combat vehicle, the speed at which
it conducts normal tactical operations.
• Maneuver Element: If an organization's or platform's normal combat or tactical
speed exceeds 50 kilometers per hour (KPH) then it will be designated as a ma-
neuver element.
• C2 Node: If a headquarter's organizations or platforms normally conduct combat
or tactical operations at speeds in excess of 50 KPH, that headquarters will be
designated as a C2 node.
If a headquarter's organizations or platforms may have a direct influ-
ence on other organizations or platforms which conduct normal combat or tactical
operations at speeds in excess of 50 KPH, then that headquarters will be designated
as a C2 node.
d. Availability
Availabihty can be described as the number of like or similar units or pieces
of equipment normally found in a division which are capable of performing a given
mission.
• Maneuver Node: If a maneuver element is considered to be a rare or constrained
resource within a division and there are no suitable surrogates in the division which
could be substituted to perform the maneuver element's mission without adversely
effecting the battle outcome, then that element should be designated as a maneuver
element.
• C2 Node: If a headquarters must exercise command and control over a constrained
resource and there are no suitable surrogates which could be employed as substi-
tutes for that element without having an adverse effect on battle outcome, then
that headquarters should be designated as a C2 node.
e. Criticality
Criticality can be defmed as those capabilities which are essential to ensur-
ing victory and if control of those capabilities is lost, the outcome of any battle would
become questionable.
• Maneuver Element: If a maneuver element possesses valuable capability such that
its presence or lack of presence in a battle would either greatly enhance or deter a
unit's abihty to attain victory, then that element should be designated as maneuver
element.
• C2 Node: If a headquarters is responsible for providing effective command and
control over a maneuver clement which possesses a valuable capabiUty such that
its presence or lack of presence in a battle would either greatly enhance or deter a
unit's ability to attain victory, then that headquarters should be designated as a
C2 node.
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/. Mode of Employment
Mode of employment refers to how an organization or platform is normally
assigned a mission or employed. Does an organization normally fight as a company size
element or do they conduct operations as an autonomous platoon in support of another
force?
• Maneuver Element: If an organization or platform normally conducts its oper-
ations as an autonomous force, away from its parent headquarters, then it will be
designated as a maneuver element.
• C2 Node Element: If a parent headquarters must provide command and control
to an organization or platforms that normally operate as autonomous elements in
support of another headquarters, then the parent headquarters will be designated
as a C2 node.
3. The Application of the Criteria
This section will provide an example of how the aforementioned criteria can
be applied to a given organization to designate units or platforms as either maneuver
elements or C2 nodes. A divisional Air Defense Artillery battahon will be the organ-
ization used in this example.
a. Maneuver Element Designation
1. MISSION: The divisional Air Defense Artillery (ADA) battahon performs a
combat support mission. It is a supporting element in the combined arms team and
usually has a subordinate but key role in planning operations. It is a force multi-
plier under the combined arms concept. Knowledge of the ADA battaUon's force
disposition would enhance the controlling headquarter's abiUty to accomplish its
assigned mission. In view of this, the elements which form an ADA battalion meet
the criteria for designation as maneuver elements.
2. DISPERSION: The ADA battahon will deploy its assets across the division's
sector, an area that is approximately 2,209 square kilometers (47 by 47 kilometers).
A battery within the battalion may be assigned the mission of supporting a forward
brigade which has a sector with an area that is approximately 300 square kilometers
(15 by 20 kilometers). The battery will assign its platoons and sections the mission
of providing air defense protection to static assets or maneuver battaUons. The
platoons and sections will disperse their fire units (weapon systems) around an as-
set or within the maneuver battaUon's sector in accordance with ADA doctrine.
The doctrine for weapon system dispersion is as follows:
• Stinger Missile System: 2-4 kilometers;
• Vulcan Air Defense Gun: 1-1.5 kilometers;
• Forward Area Alerting Radar (FAAR): 9 kilometers.
The dispersion of ADA weapon systems meets the criteria estabUshcd for desig-
nation of a unit or platform as a maneuver element. [Refs. 20:pp. 2-3; 27:p. 6.7;
28 :p. 4.2]
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3. RATE OF MOVEMENT: The fire units within an ADA battalion do not normally
operate at speeds in excess of 50 KPH. Therefore, the fire units do not meet the
criteria for rate of movement.
4. AVAILABILITY: There is only one ADA battalion in an AOE division. This
battalion is responsible for providing air defense protection to the entire division.
A battalion, organized under the J-Series Table of Organization, consists of 75
Stinger Missile System Crews, 27 Vulcan Air Defense Guns, and 6 Forward Area
Alerting Radars. These assets must provide air defense protection over the divi-
sion's area which is approximately 2,209 square kilometers. This mission must be
accomplished in accordance with ADA doctrine which restricts fire unit dispersal
as cited above. These two points support the contention that the assets of an ADA
battalion are constrained and their availability is limited. In view of this, the ADA
fire units meet the criteria for designation as maneuver elements. [Refs. 29;
20:pp. 2-3]
5. CRITICALITY: The threat forces which the U.S. Army may face in a high to mid
intensity conilict are capable of conducting large scale air operations. These oper-
ations pose a serious thieat to Army operations. The ADA battalion in a division
is the only ground asset at the divisional level that is dedicated to countering this
threat. This fact classifies ADA weapon systems as critical asset who's presence
or lack of presence, in a battle may determine a force's ability to accomplish its
mission. In view of this, the ADA fire units meet the criteria for designation as
maneuver elements. [Ref 26:pp. 1.6-1.12]
6. MODE OF EMPLOYMENT: ADA fire units are employed as dispersed platoons
or sections. They normally conduct their air defense missions as autonomous ele-
ments m support of a maneuver force. They are normally deployed away from their
parent headquarters and supported headquarters. In view of this, ADA fire units
meet the criteria for designation as maneuver elements. [Ref 27:pp. 6.1-6.30]
7. SUMMARY: The weapon systems assigned to a divisional ADA battalion meet
five of the six maneuver element designation criteria. An argument can be made
that their limited availability and cnticality to mission accomplishment, requires
maximum utilization of ADA assets therefore they are never placed in reserve and
will constantly be moving to assume new support missions and to enhance their
survivability. This excessive amount of movement must be considered as an addi-
tional criteria that can be used as a surrogate to the rate of movement criteria
thereby allowing the ADA weapon systems to meet all six criteria.
S, CONCLUSION: The weapon systems in a divisional ADA battalion should be
designated as maneuver elements.
b. C2 Node Designation
1. MISSION: ADA platoons and sections are the lowest level of headquarters that
conducts planning for combat operations. The weapon systems that comprise a
platoon or section must autonomously execute the plans that are developed by the
platoon or section headquarters. In addition, the weapon systems must operate
as dispersed elements on the battlefield. To properly execute command and control
over its assigned weapon systems, the ADA platoon and section headquarters must
know the disposition of its weapon systems. In view of this, ADA platoon and
section headquarters should be designated as C2 nodes.
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The ADA battery headquarters is the focal point for air defense oper-
ations within a brigade sector as the ADA battalion headquarters is the focal point
within a division. Both of these headquarters must know the disposition of their
assets to effectively exercise command and control. In view of this, the ADA bat-
tery and battahon headquarters should be designated as C2 nodes.
2. DISPERSION: The dispersion of an ADA platoon will be determined by the
mission, the enemy, the terrain, the troops available, and the time available. Given
these considerations and ADA doctrine, it is evident that only the Vulcan platoon
headquarters does not meet the criteria for designation as a C2 node. The ADA
battery and battahon headquarters meet the dispersion criteria and should be des-
ignated as C2 nodes.
3. RATE OF MOVEMENT: The ADA community must interface and interact with
the aviation community and the aviation community does normally conduct oper-
ations at speeds in excess of 50 KPH. In view of this, all ADA headquarters
(platoon, section, battery, and battahon) meet the criteria for designation as C2
nodes.
4. AVAILABILITY: ADA weapons systems have been defined as limited or con-
strained assets. ADA headquarters must exercise command and control over these
constrained assets for which there are no suitable surrogates. In view of this, all
ADA headquarters meet the criteria for designation as C2 nodes.
5. CRITICALITY: ADA weapon systems have been defined as being critical to de-
termining battle outcome. Their criticality has designated them as maneuver ele-
ments. ADA headquarters must exercise command and control over these critical
weapon systems. In view of this, all ADA headquarters meet the criteria for des-
isnation as C2 nodes.
6. MODE OF EMPLOYMENT: ADA platoons, sections, and batteries
autonomously execute air defense plans in support of other headquarter. ADA
batteries must exercise command and control over platoons and sections as the
battahon must over the batter>'. In view of this, ADA battery and battahon
headquarters meet the criteria for designation as C2 nodes but the platoon and
section headquarters do not.
7. SUMMARY: Only ADA battery and battahon headquarters meet all six criteria
for designation as C2 nodes.
'o'-
8. CONCLUSION: All divisional ADA battery and battalion headquarters should
be designated as C2 nodes.
The intent of the previous example was to demonstrate how the authors,
using their interpretation of doctrine, would apply the criteria to one specific functional
area. It is evident that the six criteria do not provide a concise 'cookie cutter' approach
to determining what organization or platform should be designated as a maneuver ele-
ment or C2 node. Further study and refinement is necessary.
4. The NRTIS Architecture
The previous example can be apphed to an architecture to dem.onstrate how the










Figure 16. NRTIS Architecture
battalion cited in the previous example. The various ADA weapon systems and infantry
companies are dispersed on the battlefield and are equipped as maneuver elements (ME).
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The ADA platoon, battery and battalion headquarters are C2 nodes, as are the other
battaUon, brigade, and division headquarters depicted in the figure. Note that the
NRTIS concept, through the ATCCS communication networks, ensures the supported
and superior headquarters receive timely, accurate, and relevant information on the
ADA weapon systems. Also note that the NRTIS allows headquarters that are not in
the chain of command to receive information on the ADA weapon systems.
G. SUMMARY
This chapter has taken a need, as defined by Chapter One, and has described a
concept for a C2 system which, in conjunction with other ATCCS elements, will satisfy
the need. This chapter's description has identified the operational characteristics and
operational and organizational considerations which are appUcable to a C2 system. In
Chapter Three of this thesis technology will be applied to this concept and a feasible
solution to the defmed need will be identified.
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III. A PROPOSED TECHNICAL SOLUTION
A. INTRODUCTION
1. Purpose
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate a proposed technical solution to
an identified command and control deficiency. Specifically, the concept outlined in "An
OMEGA/Transponder Display System" by Litchford and Saganowich will be examined
in terms of its ability to generate and display friendly combat forces identification, rela-
tive position, and a variety of combat related information. [Ref 30]
The technologies involved are part of three mature, operationally certified sys-
tems, each supporting large user communities consisting of civil and military subscribers.
This assessment will look at the proposed integration of these technologies and this
system's relative merit.
2. Objectives
The objectives of this examination are:
• determine if this concept can provide a near term solution to a critical command
and control deficiency;
• establish the risk associated with developing this capability;
• outline the technical and functional aspects of the proposed concept;
• assess the advantages and disadvantages of such an approach.
3. Methodology
The approach used to accomplish the stated objectives will involve:
• specification of the general concept;
• review of the individual concept technologies as they exist today;
• detailed examination of the concept and its unique technology;
• functional lay down of the proposed system.
B. CONCEPT PROPOSAL
1. Overview
Again, the specific command and control requirement is to generate and display
identification, position, and tactical information on U.S. combat forces. This near real
time display will aid the execution of current operations and support planning for future
operations. Both of these missions must be accomplished within the tenets of AirLand
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Battle (ALB) doctrine. Fielding of this capability would significantly enhance the oper-
ational effectiveness of tactical U.S. combat forces. [Ref 30:p. 13]
The OMEGA/Transponder concept proposes to capitalize on the demonstrated
strengths of very low frequency (VLF) radio systems, radar beacon system (RBS) and
computer technologies to address a stated command and control deficiency. Specifically,
the OMEGA/Transponder concept expects to capitalize on the technical strengths of the
OMEGA Radionavigation System, the Navy's VLF Communication System (VLF
COMM) and the Department of Defense Identification Friend or Foe System to gener-
ate and display friendly force disposition to enhance the command and control process.
[Ref. 30:pp. 1-2]
This chapter will extend the concept to allow for discussion of the more critical
operational and organizational considerations. This will all be accomphshed within the
context of applicable Army command and control programs.
For the purposes of this discussion, the OMEGA/Transponder concept will be
referred to as VLF/ IFF. The reasons for this will become clear in the early sections of
this chapter.
2. Technologies
VLF/ IFF technologies currently support a strategic communication system and
two internationally operated systems each providing service to thousands of civil and
military subscribers. Both systems are designed to support joint and combined oper-
ations in peacetime and wartime environments.
Figure 17 shows that both of these technologies have many years of evolution-
ary development and millions of dollars invested to ensure technical reliability. The
marriage of these technologies in VLF/IFF will reap the benefits of these investments
for little additional expense. [Ref 31:p. 3.33]
The associated risk, of such a technical effort is low due to the availability of
many of the components needed for VLF/IFF. It is estimated that greater than 80%
of the needed components are already in production. The other 20% could be provided
with minor hardware modification and standard software development elTorts.
[Ref 31:p. 3.34]
Low cost, low risk, and 'off the shelf components will ensure an accelerated
development cycle. This in turn will guarantee near term fielding of this needed capa-
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Figure 17. VLF/IFF Technology Integration
3. Operational Considerations
The global and international nature of the VLF and IFF systems will support
worId"w*ide operation. The robust, redundant capacity of these systems will enhance
tactical operations across the spectrum of anticipated battlefield environments. The
stand alone nature of VLF/IFF will support rapid deployment. The precise timing of the
VLF signal will provide for battlefield synchronization of all friendly combat elements
through reference to a common positional grid. VLF/IFF will enhance command post
survivability through the use of passive techniques. [Ref 30:p. 13]
C. THE IDENTIFICATION FRIEND OR FOE (IFF) SYSTEM
1. Background
The IFF system is the military extension of the Civil Air Traffic Control Radar
Beacon System (ATCRBS). Both systems share common RBS technologies whose ev-
olutionary' development dates back to World War II. The electrical characteristics of the
two systems are essentially the same. It is this feature that guarantees civil/military
interoperability. [Ref 32:p. 138]
To ensure the cooperation needed between the numerous international users of
this technology, standards have been developed by the International Civil Aviation Or-
ganization (ICAO), which is a subsidiary of the United Nations. Furthermore, within
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the United States, the Federal Aviation Agency is responsible for developing regulations
for civil and DOD users. The relationship between these organizations is depicted in
Figure IS. The Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) develops trans-
ponder specifications and Airlines Radio Incorporated (ARINC) publishes a special





















Figure 18. IFF/ATCRBS Standardization
IFF transponder technology is employed in all U.S. and allied military aircraft.
The current U.S. transponder is designated the Mark XII. The Army currently employs
two models of the Mark XII. They are the AN/TPX-72 and the AN/TPX-100. The
majority of U.S. allies use the Mark X transponder. [Ref 33:pp. 150-152]
The major difference between the Mark X and the Mark XII is that the Mark
XII has an encr\-ption capability that the Mark X does not. Otherwise, the versions are
fully compatible [Ref. 33:pp. 150-152]. For this reason and due to its imphcation for
combined interoperability, this chapter will use the Mark X as a vehicle for discussion.
System specifications for the Mark X transponder are shown in Table 3 on page 82
[Ref. 32:p. 20].
The Mark XV is currently being developed as the next generation of IFF
transponders. Recent agreement between the NATO Defense Ministers has selected the
Mark XV transponder as the standard for use in the NATO Identification system (NIS).
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Table 3. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MARK X SYSTEM
Range of system 370 kilometers
Frequency band L-Band
Interrogator frequency 1030 MHz
Interrogator wavelength 29.0 cm
Transponder frequency 1090 MHz
Transponder wavelength 27.5 cm










Pulse rise time < 100 ns







The Mark XV incorporates improved performance and security characteristics. As the
Mark XV is introduced into operation il will function alongside and remain compatible
with the Mark X and Mark XII versions. The VLF/IFF concept will work with any
version of these transponders. [Ref 33:pp. 150-152]
2. System Operation
The IFF system uses secondary surveillance radar (SSR) signals to determine
identification, range, azimuth, elevation and other operational information for a specific
maneuver element. Azimuth to a maneuver element is taken from an antenna pointer.
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Range is determined by the time it takes an interrogation signal to travel to a maneuver
element plus the time it takes the maneuver element's transponder reply to return to the
interrogating station. This is a cooperative process that involves an electronic signal
exchange as opposed to using passive primary radar reflection techniques.
[Ref. 34:p. 38.1]
In this system, a two way data link is established between an interrogating sta-
tion and a responding station on separate transmitting and receiving frequencies. The
interrogating station efTectively asks a question which the responding station answers.
The advantages of a cooperative system like this over primary' radar are:
• reply pulses are stronger;
• separate transmitting and receiving frequencies eliminate ground clutter and
weather return problems;
• interrogation and reply path coding provide discrete target identification and alti-
tude reporting. [Ref 33:pp. 38]
3. Signal Format
The IFF system operates in the ultra high frequency (UFIF) band of the
electromagnetic spectrum with the interrogation signal at 1030 MHz and the response
signal at 1090 MHz. As with all UHF systems, IFF is a line of sight system.
[Ref 33:p. 38.2]
Both interrogation and response signals use pulse position modulation. A de-
piction of the pulse employed is shown in Figure 19 [Ref 32:p. 23].
Each 1090 MHz reply pulse is characterized by a very short rise time of 50 ns.
Each pulse has a specified duration of 0.45 /xs with a tolerance of 0.1 ixs [Ref 32:p. 23].
Because of the requirement for fine reproduction of the IFF signal, which is necessary
to determine precise ranges, rise time is used to calculate transmission bandwidth. The
transmission bandwidth of the IFF signal is calculated as shown in equation 3.1.
[Ref 35:pp. 115-116]
Br = ——^- = ^ = 2 X loV/z = 20iV///2 (3.1)
rise time 50 x 10"^ sec
The signal format or 'mode' of the interrogation signal determines the coding
of the transponder reply [Ref 34;pp. 38.2-38.4]. Each of these signals will be discussed
in more detail later in this chapter.
Peak pulse power of the interrogator signal is typically 1 to 1.5 kW. Standard













Figure 19. IFF Pulse Format
The interrogator uses a directional antenna \^ith a signal beamwidth of 2.8 to
7.0 degrees and vertical polarization. The transponder uses an onini-directional antenna
with vertical polarization. [Ref. 34:p. 38.3]
a. Interrogation Signal
The various interrogation signal formats, or modes, are depicted in
Figure 20 [Ref. 32:pp. 21-22]. Each mode is defmed by the time interval between the
Pi and Pj pulses. Each mode effectively demands specific information to be encoded in
the transponder reply. For instance, Mode 3/A requires the transponder to reply with
the maneuver element's unique identity code. Mode C requires the transponder to reply
with the encoded altitude of the maneuver element. [Ref 32:p. 22]
Each mode is reserved for specific operational communities. Modes 1 and
2 are reserved for military use. Modes B and D are reserved for civil air traffic control
(ATC). Modes 3/A and C are shared by the military and civil communities, thereby
ensuring IFF/ATCRBS interoperability. Although not shown, there is a Mode 4 which
is reserved for use by the militar>' for Mark. XII encr>'ption [Ref 33:pp. 150-152]. Mode
4 will not be addressed in this discussion except to say that it can be used in the
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Figure 20. Interrogation Signal Format
b. Response Signal
The response signal format is depicted in Figure 21. As stated earlier, the
signal uses pulse position modulation in the sense that information in the signal is de-
pendent on the presence or absence of the pulses in specific positions in a frame. There
are specified pulse positions at 1.45 /is intervals as indicated. The duration of the re-
sponse signal is 20.3 us with a tolerance of 0.1 /is. [Ref 32:p. 23]
AVAILABLE PULSE POSITIONS jmnjuifuumrinnjuiii JL
SPACING {\isec) «
LEADING EDGE TO LEADING EDGE 2.0 S.a S.7 11. S 14. S 17.4 20.03
1.4S 4.3S 7.2S 10. IS 13.05 IS. 95 It. tS 24. 6S
Figure 21. Response Signal Format
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The typical transponder can reply 1,200 times per second [Ref. 34:p. 38.12].
The short length of the reply and the number of replies possible per second provides for
a very robust system supporting many users and the exchange of a large amount of ui-
formation.
The first and last pulses of the signal are framing pulses and are always
present. The 'X pulse' or center pulse is always an empty position. The other twelve
pulses are the information pulses which provide 2'^ or 4,096 possible code words.
[Ref 34:p. 38.3]
These code words are used primarily to assign unique identity to a maneu-
ver element and report altitude. Altitude is reported in terms of flight levels or 100 foot
increments of standard atmosphere. Special code words are currently reserved to trans-
mit operational and emergency situation information. [Ref 34:p. 38.3]
Possible enhancements to the system that will be discussed as they apply to
the VLF/IFF concept include:
• using the X pulse to provide for additional code words, i.e., 2" or 8,192 code words
per mode;
• a data link capabihty between the ground station and the transponder;
• an address coded, selective interrogation system. [Ref 32;p. 74]
D. THE OMEGA AND VLF COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
The OMEGA and VLF Communications (VLF COMM) systems are two inde-
pendent systems with different missions both operating in the very low frequency (VLF)
or 10 to 30 kHz region of the electromagnetic spectrum. For the purposes of this paper,
VLF will be used to describe a generic 10 to 30 kHz signal. Distinctions between the
OMEGA and VLF COMM signals will be specified as required.
1. OMEGA
OMEGA is a hyperbolic radionavigation system operating on a timesharing
basis with eight stations transmitting phase synchronized signals in the VLF range of the
electromagnetic spectrum. The VLF band between 9 and 14 kHz has been interna-
tionally reserved for operation of the OMEGA system. The system is designed to pro-
vide aircraft and ships with continuous, all weather, position fixing accuracy of 4
nautical miles, 95% of the time. [Ref 36:p. 1]
Due to the characteristics of the system's signal, OMEGA is exceptionally well
suited for use over enormous distances, at all altitudes and all surface locations regard-
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less of terrain. There is no line of sight requirement for use of OMEGA.
[Ref. 36:p. 2]
The OMEGA system was developed by the United States and is currently op-
erated in a partnership with Norway, Liberia, France, Argentina, Australia, and Japan.
The locations of the OMEGA stations are shown in Figure 22 while operating agencies
for each station are listed in Table 4 on page 88. [Ref. 36:pp. 1-2]
Figure 22. OMEGA Station Locations
The OMEGA system has been certified and fully operational as a global navi-
gation system since 1982. It is currently the only continuous operation global naviga-
tion system in the world. [Ref 3 7: p. 467]
Signal synchronization is the cornerstone of the OMEGA system. For the sys-
tem to operate properly, the precise OMEGA timing sequence must remain stable. This
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Table 4. OMEGA STATION OPERATING AGENCIES
LETTER
STATION: DESIGNATION: COORDINATES: OPERATOR:












Oahu, HI C 21 24 16.78N
157 49 51.51W
U.S.C.G.
La Moure, ND D 46 21 57.29N
98 20 08.77W
U.S.C.G.
La Reunion Is. E 20 58 27.03S
55 17 23.07E
French Navy
Argentina F 43 03 12.89S
65 11 27.36W
Argentine Navy








is accomphshed through the use of three cesium frequency standards located at each
OMEGA station. [Ref 36:p. 7]
The OMEGA signal format is shown in Figure 23. The signal radiated by each
transmitter is a sequence of continuous wave radio frequency transmissions lasting be-
tween 0.9 and 1.2 seconds. Each 'burst' transmission contains over 10,000 precision zero












Figure 23. OMEGA Station 'A' Signal Format
Each station's signal consists of five fi-equencies transmitted in an eight pulse
pattern of various time periods over a ten second interval. Four of these frequencies,
which are used for navigation, are shared by each station. These 'navigation' frequencies
are 10.2, 11.05, 11.33, and 13.6 kHz. In addition to the navigation frequencies, each
station transmits a unique identification frequency. The unique station identity fre-
quencies and the letter designation for each station are shown in Table 5.
[Ref 36:p. 6]







N. Dakota D 13.1




These shared and unique identity frequencies are transmitted in a specified se-
quence that allows a receiver to determine a particular OMEGA station's signal. This
OMEGA system signal 'key' is shown in Figure 24. Synchronization of an OMEGA
receiver to the OMEGA key is essential for use of this system. [Ref 36:p. 7]
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12.0 10.2 13.6 11.33 12.0 12.0 11.05 12.0
11.8 11.8 10.2 13.6
1
11.33 11.8 11.8 11.05
11.05 13.1 13.1 10.2 13.6 11.33 13.1 13.1
12.3 11.05 12.3 12.3 10.2 13.6 11.33 12.3
12.9 12.9 11.05 12.9 12.9 10.2 13.6 11.33
11.33 13.0 13.0 11.05 13.0 13.0 10.2 13.6
13.6 11.33 12.8 12.8 11.05 12.8 12.8 10.2
Figure 24. OMEGA Signal Transmission Key
CMEGA navigation is performed by measuring the phase difference of like fre-
quency signals from three different stations. The measured phase difference between two
O.MEGA station signals, say at 10.2 kHz, determines a line of position (LOP) between
the two stations on which the receiver must lie.. .Measurement of phase differences be-
tween several OMEGA stations defmes additional LOP's. The intersection of these
LOP's is used to determine receiver location. [Ref 36:pp. 13-14]
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An OMEGA station generates 150 kW of signal power. However the OMEGA
transmitter's average radiated signal power is 10 kW [Ref. 37:p. 467]. This is a result
of the inefficiency of the huge antenna necessary for signal transmission. This 10 kW
signal power precludes interference caused by signals traveling twice the circumference
of the earth. It also means that not all station signals are available everywhere in the
world. However, receipt of at least three to four usable signals has been demonstrated
by extensive survey over 95% of the earth's surface. This is sufiicient for global navi-
gation. [Ref 38:pp. 22-25]
The angle of arrival of these signals is important in determining position accu-
racy. Because of the geographic locations of the eight OMEGA stations, the arrival
angle of the signals is sufficientlv distributed over 360 decrees to minimize geometric
dilution of position (GDOP) or errors that are introduced when the angle between
intersecting signal lines is significantly less than 90 degrees. [Ref 37:pp. 471-472]
The OMEGA Radionavigation System is currently being used for various
missions by all departments of the U.S. Armed Forces and by most of our allies. The
system is also used extensively by commercial airline and maritime industries. A survey
conducted between 1984 and 1986 identified over 15,000 users of the OMEGA system
[Ref 39:pp. 186-196]. That number represents a significant increase over the past six
years. Much of this increase can be attributed to demonstrated improvements in system
accuracy and reliability [Ref 38:pp. 8-14],
In addition to the global OMEGA system, there are a series of differential
OMEGA stations, located for the most part in Europe. These stations correct for
propagation effects on the global VLF signals. This service is available for receivers
within several hundred kilometers of these stations. Differential OMEGA will not be
discussed in this paper. [Ref 36:p. CI]
2. VLF COMM
The primary mission of the VLF COMM System is to support the submarine
forces of the United States nuclear triad. There are ten U.S. and alhed VLF COMM
stations located around the world as depicted in Figure 25 [Ref 40:p. 122]. Seven of
these stations are U.S. owned and operated by the U.S. Navy [Ref 41:p. 18]. Many
of these station's signals are currently being used by commercial OMEGA receivers to
augment the OMEGA signals. [Ref 42:pp. 8-14]
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Figure 25. VLF COMM Station Locations
The VLF COMM stations operate in the VLF part of the electromagnetic
spectrum between 15 and 30 kHz, Specific station and fi-equency match ups are shown
in Table 6 on page 93. [Ref. 4I:p. 18]
Unlike OMEGA, each VLF COMM station transmits continuously on only one
frequency. In addition, the power output of the VLF COxMM transmitters is 100 to
1000 kW. [Ref 40:p. 129]
VLF COMM stations also use cesium standards resulting in extremely fre-
quency and phase stable signals. These stations employ frequency-shift keying (FSK)
to modulate the signals. For the purpose of this paper, we will limit our discussion to
the timing and phase stability aspects of the VLF COMM System. [Ref 40:p. 129]
The Soviets also have navigation and communication stations operating in the
VLF spectrum. They have three navigation stations operating at 11.905, 12.649, and
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Table 6. VLF COMM STATION SIGNAL FREQUENCIES
LOCATION: CALL SIGN: FREQUENCY(kHz):
U.S.:
Maine NAA 24.0
Washington State NLK 24.8
Maryland NSS 21.4
Hawaii NPM 23.4







14.881 kHz [Ref. 40:pp. 128-129]. The Soviets currently operate approximately 30 VLF
COMM stations for control of their submarines. These stations operate in the 15-30
kHz range with transmission power between 400 and 500 kW [Ref. 43:p. 71].
U.S. VLF COMM signals are currently being used by most OMEGA receivers
as an additional signal source. An advantage of doing this is the increased signal to
noise ratio (S/N) due to the VLF COMM's greater output power. [Ref 41:pp. 16-20]
E. VLF/IFF TECFINICAL DESCRIPTION
VLF/IFF proposes to use the IFF transponder without modification. This will
provide command and control display information without interfering with the tradi-
tional ATC/Air Defense (AD) function of the transponder. VLF signals, either
OMEGA or VLF COMM, will be used in a non traditional manner. The VLF signal
will be used, in this concept, for time synchronization. That is, VLF/IFF is not con-
cerned with phase differences between like frequencies from two different stations. Ad-
ditionally, the OMEGA and VLF COMM signals will be used one at a time, not in pairs,
in a relative manner over a small (50 x 100 km) geographic area. This is significantly
different from how OMEGA is currently being used in the global sense. This technique
elTcctively eliminates the adverse effects of long distance propagation disturbances that
contribute to conventional OMEGA navigation errors. [Ref 30:p. 7]
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The VLF/IFF concept envisions a tactical battlefield saturated, both on the ground
and in the air, with precision timed VLF signals from at least three to four OMEGA
and/or VLF COMM stations [Ref 30:p. 12]. Maneuver elements will be equipped with
a VLF receiver; IFF transponder set [Ref 31;p. 4.7]. Command and control nodes will
be equipped with a C2 element consisting of a VLF/IFF receiver and display processor
[Ref 31:p. 4.11].
It is important to note at this point that, the VLF receiver is not a full OMEGA
navigation set. Much of what is necessary for OMEGA navigation can be removed from
the receiver for VLF/IFF. This is due to VLF/IFF use of the OMEGA and VLF
COMM signals for precise timing only and not for navigation purposes.
The VLF signals will be used to defme precise timing periods by the command and
control elements and to trigger the transponders on maneuver elements, thereby syn-
chronizing and locking all players, air and ground, to a common reference grid. The IFF
transponder signals transmit unique identification, position, and tactical intelligence to
the command and control element for processing and display. [Ref 30:pp. 2-3]
1. TIME OF ARRIVAL
In the VLF/IFF approach, time of arrival (TOA) is defined as the time it takes
a VLF wave front from a distant station to pass through a command and control ele-
ment, travel to a maneuver element, trigger the maneuver element's transponder, and
that transponder's signal to return to the command and control element. TOA, there-
fore is a time inten'al. Figure 26 illustrates this concept [Ref 30:Fig. 1].
The beginning of this wave front is defined by the VLF signal's zero phase
crossing. All timing measurements in the VLF/IFF system are taken from a signal's zero
phase crossing. An example of a VLF signal zero phase crossing is shown in
Figure 27. [Ref 36:p. 9]
In VLF/IFF, the VLF signal is being used to trigger the transponder in place
of the active radar generated interrogation signal. This characteristic enables the com-
mand and control element to remain passive, thereby enhancing its survivability.
[Ref 30:p. 13]
2. Line of Position
In VLF/IFF, range and azimuth are not determined from a directed electronic
beam radiated from the command and control element. As in Figure 2S. elliptical ge-























Figure 27. Tlie OMEGA Signal's Zero Phase Crossing
As shown in Figure 29, the command and control element is considered to be
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Figure 29. LOP Elliptical Geometry
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Figure 30 shows that theoretically there exists a family of LOPs associated with
this ellipse. Each LOP is related to a specific TOA defined by a given VLF station.















Figure 30. TOA/LOP Relationship
3. Multiple LOP'S
For each VLF station and a given TOA, there is a unique LOP. LOPs from two
different stations intersect at only two points. This is shown in Figure 31
[Ref. 30: Fig. 6].
A third LOP from a third station, which could be a VLF COMM station, can
be used to remove this ambiguity and provide for a precise fix on a maneuver element's
true location. Figure 32 demonstrates this point [Ref. 30: Fig. 6].
This technique works for both up range and down range calculations as shown
in Figure 33 [Ref 30:Fig. 5]. Using this approach, only one VLF signal is needed to
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Figure 31. LOP Intersection
generate an LOP as opposed to traditional OMEGA which requires two signals to gen-
erate an LOP. [Ref. 30:p. 10]
4. Frequency Combination
Since VLF/IFF uses the VLF signal format to provide it's precision timing, the
unambiguous range or TOA measurement of the system is directly related to the fre-
quency of the VLF signal. It is the zero phase crossings of these signals that define the
start of the command and control clock and how long before it is reset (i.e., its listening
period). Equation 3.2 shows that with a 10.2 kHz signal, zero phase crossings occur
approximately every 100 /xs [Ref. 35:p. 23].
7=4 = 1
/ 10.2 X 10^ //2
= 9.8x 10" sec :^100/x5 (3.2)
The distance the signal travels in tliis time is approximately 30 kilometers
[Ref. 35:p. 5]. This calculation is shown in equation 3.3.









C2 DISPLAY COVERAGE AREA
Figure 32. Ambiguit}' Resolution
Using elliptical geometry and applying these figures to the VLF/ IFF system, this
equates to a down range distance of 30 kilometers and cross range distance of 60 kilo-
meters. This is illustrated for a single VLF signal in Figure 34 [Ref 3I:p. 3.13].
The same process used above can be applied to the 13.6 kHz signal. With the
13.6 kHz signal, the zero phase crossing occurs approximately every 75 ;xss and the dis-
tance the signal travels is approximately 22.5 kilometers. This decreases the effective up
range/down range distance to 22.5 kilometers and the cross range distance to 45 kilo-
meters. These calculations are shown in equations 3.4 and 3.5.
r=-L = 1
/ 13.6 X 10^ //2
= 7.35 X 10"' sec ^75fis (3.4)
i = cxr= (3 X 10 /cm/ sec) x 75^is = 22.5km (3.5)
To further increase the effective range of the system, VLF/IFF proposes using
a combination of the 10.2 and 13.6 kHz signals. As shown in Figure 35, coincident zero
phase crossing of these signals occur every third and fourth zero crossing, respectively.
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Figure 33. Up Range and Do>vn Range Calculations
Using the zero phase crossings of this 3.4 kHz signal increases both the listening
period of the system and the effective range. In tliis case the hstening time is increased
to approximately 300 ^s and the distance associated with that time is 90 km as shown
in equations 3.6 and 3.7.
r=-L = 1
/ 3.4 X 10^ Hz
= 2.94 X 10 sec =^300fxs
; = cxr=(3x 10^kml sec) x 300^5 = 90km
(3.6)
(3.7)
This equates to an increased down range distance of 90 kilometers and cross range dis-
tance to 180 kilometers. The coverage area using these two frequencies is shown in
Ficure 36.
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Figure 35. 10,2 and 13.6 kHz Signal Mixing
VLF/IFF can be implemented using any single VLF frequency or any combi-
nation of OMEGA frequencies. This example was used to demonstrate VLF/IFF's po-
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Figure 36. Effective Range of a 3.4 kHz Signal
As currently described, the VLF/IFF system will use OMEGA signals to determine LOP
intersections, i.e., positions of maneuver elements, and VLF COMiM signals to resolve
ambiguities. [Ref. 30:p. 1]
5. VLF Signal Selection
The VLF,TFF system must synchronize with the OMEGA system signal key.
This is routinely done in commercial OMEGA receivers using only three to four station
signals with the required signal to noise ratio, an>'where in the world. [Ref. 42:p. 8]
Since a given OMEGA frequency occurs only once every ten seconds for a given
station, the VLF receiver must synthesize that signal internally to reference it's zero
phase crossings for use in determining TOA's over the entire ten second period. This is
done in both the maneuver element and command and control element VLF receivers,
using a phase locked loop. Rate errors caused by movement of the maneuver element
in relation to the C2 element are compensated for through the use of predictive filters,
thereby providing accurate, current position information throughout the 10 second pe-
riod. [Ref 31:pp. 3.51-3.53]
These noise free, synthesized signals then generate electronic pulses at each zero
phase crossing. An example of this is shown in Figure 37 [Ref 31:Fig. 4.6]. Precision
signal generation is ensured by the use of very stable crystal oscillators. VLF/IFF pro-
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poses using a cn-'stal oscillator stable to 10-Vday in the maneuver element VLF receiver
and a cn-'stal oscillator stable to 10-'°; day in the command and control element VLF
receiver [Ref. 30:pp. 3.55-3.56]. Use of these highly stable cr>'stal oscillators guarantees
short term accuracies (ten seconds in the case of VLF/IFF) on the scale of 10"'° and
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Figure 37. VLF Trigger Pulses
Both the maneuver element and command and control element must be syn-
chronized in terms of which VLF pulses will be referenced over a given period. More
precisely, for the system to function properly both the maneuver element and the com-
mand and control element must reference the same pulse stream. For example, at some
time period Tq to 7",, both elements could reference the Norway generated pulses. Then,
from time period T, to T2 they could both reference the VLF COMM station at Culler,
Maine. It is through this process that each the station's associated TOA's are measured
and LOPs. defmed. [Ref 31:pp. 3.57-3.63]
A proposed VLF/IFF reference 'key' is shown in Figure 38. This VLF/IFF key
uses the eight precisely defined time slots of OMEGA and identifies examples of which
pulse stream will be referenced by all system elements during each time slot. This asso-
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elation of specific station pulse streams and the eight time slots is arbitrar>' and inde-
pendent of the normal use o"" the OMEGA key. [Ref 31:Fig. 3.22]
Derived VLF COMM Pulses Used In These Time Slots
To Trigger Transponder
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Figure 38. VLF/IFF Key
The eight OMEGA time slots were chosen in this example because they are al-
ready precisely defined in time to all VLF/IFF users. This could be specified otherwise
if so desired. Since only three to four OMEGA and one to two VLF COMM signals
are needed for the system to work, the best available signals are chosen and the rest are
'deselected' to avoid accuracy degradation. This creates open slots in the VLF/IFF 'key'
that could be used for transmission of immediate tactical inteUigence.
[Ref. 31:pp. 3.57-3.63]
6. Random IFF
Using 300 //s listening periods will establish 3,333 time slots per second. This
calculation is shown in equation 3.8.




To preclude continuous (i.e., once every 300 us) radiation by the maneuver element,
VLFTFF proposes that each transponder be triggered ten times per second leaving 3,323
time slots open for other transponder transmissions [Ref. 30:p. 6]. This rate is arbitrary'
and should be chosen for each maneuver element based on how often a position update
is required given the maneuver element's operating characteristics, mission requirements,
and the needs of the user community.
To statistically reduce the probability of two maneuver elements transmitting
at the same instant, possibly causing their signals to overlap and become 'garbled' at the
command and control receiver, the 300 //s pulses used to trigger the transponder are se-
lected randomly using a random number generator. This eliminates a major weakness
of the ATCRBS, i.e., synchronous code garbling, and allows for tracking of a high den-
sity of maneuver elements in near proximity to each other. [Ref 31:pp. 3.63-3.65]
A VLF/IFF command and control element using 300 pls listening periods (3,333
time slots/sec) and a reporting rate of 10 signals/sec could simultaneously support more
than 300 maneuver elements [Ref 31:pp. 3.63-3.68]. This calculation is shown in
equation 3.9.
3,333 time slots
Number of Platforms = —-—= ; — = 333 3.9)
10 time slots/platiorm
Selecting a transmission rate of ten times per second also demonstrates that if
four or five transponder transmissions are by chance or design, garbled or jammed, there
are still five or six good signals to measure several reliable, accurate TOA's and deter-
mine an associated LOP. Only three TOA's are required to perform this operation. The
extra seven or so provide a measure of redundancy, improved accuracy and robustness.
[Ref 31:pp. 3.64-3.65]
An interesting fact concerning the only 'active' component of the VLF/IFF
system, i.e., the transponder, is that since each burst occurs approximately once every
tenth of a second and lasts only 21 ,us, the duty cycle of the system is only 0.00021. This
calculation is shown in equation 3.10. [Ref 35:pp. 70-71]
dvLFiiFF = y- =
.
^! 'Z = 0-00021 (3.10)
( 1
X 10 l-is s
^ 10
''
The transponder is normally limited to 1200 transmissions per second
[Ref 34:p. 38.12]. This equates to a duty cycle of 0.0252. The VLF/IFF workload
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placed on the transponder at ten replies per second reduces this number to 0.02499. This
is really an insignificant reduction. Ho\^ ever, this small number is significant in that it
shows VLF/IFF does not detract fi-om the transponder's primary mission of providing
ATC/AD information. These calculations are shown in equations 3.11 and 3.12.
djpp = ^=^^ = 0.0252 (3.11)
. 1 X 10 ,u.s .
^ 1200 '
diFF - dvLFjiFF = ()-0252 - 0.00021 = 0.02499 (3.12)
Random triggering and 21 ix% bursts provide an additional measure of security
against ECM, intelligence collection and targeting by enemy forces. Operation of the
transponders in Mode 4 would provide encr>'ption of identification and tactical infor-
mation. [Ref 33:pp. 150-152]
7. Autocorrelation
The technique used to ensure correct maneuver element identification and TOA
matching is called autocorrelation. The 12 IFF pulses must agree, reply, to reply, to
reply. If even 2 of the 10 replies fully correlate there is only a one in (4,096)^ or 16.8
miUion chance that an error of this type will occur using this VLF/IFF coding scheme.
[Ref 31:pp. 3.44-3.47]
Autocorrelation is a common technique incorporated in current IFF/ATCRBS
equipment. This technique is used every day to separate and track thousands of aircraft
in ATC/AD operations worldwide. [Ref 34:pp. 38.2-38.16]
8. IFF Tactical Intelligence Link
VLF/IFF exploits a unique potential of the transponder. The transponder has
a 4,096 code word capacity to reply to each mode of interrogation. If the 'X pulse' is
used, this capacity doubles to 8,192 possible code words per mode. VLF/IFF proposes
reserving one of the interrogation modes for transmission of perishable and critical tac-
tical intelhgence from maneuver elements to command and control elements. An ex-
ample of such a transmission is depicted in Figure 39. [Ref 31:pp. 3.23-3.29]
This could be done in a manner similar to the current three letter operation
codes published in the Communications Electronic Operating Instructions (CHOI).
Typical input data to standard battlefield reports, i.e., situation reports (SITREPS) or
nuclear, biological, or chemical reports (NBC- 1, NBC-2, etc.), could be generated using
a keyboard or a voice actuated encoding device. Both of these items could be provided
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Figure 39. Tactical Data Link
with 'off the shelf technologies. An example of code words for a given day and time
period might be as shown in Table 7 on page 108.
VLF/IFF would also provide a potential link for passing combat information
generated by other automated information reporting systems, such as the Inter-
Vehicular Information Systems (I VIS) [Ref. 17].
Since the command and control center knows the identity and position of the
friendly maneuver element, it could easily use the code word information to determine
the enemy's activity and relative position.
9. Error Budget
To determine if VLF/IFF will meet the 100 meter accuracy requirement stated
in Chapter Two, potential sources of error must be identified. Each source of error
contributes to an overall error budget for the system. An error may have either a posi-
tive or negative value. A normal distribution of errors is assumed.
The sources of error are typical of position reporting systems. The values at-
tributed to each source of error are conservative estimates based on the results of a
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The message text: "310, 420, 510,610, 730."
The message conveyed: "Tanks, Jrom my location, one kilometer, east."
similar initiative recently conducted in England and contract work done for the Jet Pro-
pulsion Laboratory. The potential sources of error for VLF/IFF and an estimate of
their associated values are shown in Table 8 on page 109 and Table 9 on page 110.
[Ref 31:pp. 5.1-5.24]
Table 10 on page 111 and Table 11 on page 112 show the root-mean-square
calculations or S values for two sets of errors. The first set consists of those error values
already presented. The second set represents a 25% increase in all the first set values.
This is done to examine the significance and potential impact of any gross underestimate
of error values on the overall determination of system accuracy. Tne magnitude of this
increase in values is highly unlikely and is used only to highlight the minor impact a
sisnificant change to anv number of error values would contribute to the final S value.
[Ref 45:p. 155]
The S value is a measure of system accuracy. It is associated with a statistical
measure of confidence. Leave it to say for the purposes of this discussion that a \a value
about the mean relates to a 67% confidence level, 2a to 95% and 3a to 99%.
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1 . Crystal drift at maneuver element
and cr^'stal drift at the C2 node.
5 meters;
2. Angle of Arrival of the VLF signal
and any distortion of this angle of
arrival or bending of it due to local
conditions.
25 meters after corrections
by use of well known angle
of arrival technology.
3. Signal to noise ratio on the
strongest OMEGA signal.
20 meters;
4. Signal to noise ratio on the
second strongest OMEGA signal.
30 meters;
5. Signal to noise ratio on the
third strongest OMEGA signal.
meters; The third signal
is used for eliminating the
false crossing.
6. Signal to noise ratio on the
strongest VLF COMM signal.
20 meters;
7. Platform motion and the ability
to use rate aided tracking such as
Kalman to obtain predictive and real
time positions.
50 meters;
8. Platform errors due to changes in
heading of the platform.
Momentarily 75 meters until
rate aided tracking has
locked to the new straight
track.
9. Any variations across 100 km area
in propagation velocity of the VLF
signal due to local geodetic conditions.
20 meters after local
corrections
10. Local mineral deposits or highly
concentrated minerals in the area.
30 meters across a 100 km
battlefield.
11. Phase locked loop accuracy. 40 meters;
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12. Geometric Dilution of Positions
(GDOP).
40 meters;
13. Coordinate conversions (such as
elliptical, parabolic, and rectilinear
or polar coordinates).
30 meters;
14. Digital computer quantizing errors. 5 meters;
15. Deselection options to void out VLF
signals that can create errors such as
noisy ones or those perturbed by some
local condition on the path from the
VLF/IFF site to the far distant OMEGA
in that direction.
Reduction of position errors
by 30% if the errors arc
created by a noisy signal
that can be deselected in
the process. Therefore,
this is an improvement of
of accuracy.
16. Display processor errors. 30 meters;
17. Platform movement Kalman predictive
errors to create a real time continuous
position. This is known as "rate aided"
tracking in the VLF receiver design
and is an essential part of all OMEGA
receivers.
20 meters;
18. C2 node Kalman predictive errors
with regard to real time using
rate aided tracking on the same targets
even though the C2 node is a fixed
position to further use modern computer
processing as Kalman predictive vector
to increase the accuracy of the display.
10 meters;
Figure 40 shows the expected VLF/IFF system accuracies, derived from the two
o values, related to the three levels of confidence introduced above. This figure shows
that for the first set of error values, VLF/IFF would, with 99% confidence, generate
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Table 10. RMS CALCULATIONS -- SET ONE
ERROR #: (^ - A') {X. - xy
I. 5 meters 25 meters
2. 25 meters 625 meters
3. 20 meters 400 meters
4. 30 meters 900 meters
5. meters meters
6. 20 meters 400 meters
7. 50 meters 2500 meters
8. 75 meters 5600 meters
9. 20 meters 400 meters
10. 30 meters 900 meters
11. 40 meters 1600 meters
12. 40 meters 1600 meters
13. 30 meters 900 meters
14. 5 meters 25 meters
15. meters meters
16. 30 meters 900 meters
17. 20 meters 400 meters
18. 10 meters 100 meters
S-
is*****.******.**** * .-!!***** .-i!* * * * * * * ** « * .-:-. * * * * *
(3.13)
/ ^{x, - xf






/ ^{x^ - xy
V iV-i
position accuracies on the order of 96 meters. This is within the 100 meter requirement
specified in Chapter Two.
Also shown is the fact that a substantial change in all error values, as demon-
strated with the second set, still produces position accuracies, with 95% confidence, on
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Table 1 1. RMS CALCULATIONS -- SET TWO




















6.25 meters 39.06 meters
31.25 meters 976.56 meters
25 meters 625 meters
37.5 meters 1406.25 meters
meters meters
25 meters 625 meters
62.5 meters 3906.25 meters
93.75 meters 8789.06 meters
25 meters 625 meters
37.5 meters 1406.25 meters
50 meters 2500 meters
50 meters 2500 meters
37.5 meters 1406.25 meters
6.25 meters 39.06 meters
meters meters
37.5 meters 1406.25 meters
25 meters 625 meters












the order of 80 meters and, with 99% confidence, on the order of 120 meters. Given that
a 25% underestimate in all error values is unlikely, this drill serves primarily to illustrate
that VLF/IFF has a high probabiUty of generating accuracies on the order of the 100
meters required.
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Figure 40. Root Mean Square Value Distributions
The error values for numbers 7, 8, 11, 17 and 18 are all related to rate changes
essential for Kalman tracking of dynamic maneuver elements. These error values are
known with a lesser degree of certainty than the others and are therefore the most likely
of the error values to change. The potential accuracies that these o values represent
warrants their verification through a technical process.
For C2 display purposes, precision position accuracies on the order of 1 to 10
meters may be unnecessary'. Figure 41 shows a typical C2 display screen with 1,280 by
1,024 graphics. This display contains 1,310,720 pixels. If the scale represented on the
display were 8 nautical miles or 15,120 meters on each side, the display area would be
229 milhon square meters (m^). This in turn relates to a display accuracy of approxi-
mately 175 m^ /pixel. This means that each pixel, which is indistinguishable to the hu-
man eye, represents 175 rrP- on the ground. Any display generated representation of a
maneuver or C2 element would require a screen area of at least 20 x 20 pixels or cover
a ground equivalent area equal to 70,000 rr?-. Thus, to demand position accuracies on
the order of 1 to 10 meters for C2 display purposes would be extravagant.
F. FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION
1. Overview
Figure 42 depicts a relational diagram of the VLF/IFF system components























Figure 41. C2 Display Screen CaJculations
VLF COMM or OMEGA stations, crossing a localized battlefield. These signals are
used by the command and control element for clocking purposes. These same wave
fronts are used to trigger the maneuver element transponder. The UHF transponder
signal is transmitted to the command and control element where it is used to determine
identity and to calculate the relative position of the maneuver element for display.
The VLF stations are typically 1,000 to 8,000 miles distant from the maneuver
element and the command and control elements. The maneuver element and the com-
mand and control element are typically separated on the order of less than 45 kilometers.
The VLF signals are ground wave signals that are available at all altitudes, ev-
er\^'here on the battlefield, regardless of terrain. The UMF signal requires only one line
of sight between the maneuver element and any command and control element. With
VLF/IFF, the maneuver element is not tied to any one command and control element.
In fact, a maneuver element will input to the VLF/IFF system and interact with any
number of C2 elements to which it has line of sight. This feature highlights VLF/IFF's
distributed nature. [Ref. 30:p. 13]
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Figure 42. VLF/IFF System Components
In the VLF/IFF system, the VLF signal is used for time synchronization of ail
battlefield players. The UHF transponder signal is used in a traditional manner for re-
porting identity, altitude and other operational data. [Ref. 30:pp. 12-13]
2. System Operation
This discussion uill not evaluate the VLF signal generation or the operation of
the OMEGA and VLF COMM systems. However, it will discuss how the VLF signal
is used in the VLF/IFF system. This discussion will focus primarily on the maneuver
element and command and control elements, their components, and how the system will
generate and display the friendly battlefield situation.
a. Alaneuver Element
The maneuver element contains those components shown in Figure 43.
The VLF/IFF components consist of a VLF receiver and a L'HF transponder.
[Ref. 30: Fig. 4.7]
(1) Signal Receipt. Commercial VLF receivers typically have a four
frequency capacity. Three of the frequencies are tuned to the OMEGA navigation fre-
quencies, the fourth scans the VLF COMM frequencies [Ref. 31:pp. 4.7-4.10]. See

















Figure 43. Maneuver Element Components
(a) Antenna Requirements— Receipt of the VLF signal requires
an appropriate antenna. There are currently three types of antennae suit^bk for this
purpose. Two whip antennae will be needed for ground maneuver elements; one for the
VLF signal and one for the UHF signal. An E-field or H-field VLF antenna is required
for aircraft. However, an H-field antenna is preferred due to it's relative immunity to
P-static disturbances. The antenna for the transponder is already mounted on the air-
craft. [Ref 31:p. 4.10]
(b) VLF Frequency Tuner— The VLFOMEGA tuner has the
ability to autonomously recognize the eight OMEGA time slot transmissions and syn-
chronize to the OMEGA key. The tuner identifies the signal's station and frequency to
the channel selector. [Ref. 31:p. 4.8]
(c) Channel Selector— The channel selector determines the best
three or four VLF signals available based on signal to noise ratio and angle of arrival.
It then deselects the other stations. The channel selector specifies the channels (station
and frequencies) it wishes to receive to the tuner. In any one OMEGA time slot, the
receiver may spend time listening to the 10.2 kHz signal from one station and the 13.6
kHz signal from a different station. [Ref 31:p. 4.8]
(2) Signal Processing. Signal processing at the maneuver element in-
volves VLF signal synthesis, VLF signal prediction, and timing pulse generation. See
Figure 44. [Ref 31:Fig. 4.8]
(a) Stable Frequency Pattern Synthesizers— The selected chan-
nel signals are then run through a phase locked loop to synthesize a like VLF signal in
frequency and phase. This synthesis is done using a lO'V^lay stable cr\'stal. This phase
































Figure 44. Maneuver Element VLF Signal Receipt/ Processing
zation with the OMEGA time slot key. These synthesized signals are then stored over
the ten second period. The zero phase crossing of these synthesized signals are used for
timing reference points by the pulse generator. [Ref 31:p. 4.9]
(b) Signal Prediction— Since the synthesized VLF signals are
updated only once every ten seconds, it is necessary to account for phase shift and hence
changes in zero phase crossings that result from movement of the maneuver element
relative to the command and control element. [Ref 31:p. 3.51]
The VLF receiver uses Kalman filtering to predict changes in
the VLF signal zero crossings due to movement of the maneuver element. These linear
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predictive techniques minimize the potential for error in position determination during
the nine seconds of 'off time for a given frequency from each OMEGA station.
[Ref. 31:p. 3.51]
Predictions made by Kaiman filtering are based on the maneu-
ver element headmg averaged over a given period of time. In VLF/IFF, sudden changes
in heading are fed into the Kaiman filter and corrections are applied immediately. The
filter then settles into an averaging pattern again after several samples. [Ref 31:p. 3.51]
(c) Pulse Generator— The pulse generator uses zero phase
crossings of the synthesized signals to generate pulses. These pulses can be generated
using single frequency zero phase crossings or a combination of zero phase crossings,
i.e., 10.2 kHz and 13.6 kHz. [Ref 31:p. 4.9]
fS) Signal Transmission.
(a) Random Countdown Circuit— The random countdown cir-
cuit randomly selects pulses generated by the pulse generator to trigger the IFF
interrogator circuit. This circuit ensures that only about ten of these pulses are selected
per second. The pulse stream referenced at any given time is specified in the user defined
VLF/IFF key. [Ref. 31:p. 4.9]
(b) VLF Transponder Trigger— The VLF transponder could be
triggered by generating a low power (5 mW) IFF interrogating signal at 1030 MHz
across the skin of the maneuver element. This signal is not strong enough to influence
other nearby maneuver element transponders. This 1030 MHz signal allows the trans-
ponder to perform in it's designed manner, i.e., no modifications are necessary to the
transponder. Alternatively, a direct wire connection to the transponder can be used.
The 1030 MHz signal format can generate any of several modes, thereby causing the
transponder to supply identification, altitude, or battlefield information.
[Ref 31:p. 4.10]
(c) IFF Transponder— The IFF transponder, upon receipt of the
1030 MHz interrogation signal will deselect the IFF antenna, decode the interrogation,
encode the appropriate 21 fxs, 1090 MHz response and then apply the 500 W signal to
the omni-directional antenna for transmission to the command and control element.



















Figure 45. Maneuver Element IFF Signal Transmission
b. Command and Control Element
The command and control element consists of a VLF receiver, an IFF
receiver/processor, a position coordinate processor, a display driver, and a display. The
breakdown of these components is illustrated in Figure 46. [Ref 31:Fig. 4.10]
(I) Signal Receipt.
(a) VLF Receiver— See Figure 47 for the block diagram of the
VLF receiver [Ref 31:Fig. 4.11].
• Antenna Requirements: The VLF receiver will require a whip antenna, similar to
that used by the maneuver element.
• VLF Frequency Tuner: This component functions in the same manner as the ma-
neuver element tuner.
• Channel Selector: The channel selector functions in a manner similar to the chan-
nel selector of the maneuver element. The main difference being that the command
and control element must be able to detect and select the best three signals in all
eight OMEGA time slots over the ten second period. This allows the system to
adjust for maneuver elements selecting different OMEGA stations. VLF COMM
stations are purposely assigned to certain time slots in the OMEGA period.
[Ref 31:pp. 4.11-4.12]
(b) IFF Receiver/Processor— The block diagram of the IFF
receiver/processor is illustrated in Figure 48 [Ref 31:Fig. 4.12].
• Antenna Requirement: The IFF receiver/processor will require an elevated or whip
antenna.
• Receiver/Processor: The IFF receiver/processor borrows from existing SSR tech-

































Figure 46. Command and Control Element Components
(2) Signal Processing. Signal processing at the command and control
element involves VLF signal synthesis, timing pulse generation, and position determi-
nation [Ref. 31:p. 4.11].
(a) Signal Synthesis— VLF signal synthesis occurs in the same
manner as at the maneuver element receiver. The one exception being that the com-
mand and control element must synthesize all eight OMEGA signals and those VLF
COMM signals that it can receive. The receiver phase locked loop uses a cr}'stal
oscillator stable to 10-'%'day. [Ref. 31:pp. 4.11-4.12]
(b) Pulse Generation— The zero phase crossings of the synthe-
sized VLF signals are then used to generate timing pulses. These pulses are used to de-
fine listening periods for the IFF processor. In the VLF/IFF proposal, the 10.2 and 13.6
kHz signals are combined to generate a 3.4 kHz signal. The zero phase crossings of this













selects best VLF COMM/
OMEGA signal in all
















Figure 47. C2 Element VLF Signal Receipt/ Processing
stream passed to the IFF Receiver/Processor at any given time is that specified in the
user defined VLF/IFF key. [Ref. 31:p. 4.12]
(c) Position Determination— The IFF signal processor uses the
timing pulse stream from the VLF receiver and the decoded IFF signal fi-om the ma-
neuver element to determine TOA information. This TOA information, linked with the
maneuver element identity, altitude, and any tactical information is then autocorrelated
by maneuver element identity. It is through this process of autocorrelation that garbled
transmissions and positional ambiguities caused by receipt ofATC/AD radar generated
























TOA, ID, SITREPS, ALT
Figure 48. C2 Element IFF Signal Receipt/ Processing
Only three TOAs are necessary for the system to function
properly. The ten IFF responses generated each second by the maneuver element can
be degraded by as much as 70% and the system should still function.
Figure 49 shows the position processor data flow
[Ref 31:Fig. 4.13]. The position coordinate processor translates TOA information into
positional data. This is done in polar coordinate format and is then passed to the display
subsystem for tracking and display. This processing involves a series of data manipu-
lations and temporary storage of intermediate data values. Throughout this process the
identification tag is locked to the position information. It is an integral part of the
command and control data. More specifically:
• The input to the data flow diagram includes a paired TOA value and maneuver el-
ement identification, per OMEGA time slot that has been averaged from multiple
TOAs measured in a single time slot. These TOAs are stored in the appropriate
time slot of the table.
• The calculation sequencer matches the appropriate TO.A. pairs based on a ranking
of received signal strength. These TOA pairs are used along with information on
signal angle of arrival from the VLF stations and distance to the stations to com-
pute LOPs and from that the two possible positions.
• These possible positions are then stored in rank order. The first position pair is
assumed to hold the true position and the rest arc used for ambiguity resolution.
Possible positions are fed into the ambiguity resolver. Other rank ordered positions
are used to determine the true position.
• Azimuth, range, and identity are then passed to the display driver.
[Ref 31:pp. 4.13-4.14]
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Figure 49. C2 Element Position Processor Data Flow
(d) Display Signal Generation— The position fix passed fi-om the
coordinate processor is then processed by the display driver. Within the display driver,
a Kalman filter is used to predict position updates thereby ensuring accurate data over
the ten second OMEGA cycle. The display driver simply converts the identification,
position and intelligence data to a video signal for input to the ATCCS database and for
presentation on the ATCCS display screen. (Ref. 31:pp. 3.51-3.53]
(3) Video Signal Display. VLF/ IFF creates a real time, fiicndly dispo-
sition data base which can be accessed in numerous ways by the ATCCS database
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management system. The way in which the data base is accessed and the way friendly
disposition is displayed will depend on the functional area user's needs and his echelon
in the command and control system hierarchy.
The position information is displayed relative to the command and
control element. This can be done to whatever scale is required by each echelon, from
corps to battahon level. The display can be in UTM grid or polar coordinate reference.
[Ref. 31:p. 4.15]
The system will support any type of operation from air traffic control,
with individual maneuver element tracking and instantaneous update, to large scale
tactical operations, where friendly unit information is integrated with intelligence on
enemy movement, to provide a clear picture of battlefield events. [Ref 30:p. 13]
The individual command and control elements' friendly disposition
data can be passed over the ATCCS tactical communication networks and consolidated
at other command and control elements, thereby ensuring completeness of information




The purpose of this chapter is to develop a methodology for assessing whether or
not the VLF/IFF concept outlined in Chapter Three merits further consideration as a
viable solution to the operational deficiency defined in Chapters One and Two. Once
this methodology has been developed, it will be applied to the VLF/IFF concept to de-
termine the proposed system's feasibility and assess its capabihty to satisfy the stated
operational and organizational requirements outlined in Chapter Two. Finally, the
concept will be evaluated against the current political, cost and scheduling constraints
imposed on the military acquisition process.
The scope of this thesis precludes any comprehensive evaluation of a VLF/IFF
system. The VLF/IFF concept is just that, a concept. A considerable amount of work
has been done to develop the concept. However, several key tasks remain to be ac-
complished under the Army's Materiel Acquisition Process before a complete assessment
can be undertaken. This chapter will attempt to provide an initial, rough assessment of
the proposed system based on work already done and available material that can be ex-
trapolated to apply to this proposal.
The results of this study should provide decision makers a preliminary assessment
of the merit of developing this concept as a potential solution to the C2 requirement for
near real time display of friendly force battlefield disposition.
B. ASSUMPTIONS
Any concept assessment must be conducted within the limitations of very real, al-
ways changing, usually loosely defined constraints. For this reason it is necessary to
conduct the assessment at a specific point in time. This is done to minimize the impact
of small fluctuations in the key variables while still providing meaningful measures to
support program decisions. Any drastic fluctuations in the constraints will force the
need for reassessment under the new set of constraints.
There were several assumptions necessary for this appraisal. They span the spec-
trum of political, fiscal, technical and operational considerations. They are general in
context. However, they establish boundaries within which to conduct the assessment
and against which to weigh the relative value of each of the assessment criteria.
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1. Valid Requirement
The first and foremost assumption is that the requirement documented in
Chapter One and stated in the Draft Operational and Organizational Plan at Appendix
A will be approved as a valid system requirement.
2. AirLand Battle Future
The second assumption is that the evolution of the Army's AirLand Battle
doctrine will progress as envisioned in the ALB-F concept. The 15 year time line es-
tablished in the ALB concept defines the period over which these assumptions will be
assumed valid.
3. Threat Assessment
The third assumption is that the projected threat assessment will remain valid.
That is. the size of the threat will remain large, the quaUty of threat will continue to
improve and the threat employment doctrine will not change significantly.
4. Fiscal Restraint
The fourth assumption is that the trend of reduced defense spending and man-
power cutbacks will continue as the federal government attempts to reduce the budget
deficit and restore a sense of fiscal responsibility.
5. Technology
The fifth and final assumption is that there will be no technological break-
throughs that dramatically change the way combat is conducted or command, control
and communications is exercised. Although the frontiers of technology will continue to
be pushed forward, industry's ability to introduce near term, usable, cost effective ap-
plications for combat will not improve significantly.
C. ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK
The methodology used in this assessment was derived from an established, proven
framework. Under Department of the Army (DA) guidance, this framework coordinates
the efforts of the user and development communities in their efibrts to define needs,
identify solutions and provide useful produces for use by combat forces.
The context within which this assessment was conducted is defined by:
• AirLand Battle doctrine,
• Army of Excellence force structure,
• Army Force Modernization / Integration Plan,
• C2 Vlission Area Analysis (MAA),
• Materiel Acquisition Program (MAP),
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• Planning, Progamming and Budgeting System (PPBS).
These framework cornerstones provide overall guidance on how to integrate the ef-
forts of the individual communities to ensure proper division of responsibilities, reduce
duplication of effort, focus limited resources and provide proper program management.
ALB doctrine establishes how U.S. Army combat forces will fight. It provides the
context in which all other decisions on equipment, force structure and training are made.
[Ref 4]
AOE describes how U.S. Army combat forces will be organized to fight. It assigns
forces and equipment against missions. [Ref 6]
The Force Modernization / Integration Plan describes how new combat systems will
be transitioned into the force. It stresses a smooth transition without an interim loss
of capabihty.
The C2 MAA identifies deficiencies in the C2 mission area in terms of doctrine, force
structure, training and materiel. This process ensures adequate interrelation between
these components, provides a feedback mechanism for modification of existing programs
and definition of needed programs. [Ref 10]
The Materiel Acquisition Program estabUshes a process for providing needed
materiel solutions to My\A identified deficiencies. This program stresses integration
between the combat developer, materiel developer and DA leadership. Recent emphasis
has been placed on streamlining the acquisition process while continuing to ensure ade-
quate acquisition control mechanisms. [Ref 46]
The PPBS provides guidance to the Army on funding for acquisition category pro-
grams. This is implementing guidance that translates what the political leadership allo-
cates and how the services will disperse those allocations. This system reflects the fiscal
realities of defense authorization spending and drives the efforts of those within the
materiel acquisition community. This process in turn has a direct impact on the opera-
tional commanders and soldiers in the field today.
D. ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY
The methodology developed in this assessment borrows from several well established
and time proven evaluation processes. Issues for evaluation were extracted from










These issues were initially developed to assess the technical aspects of a C2 system.
However, their applicability to operational considerations is readily apparent. These
general issues were overlaid on the operational and organizational requirements devel-
oped in Chapter Two and several key considerations outlined in the following references:
Field Manual 100-5, OPERATIONS [Ref. 4];
CONCEPT STATEMENT FOR AIRLAND BATTLE FUTURE (DRAFT)
[Ref. 16];
Field Manual 101-55, CORPS AND DIVISION COMMAND AND CONTROL
[Ref. 48];
Field Manual 101-5, STAFF ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS [Ref 49];
Field Circular 100-1, THE ARMY OF EXCELLENCE [Ref. 6];
AMC-Pamphlet No. 70-2, TRADOC Pamphlet No. 70-2, AMC-TRADOC
MATERIEL ACQUISITION HANDBOOK [Ref 46];
ARMY COMMAND AND CONTROL MASTER PLAN (DRAFT), Concepts
and Management Volume 1 [Ref 10];
REQUIRED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY FOR THE FAMILY OF ARMY
TACTICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS (ATCCS) [Ref. 23];
Solicitation No. DAAB07-S7-R-B076, ARMY COMMAND AND CONTROL
SYSTEMS COMMON HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE [Ref. 50].
This resulted in the assessment design shown in Tab'e 12 on page 129. These op-
erational considerations parallel the technical criteria and should be used in conjunction
with those considerations in any follow on VLF/IFF system evaluation.
These issues and considerations will be discussed as they apply to the VLF/IFF
system. Discussion will focus on the potential advantages and possible problems asso-
ciated with using ilie VLF/IFF approach outlined in Chapter Three. The VLF/IFF
system will then be assessed against the following real world imperatives:
128


















-User Friendly -Manpower Considerations
-Information Utility -Training Requirements










-Full Scale Engineering and Development |








1. Issues and Considerations
Each of the issues will be defined as they apply for the purposes of this dis-
cussion. Each of the operational considerations will be discussed as they relate to the
VLF/IFF system. It is acknowledged that a VLF/IFF system does not exist today and
that these discussions describe a potential capability based on information available at
this time. An initial assessment will be made of a VLF/IFF system's capability with re-
spect to each of the issues and their associated considerations. An overall assessment
of the system's potential will be made in the next section along with recoinmendations
for future actions.
a. Reliability
( 1 ) Definition. Reliability establishes the degree to which a system will
be available for use when it is most needed. This determination is based on whether the
system can be maintained and sustained.
(2) Maintainability. All three of the basic components of the VLF/IFF
system are the result of successful evolutionary development processes. They are, in
essence, mature, proven, military and commercial technologies. IFF/RBS has been in
existence over forty years, VLF and computers over thirty years.
All three technologies support numerous civil and military users un-
der extremely demanding conditions every day. IFF/RBS supports over 100,000 users,
VLF over 10,000 and computers millions. The basic IFF, VLF and computer compo-
nents of a VLF/IFF system are in the Army inventory and in service today. [Ref. 51]
The types of users, operating environments, operating utilities and
degree of user dependency on these technologies demands dependable system perform-
ance. Thousands of hours have been logged on the system components. Operating
specifications are extremely stringent. VLF is a basic element of the U.S. strategic
Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network (MEECN) [Ref. 52].
OMEGA provides continuous, reliable, global navigation. Computer/software systems
support continuous ATC and air defense operations the world over. These systems have
proven their maintainability over years of service.
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(3) Supportability. A strong industrial base is already established to
support and provide additional components for this system with little or no lead time.
This was demonstrated by a recent U.S. Army Avionics Research and Development
Activity (AVRADA)/Tracor Industry project that equipped the Army CH-47 fleet and
the 101 St Airborne (Air Assault) Division C2 helicopters with OMEGA receivers
[Ref. 51]. IFF is a required component on all mihtary aircraft in service and in pro-
duction. C2 computers and software are currently being fielded under the ATCCS pro-
gram. In essence, IFF, VLF and computer equipments of the type required in the
VLF,TFF system are already in the Army inventory and have well established support
bases.
The support bases of these technologies is healthy and continues to
support rapidly expanding commercial markets. IFF/RBS equipment is being installed
on more and more civil aircraft each year. OMEGA is being purchased by most major
airlines and there are numerous commercial OMEGA ventures ongoing [Ref 42]. Se-
veral are very similar to what is being proposed in the VLF/IFF concept [Ref 53].
(4) Availability. VLF and OMEGA provide worldwide navigation sup-
port to numerous air and marine users. OMEGA is the only certified, continuous,
global navigation system in operation today. The VLF signals are like the earth's mag-
netic field, available, free, to anyone with a receiver.
IFF/RBS and computers are used in support of ATC and air defense
operations by aviation users in every country in the world today. These technologies
have proven themselves under the most demanding of environmental conditions. VLF,
IFF and computers are all combat proven systems, as evidenced by their employment
in the Falkland Islands War. [Ref 54:pp. 25 & 218]
VLF and IFF systems are truly international in nature. Their com-
ponent specifications and system operations are agreed upon and secured by interna-
tional agreements. It is through this arrangement that system operation and availability
are ensured.
(5) Initial Assessment. The VLF/IFF system's reliability appears excel-
lent based on past performance, current operational use and projected system develop-
ment. Potential problem areas include component integration, software development
and acquisition community acceptance of the notion that today's technologies can be
integrated effectively to achieve an evolutionary capability to meet future requirements.
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b. Interoperability
(1 ) Definition. Interoperability establishes the degree to which a system
will be capable of fighting efiectively with other U.S. Army systems and in conjunction
with the systems of other services and alUes.
(2) Standardization. VLF/IFF offers a unique opportunity for a truly
joint and combined interoperable system by locking all elements, air and land, to a
common grid. VLF/IFF is a distributed system that allows for the fluid entry and exit
of maneuver and C2 elements. VLF/IFF supports rapid reconfiguration of the C2
structure associated with joint and combined operations. The technology is currently
available and employed by all U.S. Services and most, if not all, our allies. The VLF
signal is available for the price of an inexpensive receiver. IFF systems are employed in
almost all military aircraft today.
International treaties guarantee equipment compatibility and system
operation. Transition to the Mark XV transponder demonstrates an international
commitment to maintain and promote system compatibility and interoperability
[Ref 55:pp. 1-9]. Integration of these two technologies could easily provide one system
for all. - -^ -
(3) Connectivity!Integration. System compatibility, interface of proce-
dures and message format design could easily be provided through the VLF/IFF sys-
tem's integrating of these existing, internationally used systems.
VLF/IFF would ensure system integration throughout a theater of
operation. This includes both vertical and horizontal transfer of information in the
system. The system is similar to the NATO Identification System in its objective of
providing a common, integrated combat picture to all users [Ref. 33].
(4) Synchronization. VLF/IFF would enhance a commander's ability to
conduct complex, combined arms operations by providing a common battlefield refer-
ence grid in both time and place. This capability would enhance the conduct of joint
and combined operations by significantly simplifying the coordination and timing nec-
essary to execute these types of operations,
(5) Initial Assessment. The VLF/IFF system's interoperability appears
excellent based on standardization of system components and operating procedures.
Connectivity throughout appears possible due to demonstrated component compatibil-
ity. Interface operation procedures and message format design would be accomplished
within existing standards. The realization of a theater wide synchronizing grid would
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significantly enhance the conduct of combined arms operations in a joint and combined
environment. Existing, operational OMEGA, VLF-COMM, IFF transponders and C2
components and systems would significantly reduce the development effort required to
place a VLF/IFF system into operation. Potential problems include system integration,
software development and allied acceptance of the VLF/IFF proposal.
c. Speed
(!) Definition. Speed defines the ease with which information can be
entered and moved through a system and the degree to which that information enhances
time dependent operations to ensure freedom of action.
(2) Accessibility. VLF/IFF would provide immediate access to all users.
Tailoring of automatic update is provided based on user community, mission and system
status.
The number of users the system will support is limited only by the
number of maneuver elements a given C2 element can support. This number can be
fairly large and is therefore usually insignificant.
Access to the net is accomphshed with a one way, line of sight radio
link, i.e., the transponder, to any C2 element possessing the VLF/IFF processor/display
component. The ATCCS communications architecture would ensure C2 element
connectivity.
(3) Tin^eliness. VLF/IFF provides commanders and their staffs an au-
tomated, near real time display system. The system generates and updates information
at speeds measured in microseconds. This capability means that information is available
to support decisions when it is needed, not minutes or hours later. There is no signif-
icant system initialization or preparation period.
Electronic data can be passed, processed and displayed as it is gener-
ated or at some user selected update rate. This capability supports the varied require-
ments of numerous operational communities.
(4) Agility. Immediate access and timely presentation of accurate in-
formation would greatly enhance the decision making process, providing for rapid cor-
rect responses to battlefield developments. Integration of the VLF/IFF display of real
time friendly force disposition with real time intelligence on the enemy's disposition
would allow a commander and his forces to operate within the enemy's decision cycle.
(5) Initiative. This increased ability to react immediately to real time
battlefield developments can be translated into a capability to seize the initiative in any
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conflict. Wresting the initiative from an enemy and causing him to react to U.S. actions
is one of the four ALB tenets. [Ref. 4]
(6) Initial Assessment. The VLF/IFF system's speed appears excellent
based on the system's ability to translate immediate access, near real time, accurate, us-
able information and improved reaction time into a capability to seize the initiative in
any conflict. Potential problem areas could include operational delays introduced by the
ATCCS communication system. High enough precedence must be provided to guaran-
tee the transmission of timely, usable information.
d. Security
(!) Definition. Security establishes the degree of confidence with which
information can be exchanged without compromise.
(2) Information Encryption. VLF/IFF offers information encryption
through use of the transponder. Transmissions from the maneuver element are passed
in encrypted form to the C2 element and then, through use of the ATCCS communi-
cation system and its encryption techniques, across the C2 network. Introduction of the
Mark XV transponder will provide enhanced security to an already secure system. En-
cr\'ption of the VLF signal is not necessary for secure system operation.
Additional security is provided by the random countdown of the IFF
burst transmissions. This randomness complicates the enemy's collection problem by
making it extremely difficult to synchronize to the transmitted IFF signal.
(3) Operational Security. The VLF component of the system is a pas-
sive receiver. The IFF transponder is the only active emitter. IFF, as currently oper-
ated, has established communications security (COMSEC) procedures. VLF/IFF would
not require any major changes to these procedures. In fact VLF/IFF could easily be
incorporated into the existing system with little adverse impact.
Some operations, for reasons of emission security, require that the
IFF transponder be turned off for some specified period of time. This type of decision
would have to be weighed against the need for real time position and tactical intelligence.
These types of trade off decisions are made every day based on the mission and
commander's concept of the operation.
IFF and processor/ display components will be as secure as the sys-
tems they are operated in conjunction with. As envisioned, processor/ display compo-
nents would be procured under the ATCCS Common Hardware/ Software Program.
[Ref 23]
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As stated in Chapter Three, the mcrease in IFF transmissions re-
quired to generate the display information would place an insignificant additional load
on the IFF system. In effect the signal generating the display would be camouflaged
by the standard IFF signal. The additional communication load spread across the
ATCCS communication network would be insignificant providing little additional infor-
mation of use to the enemy. The enemy would have great difficulty determining if the
system was even in operation.
Additional security is built into the system with the VLF/IFF syn-
chronization key required to synchronize the system components to VLF stations and
each other. Generation and distribution of this key would be handled within existing
COMSEC channels.
(4) Confidence. As stated before, all VLF/IFF components have
proven effective in combat operations. VLF/IFF system operations would be difficult
and extremely costly to spoof Several TOAs are required to calculate LOPs and posi-
tion. Unique identities are locked to these measurements. Ambiguous measurements
are rejected by the system. The VLF/IFF system would provide high level confidence
of accurate and valid information.
(5) Exploitability. Since the VLF/IFF signal is camouflaged by other
IFF transmissions it will be difficult for an enemy to exploit. Random countdown will
make it difficult for the enemy to collect. Encr>'ption will make extraction of useful in-
formation difficult. The C2 element remains -a passive receiver of the IFF signal making
its exploitation difficult. And the standardization of components and mobility of the
maneuver elements makes it hard for an enemy to exploit the IFF signal for targeting.
To generate the same picture of U.S. forces, the enemy would have
to capture or build a compatible system and possess and be able to use the IFF en-
cryption key and the VLF/IFF synchronization key.
(6) Initial Assessment. The VLF/IFF system's security appears excel-
lent based on existing, National Security Agency (NSA) approved, combat proven ca-
pabilities and system characteristics. Enhancement of system capabilities would occur
with the fielding of the Mark XV transponder. High information confidence, low prob-
ability of system exploitability and minimal impact on existing COMSEC operations
makes VLF/IFF very attractive from a security perspective. Potential problem areas
include VLF/IFF synchronization code development and NSA approval.
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e. Flexibility
(1) Definition. Flexibility establishes the degree of freedom to conduct
combat operations without being constrainted by the C2 system.
(2) Deploy-ability. VLF signals are available continuously an^'where on
the surface of the earth, thus supporting immediate worldwide deployability of a
VLF,'IFF system in support of U.S. combat forces.
VLF receiver, IFF transponder and processor/display integration into
the combat vehicle and C2 element will ensure rapid deployment of the system with the
commanders and soldiers who depend on them to fight. This means VLF,TFF will be a
self-contained system, providing immediate capabihty upon arrival.
(3) Mobility. VLF/IFF would be as mobile as the combat or C2 ele-
ment with which it would operate. This includes man, ground vehicle and air platform
configurations. Embedded system components and a common battlefield grid would
enhance control and coordination of rapidly moving forces in a non linear environment.
This system would allow a commander to wage combat without being tied to a battle-
field positioning community. VLF/IFF may have a profound influence on the way in
which the Army looks at all position/navigation (POS/NAV) requirements. In other
words, VLF/IFF could provide a baseline POS/NAV capabihty for all communities.
More stringent capabilities could be provided by a small set of specialized systems. This
differs dramatically from the way today's POS/NAV architecture attempts to justify ex-
tremely accurate POS/NAV systems for all users based on numerous, conflicting and
sometimes inconsistent functional and weapon system requirements. [Ref 56]
(4) Reconfigurability. VLF/IFF could function independently in a stand
alone mode or as part of an integrated command and control network. Tiiis modular
capabihty allows for tailoring of the C2 system in support of low, medium and high in-
tensity conllicts and unconventional operations, i.e., it can be a physical add on to any
ATCCS. This allow^s commanders to develop C2 support slices based on force structure
and composition.
(5) Adaptability. VLF/IFF system characteristics would greatly en-
hance the adaptability of a commander and his forces on the modern battlefield. The
system is capable of supporting three dimensional operations at depth. VLF/IFF pro-
vides automatic altitude on aircraft and, due to the technique used to calculate position,
remains accurate at all depths of the battlefield.
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(6) Initial Assessment. The VLF/IFF system's flexibility appears excel-
lent based on its ability to support rapid, worldwide deployment of combat forces, pro-
vide tailored support of forces in conflicts of varying intensity on the three dimensional
AirLand battlefield. Potential problems include system integration and software devel-
opment.
/. Survivability
( 1) Definition. Survivability establishes the degree to which the system
can eflect command and control without being destroyed or neutralized.
(2) Hardness. Both VLF and IFF components are in use today with the
101st Airborne (Air Assault) Division providing support for real world mission require-
ments. Their abihty to operate in harsh environments under stressful conditions has al-
ready been proven, both by the U.S. and the British.
ATCCS common hardware/software in some cases will be full mili-
lary specification (MILSPEC) and in others will be NDI [Ref 50]. VLF/IFF compo-
nents would need to be only as hardened as the maneuver and C2 element equipments
they support, and in most cases, VLF/IFF components are already hardened beyond
those requirements.
(3) Robustness. VLF/IFF is basically a system of integrated compo-
nents each capable of independent operations. There are no critical elements on the
battlefield. The destruction or neutralization of one or any number of maneuver or C2
elements elements will have little impact on the overall system's ability to continue op-
erations.
The rate at which the VLF/IFF system degrades would be relatively
gradual given the fully distributed nature of the system, which places all players on a
common, relative, positional grid and allows any of the elements to be equipped to
generate an integrated AirLand display of friendly force disposition. Thus, graceful de-
gradation of services and capabilities is an intrinsic feature of the VLF/IFF system.
(4) Electronic Countermeasure Susceptibility. The VLF signal cannot
be effectively jammed, even at great labor and expense. It is therefore the least likely
component of the system to be attacked. [Ref 57]
The processor/display components are passive with respect to
VLF/IFF, however they contribute to the thermal and electronic signatures of actively
emitting C2 elements which are high priority targets for enemy attack or suppression.
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The VLF,TFF components at these facihties will be susceptible to the extent that these
C2 elements can be neutralized or destroyed.
The IFF signal is already camouflaged in an IFF haze provided by
normal system operation. If the enemy chooses to jam the IFF system, he must do so
from close range to overcome the transponder's signal power at the relatively short op-
erational ranges and close conflict configurations specified in the VLF/IFF concept.
There are rather severe costs levied on the enemy if he should choose to employ this
strategy. These will not be discussed in this paper. Suffice it to say that, it is unlikely
that this type of effort would last long enough to significantly preclude the use of the
VLF/IFF system. Targeting the IFF signal for physical attack is complicated by the
extremely short duration of the burst transmission and the randomness of the emission.
(5) Electronic Counter-countermeasures. VLF transmitters are cispjrsed
geographically around the world away from likely battlefields. Although the signal is
available for use, the transmitter is not available for attack on the localized battlefield.
Even if the transmitters are close to the battle area, they are unlikely to be attacked due
to their extensive use by all nations and the uiternational treaties that guarantee their
operation. This was the case with the Argentine station during the Falklands Island
War. Both Argentine and British forces used the sisnal. These VLF stations are
terrestial and, unlike satellite systems, guarantee the option of defending them should it
become necessary.
Automatic, random, burst transmissions providing position, unit
identification and tactical information would significantly reduce the amount of time
spent trying to convey this information by voice. This feature would significantly reduce
the enemy's abihty to target U.S. combat elements.
The system components would be small and Hght weight, enhancing
the mobility of the maneuver elements and C2 elements in which they were employed.
Projected enhancements to the IFF system with the fielding of the
Mark XV transponder are expected to improve VLF/IFF system survivabiUty even fur-
ther.
(6) Initial Assessment. The VLF/IFF system's survivability appears
excellent based on past performance of system components, the potential for graceful
degradation of capabiUty, the relative immunity to ECM and the degree to which
VLF/IFF system components enhance the survivability of the maneuver elements and
138
C2 elements they support. Potential problem areas include susceptibility of the Mark
XII transponder to jamming.
g. Simplicity
( 1 ) Definition. Simplicity defmes the degree to which the system sim-
plifies a given function or operation.
(2) Transparency. VLF/IFF, integrated with ATCCS, would produce a
fully automated reporting and display system. It would remove the human from the
process with the exception of real time tactical information reporting. This would in-
clude reporting, data base update and communication system access. In effect, the
process would go on around the commander and his forces without taking up their time,
freeing them to concentrate on the business of combat. The system would be available
to support the C2 process, as required, in a truly transparent manner.
(S) User Friendly. The VLF signal used by the VLF/IFF system is
available at no cost to the operational user. No expenditure of effort is required to re-
ceive the synchronizing signal or ensure its continuous availability. The IFF component
is set once or twice a day similar to changing radio frequencies. All equipment is
standardized for ease of use and trainins.
The personnel who operate the system are combat vehicle operators
and C2 element personnel. Little additional training would be required to operate the
equipment. The receiver/processor component would, in essence, provide data to the
ATCCS common hardware/software to drive, graphic display utihties.
(4) Information Utility. The presentation of accurate, reliable, real time
identification, position and status information in graphic form would definitely prove the
notion that a picture is worth a thousand words. The technique by which VLF/IFF data
is generated allows for presentation of friendly force disposition in whatever format the
user community desires.
(5) Simplification of Operations. VLF/IFF would transition the func-
tion of unit position and status reporting from the manual, slow, resource intensive, in-
accurate, unreliable, FM voice process occuring today to the automatic, near real time,
accurate, and reliable process required by ALB commanders and their stalls.
VLF/IFF would allow a commander and his staff to focus their en-
ergies on more productive endeavors in support of mission accomplishment. This sys-
tem would allow more time for reaction, planning and monitoring.
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Transition to electronic medium would provide additional flexibility
in the presentation, storage and manipulation of friendly disposition data. Those func-
tions currently accomplished through the use of paper map sheets, acetate overlays and
grease pencils could gradually be transitioned to automated display devices.
(6) Initial Assessment. The VLF/IFF system's simplicity appears ex-
cellent based on the automating of a currently resource intensive system to transparently
provide a highly usable C2 product that would significantly simplify operations and al-
low the focusing of labor on more productive, mission oriented tasks. Potential problem
areas include software development and institutional bias.
h. Economy
( 1) Definition. Economy estabhshes the realizability or achievability of
a system within given constraints.
(2) Operational Capabilities. VLF/IFF would streamline the reporting
process through use of sophisticated electronic components and automation. The result
being transparent generation of near real time, accurate and reliable battlefield infor-
mation.
Timely, usable information enhances the decision making process.
Shorter reaction times, more time for planning and monitoring execution makes for a
more agile force capable of seizing and retaining the initiative in any conflict.
VLF/IFF system modularity would provide a commander additional
flexibihty in force design. In effect, any element of the combined arms team could lead
or actively participate in the synchronizing of forces at minimal cost because of the dis-
tributed nature of the system.
VLF/IFF can be deployed rapidly on the same aircraft as the C2
systems and combat forces it supports and be operational immediately after arrival
anwhere in the world.
(3) Manpower Considerations. A VLF/IFF system would require no
additional personnel to operate or maintain. Operation of the system would be accom-
pUshed by the maneuver element crews and the C2 element operations personnel.
Maintenance functions could be accomplished by existing personnel
and organizations within the current maintenance structure. This eliminates a need for
a specialized skill or additional support organizations.
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Training requirements would be minimal and could be inserted into
existing service school curricula, thereby eliminating the need for system peculiar in-
structors.
(4) Training Requirements. VLF,TFF system instruction could be con-
tractor developed and provided to service schools for incorporation into existing blocks
of instruction on maneuver element and C2 system operations and maintenance. This
approach would minimize the impact on current schooling operations and eliminate any
requirement for development of a specialized curriculum.
Current operation and maintenance curriculums would be sufficient
to support VLF/IFF system training requirements. Processor; display operation, the
most demanding of the training requirements could be incorporated into ATCCS oper-
ator training or provided as on site instruction.
(5) Trade Offs. A key ingredient of economy is the abiUty to realize an
intended system or product within the anticipated capabilities of the mihtary industrial
complex. Several recent program failures highlight this point, e.g., Sgt. York, Aquila and
LHX.
VLF/IFF is unique in that the billions of dollars invested to mature
the two technologies practically guarantees that there are no fundamental flaws which
would prevent realization of the system. Thus, the military' industrial community could
integrate two fully operational systems through straight forward engineering to achieve
a new and improved operational capability without risking realizabihty or achievabihty.
Acquisition of a VLF/IFF system would cost relatively little and free
up valuable resources for investment elsewhere. Dollars saved by purchase of VLF/IFF
could be invested in other combat system programs. Manpower savings could be redis-
tributed to other critical functions. Improved operational capability would be realized
immediately through a streamlined acquisition process vice waiting for longer research
and development efforts. The VLF/IFF system represents an adequate, available, al-
ternative for a dramatically new operational capabiUty in contrast to an all encompass-
ing, 'better' system sometime in the future.
(6) Initial Assessment. The VLF/IFF system's economy appears excel-
lent based on enhanced operational capabiUties, reduced manpower requirements, lim-
ited training impact and realization of a much needed, long overdue C2 capability now.
Potential problems include institutional bias and strong, competitive, industry lobbying.
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2. Real World Imperatives
a. Politics
( 1 ) Acceptability. AirLand Battle doctrine is an accepted way of con-
ducting combat operations among U.S. forces. As stated earlier, VLF/IFF is truly an
ALB system. Acceptance within the U.S. community of a VLF/IFF system should be
realizable.
Allied acceptance of the VLF and IFF system technologies should
provide an indication of the acceptability of a VLF/IFF system. Over 140 countries
have signed treaties guaranteeing the operation of these two system components
[Ref 30:p. 3]. These systems are operated by host nations. International forums have
guaranteed VLF and IFF system evolution and enhancement well into the twenty first
century. NATO Defense Ministers are committed to buying the Mark XV transponder
as part of the NATO Identification System. It would seem that a VLF/IFF system
mieht be easier to sell to our allies than has AirLand Battle doctrine.
There is also continuing growth in the commercial applications of
these technologies that could prove beneficial to the military. These developments make
VLF/IFF even more attractive and provide vitality to the technology base.
(2) Affordability. A big consideration for both the U.S. and our less
wealthy allies is whether or not, in these times of renewed economic responsibility and
reduced defense budgets, we can afford to pursue expensive, unproven technologies that
promise capabilities well beyond present boundaries. Our allies for years have balked
at our dollar rich approach to system development, opting instead for inexpensive,
workable solutions. [Ref 15]
The basic VLF/IFF components are in production and hi use by all
concerned. They are relatively inexpensive and have proven capable and reliable over
years of service. The major investments in research, development, testing and evaluation
(RDTE) and engineering costs have already been paid. Yearly maintenance costs are
minimal. System integration and software development cost would be relatively small.
Certainly the proposed VLF/IFF system would be alTordable to all.
(3) Accessibility. The major components of VLF/IFF are available to-
day and accessible to U.S. and allied civil and mihtary users. Their international, non
military operation makes them attractive from a political and budgetary standpoint.
(4) Technological Realities. VLF/IFF docs not depend on other high
technology systems for its operation, deployment, servicing or sustainment.
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Frequencies have been reserved worldwide for the operation of these
systems. This is provided for in international agreement.
The VLF/IFF component technologies are state of the art and a
VLF/IFF system is obtainable through minor software development and system inte-
gration efforts. VLF/IFF is not a technology pipe dream. It is an obtainable capability.
b. Economics
Preliminary cost figures and program milestones have been developed by the
Army technical community. These calculations do not reflect exactly the VLF/IFF
system configuration outlined in this thesis. However, they do represent accurately the
relative cost of the types of components discussed and should make it clear that
VLF,TFF system costs would be less than a fraction of that being paid for most new
systems.
(1) Advanced Development. The Army teclmical community stands
ready to initiate the advanced development phase of a VLF/IFF program. The cost for
brassboard fabrication and installation of two C2 elenients, of different configurations,
and ten maneuver elements has been estimated at 5 million dollars. A proof of
concept/demonstration with troops could be conducted within a year from project initi-
ation. The cost could be reduced to as little as 2.5 milhon dollars with a reduction of
brassboard equipment and appropriate scaling of the size of the tactical force supported
in the demonstration. Work on the full scale engineering and development (FSED)
contract could begin late in the troop demonstration phase. [Ref 58]
(2) Full Scale Engineering and Development. The Program Manager for
the Army's Operations Tactical Data Systems (PM OPTDS) has been briefed on the
VLF/IFF svstem and stands readv to besin svstem integration efforts. The total cost for
FSED and Development Test/Operational Test II (DT/OT II), both internal and ex-
ternal, has been estimated at 15 miUion dollars. [Ref 58]
(3) Production. Production costs have been estimated at 250 miUion
dollars. This rough estimate provides for 10,000 maneuver elements at 10 thousand
dollars apiece and 100 C2 elements, with and without displays, at 25 thousand dollars
apiece. The 250 million dollar figure represents a more than doubling of the per unit
costs to allow for logistic support and system integration costs. [Ref 58]
c. Technical Considerations
VLF/IFF offers near term capability based on a streamlined acquisition
process. This system capitalizes on previous RDTE and FSED efforts. Initial opera-
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tional capability (IOC) could be realized in as few as 4 years after award of contract for
demonstration hardware, depending on program prioritization and availability of fund-
ing. A proposed milestone schedule is depicted at Figure 50. [Ref 58]
(1) Demonstration of Capability. This would be a proof of principle de-
signed primarily to validate the technical aspects of the system and provide insight into
organizational and operational considerations.
Ideally this demonstration would be conducted in conjunction with a
tactical exercise with a VLF,TFF brassboard system used by and in support of opera-
tional commanders and their forces. This would allow for fme tuning of the Operational
and Organizational Plan.
The Army Development and Employment Agency (ADEA), located
at Fort Lewis Washington, olTers an ideal facility for integrating the user, combat and
materiel developers in support of such a demonstration. ADEA has been designated as
one of the Army's C3I testbeds for just such demonstrations.
(2) Full Scale Engineering and Development. This phase of development
would focus primarily on militarizing the hardware and software, configuring the equip-
ment for integration with other C2 systems and fielding of the system.
This phase of the schedule would be the culmination of a competitive
process that capitalizes on past VLF, IFF and computer/ software expertise and devel-
opment efforts.
(3) Development Test/ Operational Test II. This portion of the schedule
involves the validation of technical, operational and organizational capabilities. The
results of this phase would feed the acquisition process and be used to determine whether





(4) Production. VLF/IFF would not require a long lead time to begin
production. Many components are already in production and expansion of production
lines should be a relatively simple process.
(5) Initial Operational Capability. VLF/IFF would be fielded in ac-
cordance with current C2 system fielding policy and would be closely tied to ATCCS
fielding and evaluation.
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Figure 50. VLF/IFF Program Milestones
F. CONCLUSIONS
1. Technical Feasibility
The VLF/IFF system appears technically feasible. Given the availability and
demonstrated performance of the three major system components, VLF/IFF is a very
attractive technical solution to a very complex problem. Simple in its approach,
VLF/IFF would provide an extremely robust and capable system. The system capital-
izes on years of successful development efforts and technical achievements. VLF/IFF
brings all the component strengths with it while minimizing potential problem areas.
[Ref. 59:pp. 8-9]
2. Operational Potential
VLF/IFF's potential to provide significant enhancement to C2 functions in
support of ALB doctrine appears extraordinary. Increased flexibility, survivability, reli-
ability and agility are all likely results of VLF/IFF system employment. Coupled with
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manpower savings and schedule considerations, VLF/IFF provides solutions to tomor-
row's requirements t Dday. [Ref. 59:pp. 8-9]
Additionally, coupling of VLF and packet radio technologies along the same
line as VLF/IFF could produce an extremely robust communication and position re-
porting system with much greater operational capability than currently proposed data
distribution svstems.
3. Risk Assessment
In terms of the political, technical, operational, budgetary and schedule consid-
erations discussed in Chapters Three and Four, VLF/IFF appears to be a low risk ap-
proach with high, near term payoff potential. [Ref 59:pp. 8-9]
G. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Operational and Organizational Plan
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) staff the Draft Oper-
ational and Organizational Plan at Appendix A.
TRADOC provide approved Operational and Organizational Plan to AMC to
initiate the materiel acquisition process.
2. Engineering Effort
U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) initiate a system engineering elTort to
further develop the technical specifications required to support a technical assessment
of the VLF/IFF system.
AMC initiate the concept formulation process to address the requirement stated
in the Operational and Organizational Plan,
3. Proof of Principle
TRADOC/AMC initiate discussions with ADEA and the 9th Infantr>' Division
(Motorized) for the purposes of conducting a proof of principle demonstration using the
C3I Testbed and 9th Infantry Division forces during a major field training exercise.
Should ADEA and the 9th Infantry Division be unavailable, another candidate test unit
would be the 101st Airborne (Air Ajsault) Division because of their current use of and
experience with IFF and OMEGA equipment.
4. Packet Radio Experimentation
AMC explore application of VLF technology in Packet Radio experimentation
process to evaluate its potential for application in an integrated
communication/ battlefield position reporting configuration.
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APPENDIX A, OPERATIONAL & ORGANIZATIONAL PLAN (DRAFT)
1. TITLE:
a. Near Real Time Information System (NRTIS)
b. CARDS Reference Number:
2. NEED
a. The U.S. Army requires a command and control (C2) system which pemiits
commanders and staffs at all echelons of command to rapidly acquire, store,
retrieve, disseminate, and display near real time information. Presently com-
mand and control is exercised at the various operating facilities (OPFACS)
within each echelon of command using manual systems and procedures for col-
lecting, storing, processing, displaying, and disseminating information. These
systems are slow, manpower intensive, and often provide untimely and inaccu-
rate information. The limited information management and display capabiUties
provided by today's C2 systems inhibits a staffs ability to provide the
commander the critical information required for making tiniely decisions asso-
ciated with the employment and sustainment of combat power on the AirLand
battlefield.
b. Airland Battle doctrine requires that the commander conduct and plan for three
different battles (rear, close, and deep ) on a three dimensional battlefield where
operations will be conducted over greater areas, at greater speeds, and with
greater lethality than in the past. To survive, forces will be more dispersed, but
to win, they must be capable of massing quickly. These two factors have caused
the volume of information required by a commander and staff to increase. The
commander must, in near real time, have the ability to: sec his force's disposi-
tion, know their current situation and status, and sense the enemy's intentions.
The current manual C2 system cannot provide the commander and stalf with
this near real time information nor can it handle the increased information load
required to support operations on the AirLand battlefield. The characteristics
of the AirLand battlefield dictate the need for providing a commander and staff
with an automated command and control system which can harness technology
and use it as a force multiplier to synchronize the comjnander's combat power
in time, space, and activity to defeat the enemy's physical and moral determi-
nation to fight,
c. The NRTIS is capable of continuously providing the commander and staff with
a unit's position, location, mission, combat posture, and operational readiness
status. This system, through its interface with the Army Tactical Command and
Control System (ATCCS) will significantly improve the generation and dissem-
ination of battlefield information. Together, these systems (NRTIS and
ATCCS) will provide the capability of rapidly collecting, correlating, filtering,
processing, extracting, formatting, and displaying timely and accurate force dis-
position information for the force commander.
d. The NRTIS concept contributes to solviniz six deficiencies identified in the
TRADOC Battlefield Development Plan (BDP), 1986(S). The BDP provides a
prioritized composite of mission area deficiencies as determined by each school
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and center's Mission Area Analvsis (MAy\). These six deficiencies are items
number: CCOl, CC02, CC03, CC04, CC05, and CC09. The fielding oFNRTIS
will provide a total or partial solution to the BDP operational deficiencies noted.
3. THREAT
a. Threat to be countered.
1) Threat forces of the Warsaw Pact represent the most serious opposition
likely to be faced by the U.S. Army in the forsecabie future. These forces
have long enjoyed the advantages of numerical superiority over the forces
of NATO and in other theaters as well. The margin of this numerical supe-
riority is increasing and is expected to continue into the next decade. The
Threat's weapon systems and combat support systems continue to improve
and these improvements constitute a significant enhancement to the threat's
numerical superiority and a challenge the U.S. Army's quahtative and tech-
nological advantage. The Threat has made significant improvements in the
areas of mobihty {battlefield and strategic) and command, control, and
communications. These improvements, when combined with their numerical
advantage and other improvements, provides them the capability to conduct
many simultaneous attacks and to rapidly shift or redirect forces to exploit
success in any area.
2) A less serious form of conflict but one that the U.S. Army has a greater
probabiUty of becoming involved in deals with third world nations, counter
insurgency operations or peace keeping missions. These operations are
commonly referred to as low intensity conflicts and might require the rapid
deployment of a force to a remote theater of operations (a non European
scenario). This conflict would be characterized by highly lethal, intermittent
combat actions. Clear and distinct lines of combat or fronts would not exist
and U.S. forces might be widely dispersed to control more terrain and to be
better prepared to immediately respond to contingencies. This greater
dispersion of forces, lack of clear battle lines, and an enemy who is more fa-
miliar with the terrain present a serious threat to the U.S. force and a chal-
lenge to any command and control system which must support that force.
b. System Vulnerabilities
1) The XP.TIS equipment and the vehicles, shelters, and command centers in
which it will be operated, are vulnerable to attack by surface-to-surface mis-
siles, tactical aircraft, dual capable artillery, multiple rocket launchers,
airborne/ airmobile forces, and unconventional warfare or special operations
teams.
2) Some of the component elements of the NRTIS concept may be vulnerable
to enemy electronic warfare systems which will attempt to intercept, deceive,
and/or jam their transmissions. Electromagnetic pulses (EMP) from high
altitude nuclear detonations do present a threat to the concept's components.
E.VIP can burn out unprotected solid state circuits and can scramble memory
logic in computer systems, thus inducing system failure. The communication
systems which the NRTIS concept interfaces with at command centers are
vulnerable to radio frequency weapons and if destroyed, they would negate
the concept's abiUty to disseminate information beyond the command and
control center.
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3) The employment of persistent and nonpersistent chemical, biological, and
toxic agents by threat forces remains a constant hazard. Post attack residual
contamination and decontamination activities may require operators to as-
sume higher levels of protective posture which might result in a slight re-
duction in system performance.
4. OPER.ATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
a. To enhance the concept's overall survivabihty, the system has been conceived
to consist of independent (stand alone) nodes. There is no critical node in the
architecture. Therefore the loss of any one node has an insignificant elfect on
the entire system. The system will be capable of supporting worldwide oper-
ations in high, mid, and low intensity environments.
b. The NRTIS concept will:
1) Automatically provide near real time identification, location, and situational
information (mission, combat posture, and operational readiness status) to
a C2 node for command and control.
2) Improve the management of battlefield information for command and con-
trol functions by automatically collecting, correlating, filtering, processing,
storing, and displaying identification, location, and situational informxation
on all unit's operating in proximity of a selected corrLmand post.
3) Provide the commanders and staffs the ability to plan future operations, an-
alyze alternative courses of action and assess the ramifications of a tactical
decision.
4) Utilize ATCCS common hardware and software to obtain:
a) database functions (storage, retrieval, input/output of information) to
support a commander and stafT;
b) the capability to perform information input/output functions and to ma-
nipulate the system's capabiULies;
c) a nonvolatile memory that will not purge itself if there is a sudden power
loss;
d) the capabihty of loading new software and purging classified information
in the field;
e) a full color, large screen display capable of depicting all of the information
found in the system's database;
f) an interface with a large printer plotter to produce large paper and acetate
overlays of various map scales (Vom data stored in the database or dis-
played on the large screen display;
g) a capability to store, display, and manipulate decision graphics and
standard military svmbologv as specified in the current edition of FM
101-5-1, OPERATIONAL TERMS and SYMBOLS;
h) a capability to handle information with a classification rancins from
UNCLASSIFIED to SECRET;
i) an interface with the ATCCS communications networks;
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j) a capability to link different databases at different locations to provide for
a direct exchange of information without operator interface.
5) Interoperate with other automated systems in the joint and combined envi-
ronments in compliance with the U.S. Message Text Format (MTF) Program
and implement ATCCS MTF and battlefield functional area (BFA) unique
requirements.
6) Exchange standard data elements in standard formats with other control
systems found in other battlefield functional areas (BFAs) and in the joint
and combined arenas.
7) Be air, water, and ground transportable.
8) Provide full military specification (VIILSPEC) components capable of trans-
mitting and receiving digital message traffic while mounted/ moving in a
manpack configuration or on armored and wheeled vehicles or aircraft com-
monly found in an Army of Excellence Division.
9) Provide nondevelopmental items (NDI) for use in semi-static or stationary
C2 centers. NDI components will be ruggedized to permit transporting as
cargo in wheeled and armored vehicles. If possible, the components should
be mounted in the vehicles to allov/ for immediate initialization and opera-
tion once the vehicles have completed the move. The components should
be capable of operating from a remote location approximately 100 meters
from the vehicles/power source.
10) Provide MILSPEC devices capable of operation, transportation, and storage
in climate design types hot, basic, and cold as defined in AR 70-38 and the
requirements of MIL-STD 810 (dust/desert). NDI equipment will operate
in sheltered facilities in temperatures ranging from to 100 degrees
Fahrenheit and in humidities ranging from 10% to 95% (noncondensing
without environmental conditioning).
11) Provide MILSPEC and NDI equipment capable of operating in a NBC
contaminated environm-mt. MILSPEC items will be considered to be
mission essential and should therefore be EMP hardened.
12) Provide MILSPEC and NDI equipment which will not be affected by NBjC
decontamination operations.
13) Be capable of being operated by soldiers dressed in full NBC environmental
protective clothing and equipment (mission oriented protective posture level
four, MOPP 4).
14) Provide for continuity of operations in accordance with AC2MP.
15) Not create a unique electromagnetic signature.
16) Facilitate standard equipment camouflage
5. OPER/\TIONAL PLAN
a. The Near Real Information Time System (NRTIS) is a command and control
system which, in conjunction with Army Tactical Command and Control Sys-
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terns (ATCCS), will provide, store, and display near real time information on
friendly combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) forces
for commanders and staffs at various echelons of command (section to corps)
under the Army of Excellence organization. This system, in conjunction with
other ATCCS systems, will serve as a primary tool for gathering, correlating,
filtering, processing, extracting, and displaying inform.ation on friendly forces.
It will provide automated assistance in the development and coordination of
plans and in monitoring the execution of current operations. This system will
enable the staff to respond to a commander's critical information requirements
in near real time. The NRTIS system, through ATCCS elements, will fuse in-
formation on friendly forces with other pieces of information to generate a near
real time representation of the AirLand battlefield. This representation will en-
able a commander or staff to better visualize the true disposition of friendly
forces against the perceived threat and to better synchronize the actions of
friendly forces to seize the initiative and defeat the threat.
b. The system is a hybrid system which employs both .MILSPEC and ruggedized
commercial NDI equipment to fulfill the information collection, processing,
storing, displaying, and disseminating requirements of tactical organizations.
The system will consist of two sets of equipment:
1) the maneuver element set, for use by select combat, CS, and CSS elements
on whom information is desired;
2) a command and control (C2) node set, for use by select command posts
which must monitor the operations of maneuver elements. This set will also
possess all of the capabiUties incorporated into the maneuver element.
c. The maneuver element is the information generator in the system. It will em-
ploy the unique characteristics of VLF;IFF technologies to automatically and
periodically transmit its identification, location, mission, combat posture, and
operational status to any C2 node. The functions of a maneuver element's set
will normally be transparent to its operators and will not inhibit its/his abihty
to perform its/his primary combat/xactical mission. At initialization of oper-
ations, the operator will load the maneuver element's identification, inission,
combat posture, and operational readiness status into the system. The system
will automatically function using this information until such time as the opera-
tor (through an interface device) or another system on the maneuver element
changes one of the information elements. The svstcm will automaticallv sencr-
ate and provide the data required by the C2 node to determine the maneuver
element's location.
d. The C2 node is the collector, displayer and disseminator of information. The
functions performed by this set will also be transparent to its operators and it
will:
1) automatically provide information about itself to other C2 nodes, as if it were
a maneuver element;
2) automatically collect transmissions emitted by any maneuver element oper-
ating in pro.ximity to it;
3) automatically store processed maneuver element transmissions into infor-
mation which determines the maneuver element's identification, location,
mission, combat posture, and operational readiness status;
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4) employ ATCCS common hardware and software to:
a) automatically update a database system and an operational display device
with the processed information;
b) provide operator Interface devices for manipulation of the system's hard-
ware and software;
c) support stair planning and operating functions.
5) interface with the communication networks of the ATCCS to
disseminate/receive information to/from higher and lower echelons of com-
mand.
6) pass information received over communication networks to the database and
display modules.
7) A C2 node will consist of the following modules: an antenna module, a
transceiver module, an operator interface module, a database module, a large
screen operations display module, and a communications interface module.
The number of operator interface modules and large screen display modules
available at a command post (or as part of a command post's C2 node) may
differ based on echelon of command and staff requirements.
6. ORGANIZATIONAL PLAN
a. General
b. The NRTIS will be employed within all BFAs in both heavw and light corps;
armored, infantry, light infantry, mechanized, motorized, airmobile, and air-
borne divisions; separate heaw, light, and tlieater defense brigades; and armored
cavalrv reaimcnts. The svstem will ausment the manual C2 svstem. replacina
some functions such as: the collection of periodic situation reports, updating
of friendly information on operations maps, maintenance of status charts, and
the preparation of overlays and periodic reports. The system will be operated
by personnel assigned to organizational elements performing C2 ftmctions and
operating maneuver elements. The distribution of hardware is based on the
following force structure and units:
'JT
1) Active Force Structure. (Includes associated RC round-out units.)
• Corps: I, III, V, VII, XVIII





• Motorized Divisions: 9ID
• Infantr>' Divisions: 2 ID
• Airborne Divisions: 82ABN
• Air Assault Divisions: lOlABN(AA)
• Licht Divisions: 6ID, 7ID, lOID,
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• Heav>' Separate Brigades:
• Armored Cavalry Regiments:
• Theater Defense Brigades;




• Separate Infantrv' Brigades:
• Armored Cavarly Regiments:
• Separate Heavy Brigades:






















1) The full MILSPEC devices will be fielded and provide hardened survivablc
C2 capability to all command posts that must perform mobile and critical
command and control functions at anv echelon of command. This will in-
elude but not be limited to: corps, division, regimental, brigade, and battal-
ion main and forward main command posts.
2) The NDI devices will be fielded to fulfill automation requirements at lo-
cations not requiring full MILSPEC devices. The selection of locations to
receive NDI equipment will be based on enemy threat, environment, and
mission criticaUty.
3) TR-ADOC schools and centers will identify those combat, combat support,
and combat service support elements which will be designated as maneuver
elements using mission, dispersion, rate of movement, availabihty, criticality.
and mode of employment as decision criteria. These criteria arc defined m
Annex A, to be pubhshed (TBP).
4) TR.'\DOC schools and centers will identify those headquarters elements
within combat, combat support, combat service support elements which will
be designated as C2 nodes using mission, dispersion, rate of movement,
availabihty, criticality, and mode of employment as decision criteria. These
criteria are defined in Annex B (TBP).
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5) TRADOC schools and centers will identify the number of operator interface
modules and large screen display modules to be authorzed per C2 node




1) Transportable by air, water, and ground means.
2) System will not overburden the transportation assets available to the organ-
ization in which it is deployed. Ideally the system will become an integrated
component of any vehicle/command center that is authorized to employ it.
3) Air transportability includes being capable of roll on, roll off transport on a
variety of cargo aircrait (L'SAF C-130, C-141, C-5A, and C-17) and being
transportable by helicopters.
4) The design of the equipment should not impede the speed with which a unit
or section can emplace or displace in tactical situations.
5) Regardless of the command posts location, the system will be capable of
providing the commander or staff the required critical information.
b. Power
1) The system will be powered by military tactical generators, 28 Volt DC ve-
hicular and aircraft power supplies, and by commercial power
(110-115/220-230 Volt AC, 50/60/400 Hz) dependent'upon configuration.
2) The system must maintain memory for at least five minutes during power
loss or fluctuations to allow archiving of data.
c. Manprint
1) Manpower and Personnel
a) System will be operated by TO&E personnel currently performing manual
command and control functions therefore no additional personnel will be
required to operate the system.
b) The system will, for the most part, consist of ATCCS common hardware
or other components which are currently and/or will be in the Army in-
ventory. Those MOS's identified to repair this common equipment will
support this system's maintenance programs. Personnel requirements to
support the maintenance of non-standard equipment is yet to be deter-
mined but its impact is perceived to be minimal.
2) New Equipment Training (NET)
a) Initial training of operators will be conducted in units by New Equipment
Training Teams (NETT) IAW AR 350-35. Army Materiel Command
(AMC) will provide the NETTs.
b) Displaced Equipment Training (DET): This system will not displace any
system currently in use therefore there is no need to provide for DET. If
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this system is fielded to USAR units then additional NETT will be re-
quired as specified above.
c) Institutional Training: Training on the use and employment of NRTIS
concept will be integrated into the programs of instruction at selected
TRADOC schools and centers.
d) "Non- Institutional Training: Operational (field) sustainment training will
be provided by embedding tutorials in the system's software. Tutorials
will be designed with critical task training problem situations and exercise
which approximate those expected to be encountered in actual tactical
operations.
e) Training Devices, Simulators, and Simulation: None required.
f) Test Training Support Packages (TTSP): TBD.
g) System Safety/Health Hazard Assessment: Operation of this system will
present no unusual safety or health hazard.
3) Losistics
a) The system will be issued with a complete logistics package, to include
repair parts, technical manuals, Class II requirements, and special tools
required to support operator/ organizational and intermediate direct sup-
port maintenance programs.
b) Maintenance Concept
i. Operator/Organizational: Operators will perform maintenance lAW
Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services (PMCS) as directed by
the appropriate operator manual. Using built-in test equipment
(BITE) and diagnostic software, operators will perform organizational
maintenance troubleshooting. BITE will perform fault detection and
isolation programs will identify the malfunctioning component and
direct the appropriate corrective action (i.e.: "replace circut card
A23"y The operator will evacuate malfunctioning components
through their organic maintenance section which will evacuate the
components to the intermediate direct support level. The operator
should require a minimal number of tools to extract and replace sys-
tem components.
ii. Intermediate Direct Support Maintenance: TBD.
iii. Intermediate General Support Maintenance: TBD.
iv. Depot Level Maintenance: TBD.
d. Environmental
1) MILSPEC equipment must be capable of surviving NBC contamination and
the effects of high altitude electromagnetic pulse (IIAEMP). NDI equipment
must be capable of operating in similarly contaminated environment.
2) MILSPEC must meet the environmental requirements ofAR 70-38 (cUmatic
design types hot, basic, and cold). NDI equipment must operate in temper-
atures ranging from to 100 degrees fahrenheit.
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e. Communications: This system will be capable of passing information that has
been processed via the ATCCS link over the full range of tactical and commer-
cial communication systems including local area network (LAN) technology.
The system must provide for efficient transmission of data to support distributed
information requirements.
S. STANDARDIZATION AND INTEROPERABILITY
This system will be able to interoperate with all other systems in the ATCCS
and with automated C2 systems of other joint and combmed mihtar>' forces.
9. FUNDING IMPLICATIONS
a. RDTE Costs: To be determined (TBD).
b. Procurement Costs: TBD.
c. Unit Cost: TBD.
d. Life Cycle Costs: TBD.
10. ANNEXES
a. Annex A - Operational Mode Summary/Mission Profile (OMS/MP): TBP.
b. Annex B - Rationale: TBP. -
c. Annex C - Coordination: TBP.
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APPENDIX B. ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND TERMS
AC Alternating Current
AC2MP Army Command and Control Master Plan
AD Air Defense
ADA Air Defense Artillery
ADEA Army Development and Employment Agency
ALB AirLand Battle
ALB-F AirLand Battle Future
AMC Army Materiel Command
AGE Army of Excellence
AR Army Regulation
ARINC Airlines Radio Incorporated
ASAS All Source Analysis Section
ATC Air Traffic Control
ATCCS Army Tactical Command and Control System
ATCRBS Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System
AVR.A.DA Avionics Research and Development Activity
BFA(s) Battlefield Functional Area(s)
BITE Built In Test Equipment
C2 Command and Control
CARS Combat Arms Regimental System
CCS2 Command, Control, and Subordinate System
CEOI Communications and Electronic Operating Instructions
CEP Circular Error Probability
CIM Communications Interface Module
cm centimeter(s)
COL Colonel
COM INT Communications Intelligence
CP Command Post











































Forward Area Alerting Radar
Front Line of Own Troops
Field Manual
Frequency ^Modulation
Full Scale Engineering and Development
Frequency-Shift Keying




International Civil Aviation Organization
Identification Friend or Foe
Initial Operational Capability
Inter-Vehicle Information Systems







Limited Operator Interface Module
Line of Position
Large Screen Operational Display
Mission Area Analysis







































Mission Oriented Protective Posture
Mobile Subscriber Equipment


















Planning Programming and Budgeting System
Peoples Republic of China
Radar Beacon System
Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation
root-mean-square
Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics
second(s)





Target Alerting Data Display
Time of Arrival
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United States of America
United States Air Force
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Universal Transverse Mercator
Very Low Frequency
VLF COMM Very Low Frequency Communication
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